Gilbert v. Alsamiri

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 DARREN GILBERT, Case No. 1:22-cv-00481-JLT-HBK 10 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 11 v. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT1 12 ABDO M. ALSAMIRI and TALAL A. OBJECTIONS DUE IN FOURTEEN DAYS OBAID, dba Obaid Smoke Shop Plus 13 (Doc. No. 9) Defendants. 14

15 16 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment filed pursuant to Fed. 17 R. Civ. P. 55(b) on December 19, 2022. (Doc. No. 9, “Motion”). Defendants have not answered 18 nor responded to the Complaint. Nor have Defendants filed any opposition or taken any actions 19 in this case. The Court found the Motion suitable for disposition without oral argument under 20 Civil Local Rule 230(g) and vacated the hearing scheduled for February 8, 2023. (Doc. No. 10). 21 For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the district court grant in part 22 Plaintiff’s Motion. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 On April 24, 2022, Plaintiff Darren Gilbert commenced this action by filing a complaint 25 against Defendants Abdo M. Alsamiri and Talal A. Obaid, doing business as Obaid Smoke Shop 26 Plus, (collectively referred to as “Defendants”) alleging violations of Title III of the Americans 27 1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 28 (E.D. Cal. 2022). 1 with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq; the California Unruh Act, 2 California Civil Code § 51 et seq.; and California Health & Safety Code §§ 19955, 19959. (Doc. 3 No. 1, “Complaint”). Plaintiff seeks an award of statutory damages, costs of suit, attorney’s fees, 4 litigation expenses, injunctive or preventative relief, and interest at the legal rate from the date of 5 filling of the Complaint. (Id. at 8). 6 The Complaint sets forth the following facts in support of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff is a 7 person with physical disabilities and is “substantially limited in his ability to walk,” requiring the 8 use of a wheelchair, knee scooter, or prosthetic. (Id at 2, ¶8). Defendants are the alleged owners, 9 operators, or lessors of T & S Smoke Shop, a/k/a Obaid Smoke Shop (hereinafter referred to as 10 “the Facility”) which is located at 1029 Herndon Road, Modesto, CA. (Id. at 1, ¶¶1-2 and 2, ¶7). 11 The Facility is open to the public and intended for non-residential use and affects commerce. (Id., 12 at 2, ¶9). On December 17, 2021, Plaintiff, who lives less than thirty miles from the Facility, 13 visited the Facility to do holiday shopping, but “barriers” prevented him from accessing their 14 “goods, services, privileges and accommodations.” (Id. at 2-3, ¶10). Specifically, Plaintiff was 15 unable to unload his wheelchair because the designated accessible parking space had an access 16 aisle next to the parking space that was “too narrow” for Plaintiff to deploy his van’s ramp and 17 unload his wheelchair from the passenger side of his vehicle. (Id. at 3, ¶ 10). As a result, 18 Plaintiff was unable to enter the Facility and left in frustration. (Id.). Plaintiff was deterred from 19 visiting the Facility but states he will return once the barriers are removed. (Id. ¶12). 20 Plaintiff filed a Proof of Service of Summons as to Defendant Talal A. Obaid, doing 21 business as Obaid Smoke Shop, on June 7, 2022. (Doc. No. 4). Plaintiff filed a proof of service 22 as to Defendant Abdo M. Alsamiri on June 7, 2022. (Doc. No. 5). Neither Defendant appeared 23 nor answered. See docket. On August 2, 2022, Plaintiff requested the Clerk of Court enter a Rule 24 55(a) clerk’s default against Defendants Obaid and Alsamiri. (Doc. No. 6). The Clerk of Court 25 entered the default on the same day. (Doc. No. 7). On December 19, 2022, Plaintiff filed this 26 Motion seeking a default judgment as to all defendants. (Doc. No. 9). 27 On March 13, 2023, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the Court should not 28 decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act and California Health and 1 Safety Code claims for the reasons set forth in Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 167 (9th Cir. 2022) and 2 Arroyo Jr. v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202 (9th Cir. 2021). (Doc. No. 11). Plaintiff failed to respond to 3 the Court’s March 13, 2023 Order. See docket. On August 16, 2023, the undersigned issued 4 findings and recommendation to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act and 5 Health and Safety Code Claims. (Doc. No. 12). On September 1, 2023, the district court adopted 6 the findings and recommendation in full, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 7 Plaintiff’s Unruh Act and Health and Safety Code claims, and dismissed Plaintiff’s Unruh Act 8 and Health and Safety Code claims without prejudice. (Doc. No. 13). 9 II. ANALYSIS 10 A. Legal Standard 11 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) allows the court to enter judgment against a 12 party following the Clerk of Court’s entry of default under 55(a). The court cannot enter default 13 judgment if the defendants were not properly served. Mason v. Genisco Tech. Corp., 960 F.2d 14 849, 851 (9th Cir. 1992). If the court determines service was proper, the court is bound to 15 undertake an analysis applying the “Eitel” factors enumerated in Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 16 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986) before entering a default judgment. Specifically, the court considers the 17 following factors: (1) the potential prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the underlying claim’s merits and 18 sufficiency, (3) the amount of money at stake, (4) the possibility of a factual dispute, (5) whether 19 the default resulted from excusable neglect, and (6) the court’s overriding preference to issue 20 decisions on the merits. (Id). 21 After the clerk enters a default, the court shall accept “as true all factual allegations in the 22 complaint, except those as to the amount of damages.” Yoon Chul Yoo v. Arnold, 615 F. App’x. 23 868, 870 (9th Cir. 2015); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6). Allegations about “the amount of damages must 24 be proven.” Strojnik v. JW World Enterprises, Inc. Best W. Bakersfield N., 2021 WL 22137, at *1 25 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2021). The court also does not accept facts that are not well pled or statements 26 that constitute conclusions of law. Wecosign, Inc. v. IFG Holdings, Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 27 1078 (C.D. Cal. 2012). Ultimately, the decision of whether to grant a default judgment lies 28 within the discretion of the court. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). 1 B. The Eitel Factors 2 1. Defendants Were Properly Served with Process 3 Defendants were properly served, and the Clerk of Court rightfully entered defaults 4 against defendants. (Doc. Nos. 4, 5, 7). Service is effectuated under Federal Rule of Civil 5 Procedure 4(e) by “following state law for serving a summons . . . in the state where the district 6 court is located or where service is made,” or by “delivering a copy of [the summons and 7 complaint] to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.” 8 California law permits service of the summons and complaint by personal service or by leaving 9 them with a “competent member of the household or a person apparently in charge of his or her 10 office [or] place of business,” among other methods. Cal. Code Civ. P. § 415.10-20. All methods 11 require that the service be handled by an individual who is not a party to the action. (Id.). 12 a. Talal A. Obaid 13 The record reflects a registered process server personally served a co-occupant of 14 Defendant Talal A. Obaid’s home on May 22, 2022. (Doc. No. 4). The co-occupant is described 15 as a 55–65-year-old John Doe. (Id.). On May 26, 2022, a registered process server also mailed, 16 via first-class mail, a copy of the complaint and summons to Defendant Talal A. Oabid using the 17 address for his home. (Id.). California permits service by serving a co-occupant of a home who 18 is over the age of 18 and then mailing it to the defendant at his or her home. See Cal. Civ. Proc. 19 Code §§ 415.10, 415.20(b); see also Trujillo v. Taco Riendo, Inc., 2022 WL 2236932 (E.D. Cal. 20 Jun. 22, 2022); Block v. Narwal, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220211 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2022). 21 Plaintiff also attempted, via a service processor, to serve Defendant Talal A. Obaid at his place of 22 business, T & S Smoke Shop, by personally serving Salah “Doe,” who appeared to oversee the 23 business, and mailed a copy of the documents to Defendant Talal A. Obaid at his place of 24 business. (Doc. No. 9-2 at 3, ¶ 13). Therefore, because service on Defendant Talal A. Obaid 25 complies with California law and the proof of service was filed, Defendant Talal A. Obaid was 26 properly served consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. 27 28 1 b. Abdo M. Alsamiri 2 The record reflects a registered process server personally served a co-occupant, Magda 3 Isamin, of Defendant Abdo M. Alsamiri’s home on May 19, 2022. (Doc. No. 5). Magda Isamin 4 was at least eighteen years old. (Id.). On May 25, 2022, the registered process server also 5 mailed, via first-class mail, a copy of the complaint and summons to Defendant Abdo M. 6 Alsamiri at his home. (Id.). California permits service by serving a co-occupant of a home who 7 is over the age of 18 and then mailing it to the defendant at his or her home. See Cal. Civ. Proc. 8 Code §§ 415.10, 415.20(b); see also Trujillo, 2022 WL 2236932; Block, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9 220211. Plaintiff also attempted, via a service processor, to serve Defendant Abdo M. Alsamiri at 10 his place of business, T & S Smoke Shop, by personally serving Salah “Doe,” who appeared to 11 oversee the business, and mailing a copy of the documents to Defendant Abdo M. Alsamiri at his 12 place of business. (Doc. No. 9-2 at 3, ¶ 13). Therefore, because service on Defendant Abdo M. 13 Alsamiri complies with California law and the proof of service was filed, Defendant Abdo M. 14 Alsamiri was properly served consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. 15 2. Application of the Six Eitel Factors 16 a. Potential Prejudice to Plaintiff 17 The Court first considers whether Plaintiff will suffer prejudice if a default judgment is 18 not entered. When a defendant neglects to respond to a complaint, a plaintiff lacks means to 19 recover beyond a default judgment. True Religion Apparel, Inc. v. Jet 2A, 2009 WL 10671791, at 20 *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2009). Here, Plaintiff claims he wishes to patronize the Defendants’ 21 establishment, and he will continue to suffer discrimination due to his disability without recourse 22 against the Defendants. The “[p]otential prejudice to the plaintiff militates in favor of granting 23 default judgment.” Solis v. Orland Sand & Gravel Corp., 2013 WL 85403, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24 8, 2013). The first Eitel factor therefore weighs in favor of default judgment. 25 b. The Underlying Claim’s Merits and Sufficiency 26 The Court next weighs the merits and sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Default 27 judgment will only be granted if the plaintiff’s complaint states a claim that supports the desired 28 relief. Danning v. Lavine, 572. F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978); Wells Fargo Equip. Fin., Inc. v. 1 Virk Sys., Inc., 2021 WL 347408, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2021). While well-plead “allegations in 2 the complaint are admitted by a defendant’s failure to respond, ‘necessary facts not contained in 3 the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default.” Soto v. 4 Rio Gary II, L.P., 2022 WL 112047, *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2022) (citing Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of 5 N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992). 6 Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges Defendants violated Title III of the ADA, which provides 7 that in public places of accommodation “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the 8 basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). To prevail on a Title III ADA claim, Plaintiff “must 9 establish that: (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) [Defendants] are a private 10 entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) [Defendants] 11 discriminated against him by denying him public accommodations because of his disability.” 12 Lopez v. Catalina Channel Express, Inc., 974 F.3d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 2020). 13 The ADA defines disability as “[a] physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 14 one or more major life activities ... [,] a record of such an impairment [,] or being regarded as 15 having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Major life activities as defined by the ADA 16 include walking and standing. Id., § 12102(2). Plaintiff represents he is “physically disabled” 17 and requires the use of a wheelchair, knee scooter, or prosthetic. (Doc. No. 1 at 2, ¶8). Accepting 18 the allegation as true, Plaintiff is deemed to have physical impairment that substantially limits the 19 major activity of walking and standing and therefore is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. 20 Plaintiff, who lives less than thirty miles from the Facility, states that he arrived at the 21 Facility on or about December 17, 2021, with the intention of patronizing the business. (Id. at 2- 22 3, ¶10). Plaintiff was unable to unload his wheelchair because the designated accessible parking 23 space had access aisles too narrow for Plaintiff to deploy his van’s ramp which is needed to 24 unload his wheelchair. (Id.). As a result, Plaintiff was unable to enter the Facility. (Id. at 3). 25 Plaintiff claims he is disabled under the ADA and his depiction of the Facility is one of 26 public accommodation. Despite the Facility being a place of public accommodation, Plaintiff was 27 unable to access the Facility’s services due to architectural barriers. Such barriers to access are 28 “discrimination” under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). Because these facts are taken 1 as true following Defendants’ entry of default, Plaintiff has stated a prima facie Title III 2 discrimination claim. 3 Given the district court’s ruling to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh 4 Act and California Health and Safety Code claims, the undersigned omits any evaluation of the 5 sufficiency of these claims. (See Doc. Nos. 12, 13). 6 While Plaintiff’s Complaint is largely boilerplate, his allegations are taken as true due to 7 Defendants’ default. Therefore, Plaintiff sufficiently pled his claims and demonstrated that they 8 have merit. Trujillo v. GH Food Mart, Inc., 2020 WL 4697139, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2020). 9 Plaintiff’s Complaint meets the low bar to put Defendants on notice by providing enough factual 10 details to determine how he was denied full and equal enjoyment of the Facility. See Whitaker v. 11 Tesla Motors, Inc., 985 F.3d 1173, at 1177 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that a complaint cannot recite 12 legal conclusion and the elements of an ADA claim but must put a defendant on notice by 13 alleging sufficient factual details to determine how a plaintiff was denied full and equal 14 enjoyment of the premises); see also Gilbert v. HBA Enter., Inc., 2022 WL 2663761 (E.D. Cal. 15 Jul. 8, 2022); Trujillo, 2022 WL 2236932. As such, the second Eitel factor weighs in favor of 16 default judgment. 17 c. The Amount of Money at Stake 18 Default judgment “is disfavored where large amounts of money are involved.” 19 Christofferson v. All Pure Pool Serv. of Cent. California, Inc., 2020 WL 3249323, at *19 (E.D. 20 Cal. June 16, 2020), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Christofferson, v. All Pure 21 Pool Serv. of Cent. California, Inc, WL 3819413 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2020). Here, Plaintiff seeks 22 statutory damages in the amount of $4,000.00, plus $2,983.28 in attorney’s fees and costs. 23 Plaintiff’s request for statutory damages is premised on his Unruh Act claim. (Doc. No. 9-1 at 4- 24 5). Because the district court declined supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim, 25 the undersigned recommends the district court deny Plaintiff’s request for $4,000.00 in statutory 26 damages. Thus, only Plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees remains. Given the rather modest sum 27 of the attorney fees requested, the undersigned finds the third factor weighs in favor of default 28 judgment. 1 d. The Possibility of a Factual Dispute 2 The Clerk of Court’s entry of default requires this Court to accept Plaintiff’s well-pled 3 factual allegations as true. Despite being properly served, Defendants have failed to appear, 4 answer, or otherwise respond. Thus, the only facts before the Court are those presented by 5 Plaintiff in the Complaint, which are well-pled and must be accepted as true. There is 6 accordingly no factual dispute. United Specialty Insurance Co. v. Saleh, 2016 WL 4434479, at 7 *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016). Thus, the fourth Eitel factor does not preclude entry of a default 8 judgment. 9 e. Whether the Default Resulted from Excusable Neglect 10 Both Defendants were properly served yet neither have appeared over a year since service 11 was effectuated. When service is proper it suggests there was not excusable neglect. USA Truck, 12 Inc. v. Jugan Express Inc., 2020 WL 2128387, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 5, 2020), report and 13 recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 3451580 (E.D. Cal. June 24, 2020). The undersigned 14 therefore finds the fifth Eitel factor weighs in favor of default judgment. 15 f. The Court’s Overriding Preference to Issue Decisions on the Merits 16 Eitel emphasizes that “[c]ases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably 17 possible.” 782 F.2d at 1472. Here, with no appearance from Defendants, there is no reasonable 18 possibility of deciding this matter on the merits. Because this sixth and each of the above Eitel 19 factors overwhelmingly weigh in favor default judgment, the undersigned recommends the 20 district court grant Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. 21 3. Terms of the Judgment and Proof of Damages 22 a. Injunctive Relief 23 Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief requiring Defendants to make a change and alteration to 24 their businesses. (Doc. No. 9-1 at 3-4). For Title III ADA violations “only injunctive relief is 25 available.” Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002). Injunctive relief “may be granted 26 when architectural barriers at defendant's establishment violate the ADA.” Kraus v. Rattu, 2020 27 WL 526105, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 28 1274269 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2020). Plaintiff alleges the Facility was designed or constructed 1 after January 26, 1993, therefore the 1991 ADA Standards for Accessible Design apply for 2 purposes of determining whether a barrier existed. (Doc. No. 1 at 5, ¶23). However, because 3 any remedial work to the Facility will occur after March 15, 2012, Plaintiff submits the 2010 4 standards govern any injunction. (Doc. No. 9-1 at 3). As noted below, these standards remain the 5 same. 6 A plaintiff bears the initial burden to “plausibly show how the cost of removing the 7 architectural barrier at issue does not exceed the benefits under the circumstances. Lopez, 974 8 F.3d at 1038. A plaintiff is not required to give precise cost estimates or give specific designs for 9 the proposed accommodations. Id. Plaintiff avers he was unable to deploy his van’s ramp and 10 unload his wheelchair because the access aisles for the designated accessible parking space at the 11 Facility were “too narrow.” The undersigned finds removal of this barrier is readily achievable, 12 as it can be completed without difficulty or expense by re-painting the pavement markings. 13 “Creating designated accessible parking spaces” has been identified as an “exampl[e] of readily 14 achievable steps to remove barriers.” Johnson v. Altimira Corp., No. 16-cv-05335 NC, 2017 U.S. 15 Dist. LEXIS 57647 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2017); 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b)(18). See also Johnson 16 v. Garlic Farm Truck Ctr. LLC, No. 20-cv-03871-BLF, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113031, at *16- 17 17 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2021). 18 Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true and considering Defendants’ nonresponse, the 19 undersigned finds Plaintiff is entitled to the requested injunctive relief requested. The undersigned 20 accordingly recommends injunctive relief requiring Defendants, within sixty (60) days of the 21 district court’s order, remove those barriers by providing and provide: a properly configured van- 22 accessible parking as required by 1991 ADAAG § 4.1.2(5)(b), 4.6.3, A4.6.3 (space must be 96 23 inches wide with 96-inch access aisle or 132 inches wide with 60-inch access aisle); 2010 24 ADAAG §§ 502.2, 502.3 (same). 25 b. Statutory Damages 26 The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act 27 and Health and Safety Code Claims. (See Doc. Nos. 12, 13). Accordingly, because the district 28 court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims, the 1 undersigned recommends that the district court decline to award Plaintiff $4,000.00 in statutory 2 damages under the Unruh Act. 3 c. Attorney’s Fees and Costs of Litigation 4 The ADA permits the recovery of attorney’s fees and costs upon receiving injunctive 5 relief. 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Attorney’s fee awards are calculated using the lodestar method, which 6 multiplies the numbers of hours reasonably spent on the matter with a reasonable hourly rate. 7 Vogel v. Harbor Plaza Ctr., LLC, 893 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 2018). When “calculating a fee 8 applicant's lodestar, a court has discretion to exclude hours that were not reasonably expended by 9 counsel. McDonald v. Navy Exch. Serv. Command, 691 F. App’x 448, 449 (9th Cir. 2017) 10 (internal quotations omitted). 11 Plaintiff’s counsel seeks an award of $1,957.50 for total billable time spent by the Moore 12 Law Firm, plus $1,025.78 for costs and litigation expenses. (Doc. No. 9-1 at 6-7.) The billable 13 time encompasses: (1) $1,440.00 for 4.8 hours worked by attorney Tanya E. Moore at an hourly 14 rate of $300.00; (2) $218.50 for 1.9 hours worked by paralegal Whitney Law at an hourly of 15 $115.00; and (3) $299.00 for 2.6 hours worked by paralegal Isaac Medrano at an hourly rate of 16 $115.00. (Id.). 17 i. Billable Time 18 Plaintiff’s counsel provided the court with the time entries detailing the firm’s efforts in 19 this matter. (Doc. No. 15 at 2-4). These entries do not indicate time was unreasonably expended. 20 While certain paralegal entries include calendaring deadlines, these tasks were dependent upon a 21 review of the Court’s Orders; and thus, do not appear to justify reductions as merely clerical 22 functions. The Court previously recognized in December 2022 that a paralegal hourly rate of 23 $115.00 was reasonable. Trujillo v. 4B Market Incorporated, et al., 2022 WL 17667894 (E.D. 24 Cal. Dec. 14, 2022); Findings and Recommendations adopted in full, 2022 WL 18027841 (E.D. 25 Cal. Dec. 30, 2022). Similarly, this Court additionally has previously determined in December 26 2020 that a $300.00 hourly rate was reasonable where the lead attorney has considerable 27 experience in ADA matters. Id. Ms. Moore has been an attorney for over 20 years with the last 28 10 years specially proacting in “disability access litigation.” (Doc. No. 9-3 at 2-4). Because both 1 the time spent and rate requested are reasonable, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff’s counsel 2 be awarded $1,957.50 in attorney’s fees. 3 ii. Litigation Expenses and Costs 4 Plaintiff moves to recover litigation expenses and costs of $1,025.78. (Doc. Nos. 9-1 at 6; 5 9-3 at 6-16). Plaintiff has attached receipts for the filing fee, a pre-filing investigation and 6 process server fees, which are recoverable under the ADA. Trujillo v. La Valley Foods, Inc., 7 2017 WL 2992453, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2017); Moralez v. 76 Orinda, 830 F. App’x 209, 210 8 (9th Cir. 2020); 42 U.S.C. § 12205. The receipts include: (1) an invoice in the amount of $112.73 9 from One Legal for service on Defendant Abdo M. Alsamiri dated May 25, 2022 (Doc. No. 9-3 at 10 6); (2) an invoice in the amount of $112.73 from One Legal for the service on Defendant Talal A. 11 Obaid dated May 27, 2022 (Id. at 7); (3) a receipt in the amount of $402.00 for this Court’s filing 12 fees dated April 24, 2022 (Id. at 9); (4) an invoice in the amount of $112.73 from One Legal for 13 service on Defendant Talal A. Obaid dated July 26, 2022 (Id. at 11); (5) an invoice in the amount 14 of $112.73 from One Legal for service on Defendant Abdo M. Alsamiri dated July 29, 2022; and 15 (6) an invoice from Robert Ferris Investigations in the amount of $172.86 for a pre-filing 16 investigation dated March 28, 2022 (Id. at 16). These receipts total $1,025.78. Accordingly, the 17 undersigned recommends that Plaintiff be awarded the sum of $1,025.782 for litigation expenses 18 and costs. 19 Below is a summary of the total amount in attorney fees and costs the undersigned 20 recommends be awarded to Plaintiff’s counsel: 21 Professional Hourly Rate Hours Total 22 Ms. Tanya E. Moore $300.00 4.8 $1,440.00 23 Ms. Whitney Law $115.00 1.9 $218.50 24 Mr. Isaac Medrano $115.00 2.6 $299.00 25 Costs and Expenses $1025.78 26 Total $2,983.28 27 28 //// 1 Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 2 Plaintiff must mail a copy of these findings and recommendations to Defendants at their 3 | last known address and file with the court proof of service within fourteen (14) business days of 4 | the date of this Order. 5 It is further RECOMMENDED: 6 Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. No. 9) be GRANTED in part as follows: 7 a. Judgment be entered in Plaintiff's favor and against Defendants; 8 b. The district court decline to award Plaintiff statutory damages in the amount of 9 $4,000.00; 10 c. Plaintiff be awarded attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs in the amount ll of $2,983.28; and 12 d. Defendants be required within sixty (60) days of the district court’s order be 13 required to properly configure a van-accessible parking stall at the Facility with an 14 access aisle at least be 96 inches wide with 96-inch access aisle or 132 inches wide 15 with 60-inch access aisle as required by 2010 ADAAG 8§ 502.2, 502.3; and 16 NOTICE TO PARTIES 17 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States district judge 18 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) 19 | days after being served with these findings and recommendations, a party may file written 20 | objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 21 | Findings and Recommendations.” Parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 22 | specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 23 | 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). ** | Dated: _ September 8, 2023 Wiha. □□ fares Back 25 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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