Gilbert Benson v. Merrick Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: December 28, 2021
• Docket: 2069-20
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-2069

GILBERT BENSON,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Submitted: September 2, 2021 Decided: December 28, 2021

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and HARRIS and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Joshua Adam Berman, Baltimore, Maryland, for Petitioner. Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Cindy S. Ferrier, Assistant Director, Marie V. Robinson, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:

Gilbert Benson, a native and citizen of Ghana, petitions for review of the order of

the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing his appeal from the immigration

judge’s denial of his motion to reopen. We review the denial of a motion to reopen for

abuse of discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3) (2021); INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323-

24 (1992); Lawrence v. Lynch, 826 F.3d 198, 203 (4th Cir. 2016). The “denial of a motion

to reopen is reviewed with extreme deference, given that motions to reopen are disfavored

because every delay works to the advantage of the deportable alien who wishes merely to

remain in the United States.” Sadhvani v. Holder, 596 F.3d 180, 182 (4th Cir. 2009)

(internal quotation marks omitted). We will reverse a denial of a motion to reopen only if

it is “arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.” Lawrence, 826 F.3d at 203 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

We conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in finding that Benson did

not substantially comply with the procedural requirements under In re Lozada, 19 I. & N.

Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988). We further conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in

finding that Benson failed to show prima facie eligibility for cancellation of removal.

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED