Gilbert v. Bonfare Markets, Inc.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: February 7, 2023
• Docket: 1:22-cv-00605
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DARREN GILBERT, Case No. 1:22-cv-00605-AWI-BAM 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 v. DECLINING SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION AND DISMISSING 14 BONFARE MARKETS, INC. dba STATE LAW CLAIMS WITHOUT BONFARE MARKET #43, et al., PREJUDICE 15 Defendants. 16

17 18 Plaintiff Darren Gilbert (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action on May 20, 2022. (Doc. 1.) The 19 complaint asserts a claim for injunctive relief arising out of an alleged violation of the federal 20 Americans with Disabilities Act, a claim for damages pursuant to California’s Unruh Act, and a 21 claim for injunctive relief under state law. (Id.) No defendant has appeared in this action, 22 default has been entered against all defendants, and Plaintiff has filed a notice of voluntary 23 dismissal of Defendant Bonfare Markets, Inc. dba Bonfare Market #43. (See Docs. 8, 10, 17, 19, 24 25.) Plaintiff has filed a motion for default judgment against remaining Defendants Sameer 25 Abdulwahid Nagi, Sanaa A. Obaid, and Stop ‘ N ’ Save, Inc. (“Defendants”) (Doc. 21.) The 26 Court will not address Plaintiff’s pending Motion for Default Judgment until after resolution of 27 these Findings and Recommendations. 28 1 On December 27, 2022, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the Court should 2 not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim for the reasons 3 stated in Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167 (9th Cir. 2022) and Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202 (9th Cir. 4 2021). (Doc. 27.) Plaintiff filed a response on January 13, 2023. (Doc. 28.) For the reasons 5 discussed below, the Court recommends declining supplemental jurisdiction and dismissing 6 Plaintiff’s state law claims without prejudice. 7 I. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION 8 In an action over which a district court possesses original jurisdiction, that court “shall 9 have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action 10 within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article 11 III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Even if supplemental jurisdiction 12 exists, district courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction: 13 The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a 14 claim under subsection (a) if— 15 (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, 16 (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which 17 the district court has original jurisdiction,

18 (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or 19

20 (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 21 22 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The Supreme Court has described 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) as a “codification” 23 of the principles of “economy, convenience, fairness, and comity” that underlie the Supreme 24 Court’s earlier jurisprudence concerning pendent jurisdiction. City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of 25 Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172-73 (1997) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 26 357 (1988)); see also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Gibbs”). In 27 Gibbs, the Supreme Court noted that it “has consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction 28 is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. The justification for 1 pendent jurisdiction “lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to 2 litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state 3 claims, even though bound to apply state law to them.” Id. The Court emphasized that 4 “[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote 5 justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.” Id. 6 District courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental state law claims 7 “[d]epending on a host of factors” including “the circumstances of the particular case, the nature 8 of the state law claims, the character of the governing state law, and the relationship between the 9 state and federal claims.” City of Chicago, 522 U.S. at 173. The supplemental jurisdiction statute 10 “reflects the understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a 11 federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the 12 values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” Id. (quoting Cohill, 484 U.S. at 13 350). 14 The Ninth Circuit does not require an “explanation for a district court’s reasons [for 15 declining supplemental jurisdiction] when the district court acts under” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c)(1)- 16 (3), San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 478 (9th Cir. 1998), but does 17 require a district court to “articulate why the circumstances of the case are exceptional in addition 18 to inquiring whether the balance of the Gibbs values provide compelling reasons for declining 19 jurisdiction in such circumstances.” Executive Software N. Am. Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the 20 Cent. Dist. of Cal., 24 F.3d 1545, 1558 (9th Cir. 1994); Vo, 49 F.4th at 1169-1170 (“a district 21 court must: (1) sufficiently explain ‘why the circumstances of the case are exceptional’ under § 22 1367(c)(4); and (2) show that ‘the balance of the Gibbs values provides compelling reasons for 23 declining jurisdiction in such circumstances.’”). According to the Ninth Circuit, this “inquiry is 24 not particularly burdensome.” Executive Software N. Am. Inc, 24 F.3d at 1558; Vo, 49 F.4th at 25 1171. When declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4), “the 26 court must identify the predicate that triggers the applicability of the category (the exceptional 27 circumstances), and then determine whether, in its judgment, the underlying Gibbs values are best 28 served by declining jurisdiction in the particular case (the compelling reasons).” Executive 1 Software N. Am. Inc, 24 F.3d at 1558. 2 II. DISCUSSION 3 This Court concludes, as have numerous courts before it, the circumstances here are 4 exceptional. See e.g., Garcia v. Maciel, No. 21-CV-03743-JCS, 2022 WL 395316, at *2 (N.D. 5 Cal. Feb. 9, 2022) (collecting cases). The Ninth Circuit has held that a district court properly 6 declined supplemental jurisdiction in a joint Unruh Act and ADA case based upon the heightened 7 pleading requirements California imposes upon high-frequency litigants. Vo, 49 F.4th. The 8 “high-frequency litigants” subject to those heightened pleading requirements are defined as:

9 A plaintiff who has filed 10 or more complaints alleging a construction- related accessibility violation within the 12-month period immediately 10 preceding the filing of the current complaint alleging a construction-related 11 accessibility violation.

12 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55(b)(1). The definition of “high-frequency litigant” also extends to 13 attorneys. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55(b)(2). “High-frequency litigants” are subject to a 14 special filing fee and further heightened pleading requirements. See Cal. Gov. Code § 70616.5; 15 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.50(a)(4)(A). 16 Plaintiff admits that he has filed more than ten complaints alleging a construction-related 17 accessibility violation within the 12-month period immediately preceding the filing of the 18 complaint in this action and thus would be classified as a “high-frequency litigant” had he filed 19 this case in California state court. (Doc. 28 at 2, Response to Order to Show Cause; Doc. 28-1, 20 Declaration of Plaintiff Darren Gilbert in Response to Order to Show Cause.) Indeed, as noted in 21 the OSC, “Plaintiff Darren Gilbert appears to be a high-frequency filer, with over 200 cases filed 22 in this district within the last two years alone.” (Doc. 27.) Counsel for Plaintiff states in her 23 declaration that she is not a high-frequency litigant. (Doc. 28-2, OSC Response.) 24 Even if Plaintiff or counsel were not a high-frequency litigant, the Ninth Circuit has held 25 that district courts need not adjudicate this threshold matter. Forcing the district court to 26 determine if Plaintiff or counsel is a high-frequency litigant would itself run afoul of the Gibbs 27 values—especially comity. Accord Brooke v. Sarodia Suncity LLC, No. ED CV-22-1374 JGB 28 1 SPX, 2022 WL 17363913, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2022), citing Vo, 49 F.4th at 1173. As Gibbs 2 explains, “[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to 3 promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable 4 law” by the state courts. Vo, 49 F.4th at 1173–74, citing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. If the federal 5 district court is required to adjudicate these threshold matters, it will “deprive the state courts of 6 their critical role in effectuating the policies underlying those reforms.” Id., citing Arroyo, 19 7 F.4th at 1213. 8 If this Court were to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim, 9 the “distinctive configuration of California-law rules—which pair a damages remedy with special 10 procedural requirements aimed at limiting suits by high-frequency litigants—would be rendered 11 ineffectual.” See Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1211–12. “By enacting restrictions on the filing of 12 construction-related accessibility claims, California has expressed a desire to limit the financial 13 burdens California’s businesses may face for claims for statutory damages under the Unruh Act. 14 Plaintiffs who file these actions in federal court evade these limits and pursue state law damages 15 in a manner inconsistent with the state law’s requirements.” Id. at 1206-07, 1209; (Doc. 27, OSC 16 at 2.) It is not, under the Gibbs factors, “fair” to defendants that a plaintiff may pursue 17 construction-related accessibility claims in this Court while evading the limitations California 18 state law has imposed on such claims. In addition, to allow federal courts to become an “escape 19 hatch” for plaintiffs is also an affront to the comity between federal and state courts. Vo, 49 F.4th 20 (affirming the district court holding that allowing federal courts to be an ‘escape hatch’ for 21 plaintiffs seeking to avoid the heightened requirements would be an “affront to the comity 22 between federal and state courts.”) 23 Moreover, permitting high-frequency litigants to evade California’s limitations on 24 construction-related accessibility claims places tremendous strain on the federal courts. As noted, 25 Plaintiff Gilbert has filed over 200 cases in this district within the last two years alone. (Doc. 27, 26 OSC at 3.) This high-frequency filing suggests that it is precisely because the federal courts have 27 not adopted California’s limitations on such claims that federal courts have become the preferred 28 forum for such claims. See generally Garibay v. Rodriguez, 2019 WL 5204294, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 1 2019) (“Indeed, those reasons, if true at all, do not explain why nearly 9 times more construction- 2 related accessibility actions are being filed in the Central District in 2019 than were filed in 3 2013.”) Permitting federal courts “to become an escape hatch” that allows plaintiffs like Gilbert 4 to pursue such claims offends the comity between state and federal courts. Declining to exercise 5 supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims early in the litigation preserves federal judicial 6 resources for the consideration of federal claims, while still allowing plaintiffs to pursue their 7 state law claims in state court. See e.g., Brooke, 2022 WL 17363913, at *5 (“Continuing to 8 exercise supplemental jurisdiction in these extraordinary circumstances would unnecessarily force 9 this Court to expend resources to resolve state law claims for relatively modest statutory damages 10 and attorneys’ fees even after the federal claim is moot.”) 11 Plaintiff Gilbert argues that fairness, economy, and convenience disfavor declining 12 supplemental jurisdiction because litigating his claims in separate forums would duplicate work, 13 increase costs, and risk inconsistent results. (Doc. 28 at 3.) However, the Court finds that 14 fairness favors declining jurisdiction because Plaintiff can pursue identical remedies in state 15 court. Exercising the Court’s discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction does not deprive 16 Plaintiff of any remedies. Indeed, an ADA claim for injunctive relief remains pending in this 17 Court. 18 Accordingly, the Court concludes that California’s enactment of laws restricting 19 construction-related accessibility claims, combined with the burden the ever-increasing number of 20 such cases poses to the federal courts, presents “exceptional circumstances” and “compelling 21 reasons” that justify the Court’s discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 22 Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). See Schutza v. Cuddeback, 262 F. 23 Supp. 3d 1025, 1031 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (relying on Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-68 24 (1965), for the proposition that federal courts are permitted to decline supplemental jurisdiction to 25 discourage improper forum-shopping, such as ADA plaintiffs’ “use [of] federal court as an end- 26 around to California’s pleading requirements”). Moreover, the Court sees no prejudice in 27 requiring Plaintiff Gilbert’s state-law claims be heard in state court. See Garibay, 2019 WL 28 5204294, at *6 (“[D]eclin[ing] supplemental jurisdiction does not deprive plaintiff of any 1 remedies. Nor does it allow an ADA claim for injunctive relief to go unaddressed.”). 2 For all of the foregoing reasons, it is hereby recommended that the Court, in its discretion, 3 decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act and any other state law 4 construction-related accessibility claim and that any such claims be dismissed without prejudice, 5 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). 6 III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 7 Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS as follows: 8 1. The Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act 9 claim and any other state law construction-related accessibility claim; and 10 2. Plaintiff's Unruh Act and any other state law construction-related accessibility 11 claim be dismissed without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). 12 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 13 Judge assigned to the case, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) days after 14 being served with these findings and recommendations, the parties may file written objections 15 with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 16 and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that the failure to file objections within the 17 specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual 18 findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 19 Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21

22 Dated: February 7, 2023 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 23

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