Gile v. Reiner

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: July 7, 2006
• Docket: YORcv-06-031
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION YORK, ss. DOCKET NO: CV-067031

NORMAN C. GILE and. ANNE B. GILE, Plaintiffs ORDER

GARY H. REINER and REINER & BOUFFARD, A MAINE PARTNERSHIP,

Defendants

This case comes before the Court on Defendants Gary H. Reiner and Reiner and

Bouffard's motion for summary judgment on all counts of Plaintiffs Norman and Anne

Gile's complaint for the failure to commence the cause of action within the statutorily

mandated period.1 Aft~erhearing, the motion is Granted.

FACTS

On or about February 12, 1999, Norman and Anne Gile (the "Giles") contacted

Gary Reiner and the partnership of Reiner & Bouffard (the "partnership"), of Kittery,

Maine, for legal advice. The Giles sought to pursue legal action against Kenneth Albert

d / b / a Albert Construction ("Albert") for breach of contract and unfair trade practices.

On May 19,1999, the Giles sent a letter to the partnership asking for its assistance

in obtaining invoices firom Albert. On June 7, 1999, the Giles asked the partnership to determine if there were any irregularities in the invoices and to advise the Giles about

I The motion originally came before the Court on a motion to dismiss. However, both parties agreed to transform the motion into one for summary judgment because matters outside of the pleadings were presented to the Court. See M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). what action should be pursued. After some delay, the partnership met with Albert on

November 12, 1999, to discuss the requested invoices. The Giles were not present at the

meeting.

The Giles did not hear from the partnership about the events of the November

12, 1999, meeting for ,approximately eleven days. On November 23, 1999, the Giles

faxed the partnership a request for information concerning their case. The partnershp

responded the same day by letter explaining that Albert had provided the requested

invoices and sufficiently explained the project's history. The partnershp further

conveyed that, in its opinion, the project was not overcharged, that there was "no

justifiable claim against Mr. Albert", and that it was closing the Gile case file. On

November 26,1999, the Giles received the letter and the enclosed invoices.

On January 24,. 2000, the Giles sent a letter specifically acknowledging the termination of representation by the partnership, retroactive to November 23, 1999.

Notwithstanding this recognition, the Giles requested a "brief substantive report of

[the] meeting with Allbert on November 12, 1999." By mail, on January 26, 2000, the

partnership sent a letter reiterating that all requested invoices had been sent on

November 23, 1999, that in its opinion, no claim was worth pursuing and that it had

already closed the file on the matter. The Giles received this notice on January 28,2000.

On January 27, 2006, the Giles filed a complaint alleging breach of contract for legal representation, professional malpractice, and negligence in said representation.

DISCUSSION

The only issue in dispute is the date on which the cause of action accrued, thus

commencing the statute of limitations time period. The partnership argues that, at the

latest, the Giles' action accrued on November 23, 1999, when they were explicitly

notified that the partnership would take no further legal action on their behalf. In response, the Giles contend that the January 28, 2000 notice marks the date of accrual

because it was on that date that the partnership unequivocally manifested its intention

not to cooperate with the Giles' request.

Under Maine la~w,an action is commenced by filing a complaint with the Court

or by serving notice on the defendant. M.R. Civ.P. 3. Maine law mandates that a cause

of action, pertaining to legal representation, be brought within six years of the date of

accrual. 14 M.R.S.A $j§752, 753-B. Accrual is defined as the moment a "judicially

cognizable injury is sustained." Dugal v. Martel, 588 A.2d 744, 746 (Me. 1991). Under

tort law, accrual occurs when the tortfeasor's "wrongful act produces an injury for

which a plaintiff is entitled to seek judicial vindication." Id. For a breach of contract, a

cause of action accrues when the aggrieved party learns that the binding obligation has

been breached. Jackson v. Borkowski, 627 A.2d 1010,1014 (Me. 1993).

In reviewing a :motion for summary judgment, the Court considers the evidence

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party to ascertain whether the record

indicates a dispute concerning a genuine issue of material fact. Parish v. Wright, 2003

ME 90,

summary judgment is permissible. Tisei v. Town of Ogunquit, 491 A.2d 564, 568 (Me.

1985). Generally, a determination on a statute of limitations issue is made either on a

motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Townsend v. Chute Chem. Co., 1997 ME 46,

material fact as to the (late of injury will preclude such rulings. Id.

In the present clase,the only issue to be resolved is when the Giles were aware of

a judicially cognizable injury. The Court finds that the cause of action against the partnership accrued on November 23, 1999, when the partnership terminated its legal

relationship with the Giles. On November 23, 1999, the partnership informed the Giles that no legal action ~rouldbe pursued in the requested matter. Moreover, in a later

letter, the Giles ackno~~ledged that the representation contract was in fact terminated as

of November 23, 1999. Accordingly, because the Giles accepted that, as of November

23, 1999, the partners:hip would take no further action on their behalf, it was at that

moment when they became aware of their right to seek "judicial vindication" with

respect to their claims. See Dugal, 588 A.2d 744.

While the Giles argue that they did not have sufficient information to support a

cause of action until they received Alberfs accounting from the partnership two months

later, they were aware on November 23, 1999, that the partnership did not intend to act

on their behalf in the case as a whole. As such, that is the date the Giles were allegedly

injured by the partnership. Consequently, the commencement of this case on January

27, 2006, is more than six years after the date of accrual, and is thus barred by the

partnership's statute of limitations defense.

The entry is:

Defendant Gary Reiner and the Partnership of Reiner & Bouffard's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Plaintiffs failed to commence their cause of action within,the statutorily mandated period.

DATE:

[fustice, Superior Court

Norman C. Gile - Pro se - PL Anne B. Gile - Pro se: - PL Harrison L. Richardson, Esq. - DEFS