Giles v. Davis

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedDecember 9, 2019
Docket4:18-cv-07466
StatusUnknown

This text of Giles v. Davis (Giles v. Davis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Giles v. Davis, (N.D. Cal. 2019).

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 OSSIE GILES, 4 Case No. 18-cv-07466-YGR (PR) Plaintiff, 5 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S v. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A 6 SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT; G. FORNCROOK, et al., DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANTS’ 7 PENDING MOTIONS; AND SETTING Defendants. BRIEFING SCHEDULE 8

9 I. INTRODUCTION 10 Plaintiff, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison (“SQSP”) filed 11 this instant pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He seeks monetary damages. 12 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s supplemental complaint, dkt. 11, which the Court construes 13 as a motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint. Also before the Court are Defendants’ 14 motion requesting screening of Plaintiff’s supplemental complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 15 waiving their reply. Dkt. 13. Finally, Defendants also filed an administrative motion asking the 16 Court to clarify whether the supplemental complaint is the operative complaint in the instant 17 action and, if so, refraining from filing a dispositive motion until the Court screens the 18 supplemental complaint. Dkt. 14 19 For the reasons outlined below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a 20 supplemental complaint. Because the original complaint it still the operative complaint in this 21 matter, the Court DENIES as moot Defendants’ motion to screen Plaintiff’s supplemental 22 complaint as well as their aforementioned administrative motion. 23 II. DISCUSSION 24 A. Background 25 On December 12, 2018, Plaintiff filed his original complaint. Dkt. 1. He named the 26 following Defendants at SQSP: Warden Ron Davis; Associate Warden R. Bloomfield; Captain J. 27 Arnold; Lieutenants B. VanMastrigt, R. Shelton and M. Nelson; Sergeants J. Sangmaster and 1 Forncrook; Correctional Officers F. Jaugan, and J. Cartwright; Office of Appeals Chief M. Voong; 2 and Psychologist R. Pearl. Id. at 2. 3 On July 15, 2019, the Court issued its Order of Partial Dismissal and Service upon 4 screening Plaintiff’s original complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Dkt. 6. In its July 15, 2019 5 Order, the Court concluded that, liberally construed, the original complaint stated cognizable First 6 Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims based on actions stemming from November 2017 to 7 December 2017 against Defendants Cartwright and Jaugan for authoring a false Rules Violation 8 Report (“RVR”) and supplemental reports, respectively, and for causing Plaintiff’s removal from 9 his housing and placement into administrative segregation (ad-seg) from November 16, 2017 to 10 December 28, 2017. Id. at 3. The Court further found that the complaint stated a cognizable claim 11 against Defendants VanMastrigt, Forncrook, Maxfield, Pearl, Sangmaster, Arnold, Shelton, and 12 Samara for due process violations insofar as he was removed from his housing and placed into ad- 13 seg without evidentiary support, and for a First Amendment violation insofar as they were 14 involved in failing to rectify or correct the false RVR. Id. at 3-4. The Court also found that 15 Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Broomfield, Nelson, and Voong stated a cognizable First 16 Amendment claim for denial of access to established grievance procedures. Id. at 4. The Court 17 dismissed Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Madding upon concluding it was without merit. Id. 18 It also dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Davis (the SQSP warden) 19 upon concluding that Plaintiff alleged no facts to establish supervisorial liability on Defendant 20 Davis’s part. Id. at 5. The Court directed Defendants to file a motion for summary judgment or 21 other dispositive motion by September 13, 2019. Id. at 6. 22 On August 18, 2019, Plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint, which as explained above, 23 the Court construes as a motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint under Federal Rule of 24 Civil Procedure 15(d). Dkt. 11. The supplemental complaint includes unrelated claims of 25 harassment and retaliation against the following five new Defendants: Correctional Officer V. 26 Michael; Correctional Lieutenants R. M. Ballein and M. Bloise; SQSP Office of Appeals, Appeals 27 Examiner J. Knight; and Office of Appeals Chief T. Ramos. Id. at 2. Plaintiff’s new allegations 1 On September 12, 2019, Defendants filed an Answer. Dkt. 12. 2 As mentioned, on September 17, 2019, Defendants filed a motion requesting the Court 3 screen Plaintiff’s supplemental complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and waiving their reply. Dkt. 4 13. On September 19, 2019, Defendants filed an administrative motion asking the Court to clarify 5 whether the supplemental complaint is the operative complaint in the instant action and, if so, 6 refraining from filing a dispositive motion until the Court screens the supplemental complaint. 7 Dkt. 14. 8 B. Plaintiff’s Request for Leave to File an Supplemental Complaint 9 Plaintiff requests leave to file a supplemental complaint to add unrelated claims against 10 five new Defendants. Dkt. 11. Plaintiff seeks to add new claims that were not in the original 11 complaint. See id. In fact, Plaintiff acknowledges that the allegations asserted in the supplemental 12 complaint can be categorized as post-complaint, as they involve events occurring after the events 13 complained of in the original complaint. Id. at 3. These allegations are unrelated to the gravamen 14 of Plaintiff’s original complaint, which mainly concerns events surrounding the original 15 Defendants’ conduct in removing Plaintiff from his housing and placing him in ad seg pending the 16 outcome of an allegedly falsely authored RVR that Plaintiff received in November 2017. Dkt. 1 at 17 6, 15-18. 18 Furthermore, the Court points out that this action was first filed almost a year ago, on 19 December 12, 2018. Dkt. 1. Moreover, Plaintiff’s original complaint pertains to a specific set of 20 events which took place in in 2017, and it involves a limited number of Defendants, all of whom 21 have been served. Despite the Court’s July 15, 2019 Order of Partial Dismissal and Service, 22 Plaintiff now presents the Court with another lengthy document with additional unrelated claims 23 from 2019, as explained below. See Dkt. 11 24 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, Plaintiff may amend as of right at any time 25 prior to the filing of a responsive pleading and thereafter only with leave of court. Leave must be 26 freely granted “when justice so requires.” Janicki Logging Co. v. Mateer, 42 F.3d 561, 566 (9th 27 Cir. 1994); cf. id. (attempt to amend complaint requiring amendment of scheduling order under 1 grounds to deny amendment, leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint 2 would cause the opposing party undue prejudice, is sought in bad faith, constitutes an exercise in 3 futility, or creates undue delay. Id.; see also Roberts v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 661 F.2d 796, 798 4 (9th Cir. 1981) (district court’s finding of prejudice to defendants sufficient to deny amendment, 5 because motion to amend came at eleventh hour, when summary judgment pending and discovery 6 period had closed, affirmed as proper exercise of district court’s discretion).

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