Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.

669 N.W.2d 265, 469 Mich. 883, 2003 Mich. LEXIS 2039
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 17, 2003
Docket122457, COA No. 227392
StatusPublished
Cited by37 cases

This text of 669 N.W.2d 265 (Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 669 N.W.2d 265, 469 Mich. 883, 2003 Mich. LEXIS 2039 (Mich. 2003).

Opinion

669 N.W.2d 265 (2003)

Linda M. GILBERT, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 122457, COA No. 227392.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

September 17, 2003.

On order of the Court, the motion for recusal and for an evidentiary hearing is considered, and it is DENIED.

KELLY, J., not participating in the decision regarding this motion.

WEAVER, J., not participating in the decision regarding the motion to recuse Chief Justice CORRIGAN and Justices TAYLOR, YOUNG and MARKMAN, denies the motion to recuse herself and states:

On April 8, 2003, this Court entered an order granting defendant's application for leave to appeal.[1] Subsequently, plaintiff filed a motion for recusal by Chief Justice Corrigan and Justices Weaver, Taylor, Young, and Markman from hearing this appeal. Plaintiff also asks that there be an evidentiary hearing on the motion for recusals.

A challenged judge decides the motion asking for his disqualification. MCR 2.003(C)(1)(3). Therefore, even though the plaintiff's motion also asks for recusal by Chief Justice Corrigan and Justices Taylor, Young and Markman, the only issue before me is whether I should recuse myself from participating in this appeal.[2] I do not decide whether my colleagues should recuse themselves or not.

As explained below, given the nature of the allegations plaintiff makes supporting the request for my recusal, there is no need for an evidentiary hearing for me to decide whether to participate in this matter. I deny plaintiff's motion requesting that I recuse myself from this appeal.

I

In requesting my recusal from this appeal, plaintiff asserts only that the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which filed a brief as amicus in this case, contributed to my campaign for reelection to the Michigan Supreme Court in 2002 and aired advertisements advocating my reelection.[3]

While plaintiff alleges that Chief Justice Corrigan and Justices Taylor, Young and Markman have made statements about plaintiff's attorney, Geoffrey Fieger, and the issues in this case demonstrating bias or prejudice in this appeal, plaintiff does not allege that I have made any such statements. For the record, I note that I have not made or caused to be published any statements about any of the parties, *266 their attorneys, the amicus, or the issues in this case that would raise the issue of bias or prejudice on my part.

In 2002, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce made a contribution of $15,055 directly to my reelection campaign.[4] The Chamber also spent $840,000 on advertisements supporting the reelection of Justice Young and myself that it created and aired without my knowledge or participation.[5] In the interest of complete disclosure, I also note that my reelection campaign records show that it received contributions of $200 from plaintiff's attorney, Geoffrey Fieger; $2,000 from DaimlerChrysler's political action committee (PAC); $250 from DaimlerChrysler's assistant general counsel, Steven Hantler; $375 each from DaimlerChrysler's attorneys Elizabeth Hardy and Thomas Kienbaum; and $500 from retired Justice Patricia Boyle, of counsel for DaimlerChrysler in this case.

Plaintiff essentially asserts that the Chamber's contributions to my reelection campaign and the advertisements that the Chamber produced and aired advocating my reelection are inherent cause for my recusal from the case. I disagree. Under the current system for selection of Michigan Supreme Court justices, the rules clearly allow both the contributions that were made to my campaign and the advertisements that the Chamber created and aired supporting my reelection.

The question, given the current election system, is not whether amicus made contributions to my reelection campaign or created and aired advertisements supporting my reelection, but whether those contributions and that support would influence my judgment in this appeal. A judge is disqualified from participating in a case when the judge cannot impartially hear the case, including when the judge is personally biased or prejudiced for or against a party or attorney. MCR 2.003(B). The contribution to my 2002 reelection campaign made by amicus, Michigan Chamber of Commerce, and the advertisements that the Chamber produced and aired have not caused me to be influenced for or against either party. None of the contributions to my reelection campaign nor any of the advertisements aired supporting my reelection have even the remotest effect on my decisions and judgment as a justice of this Court.

I have given careful consideration to plaintiff's request that I recuse myself from participating in this case. Because I am neither biased nor prejudiced for or against anyone in the case I deny plaintiff's motion requesting that I recuse myself from participation in this appeal. It would be a disservice to the public that elected me if I failed to participate in a case in which I am eligible to serve when I have no bias or prejudice that would prevent me from doing so.

II

Plaintiff also asks that there be an evidentiary hearing on the motion for recusal. I would not be opposed to holding an evidentiary hearing on plaintiff's motion, were there allegations against me that required fact-finding. But there are none. Given the nature of the allegations supporting plaintiff's request for my recusal, *267 such a hearing is not necessary for me to decide whether I should participate in this case. Plaintiff's allegations that amicus, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, contributed to my campaign for reelection and aired advertisements supporting my reelection are well-established on the public record and are not in dispute. Thus, an evidentiary hearing would not provide any additional information to assist me in deciding whether to participate in the case.

III

Plaintiff's motion for recusal presents an opportunity to address Michigan's current system of selecting justices, which combines statewide elections and appointments by the Governor to fill vacancies. A full term of office is eight years, and a justice may run for reelection. When a justice leaves office before his or her term expires, the Governor appoints a new justice to fill the vacancy. The Governor's power of appointment to fill vacancies is absolute and unchecked. The newly appointed justice must then run in the next election for the remainder of the predecessor's term. Because the terms of justices are staggered, and because justices appointed to fill vacancies must run for the remainder of the term, there is a statewide election for Supreme Court every two years.

Increasingly large sums of money have been raised for and spent by the candidates' campaigns and/or independent political action committees. During the years from 1994 to 2000, the amounts contributed to the candidates nominated by the two major parties and the independent expenditures by the political parties and political action committees have risen sharply. The total amount spent on Supreme Court elections has gone from $1,339,842 in 1994 to at least $16 million estimated in 2000—a 12-fold increase in just 6 years.[6]

Michigan's method of selecting Supreme Court justices has rightly come under intense scrutiny since the 2000 election—the most expensive and rancorous for the judiciary in state history. In my opinion, the escalating cost and rhetoric of Michigan Supreme Court justice campaigns have not served to better inform the electorate regarding the qualifications of the candidates.

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Bluebook (online)
669 N.W.2d 265, 469 Mich. 883, 2003 Mich. LEXIS 2039, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gilbert-v-daimlerchrysler-corp-mich-2003.