Gil-Cabrera v. Department of Corrections

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided December 21, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-09493·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK RICARDO GIL-CABRERA, Plaintiff, -against- 20-CV-9493 (LTS) DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; ORDER TO AMEND CYNTHIA BRANN; PATSY YANG; MARGARET EGAN, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently detained at the Vernon C. Bain Center (“VCBC”), brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants are violating his federal constitutional rights by not protecting him from contracting COVID-19. He originally filed this complaint with 49 other VCBC detainees. The original complaint was assigned to Judge George B. Daniels and opened under docket number 20-CV-8407; Judge Daniels referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Aaron, who severed the plaintiffs’ claims and directed that each plaintiff’s claims be opened as a separate action. See Lee v. Brann, ECF 1:20-CV-8407, 7 (GBD) (SDA) (S.D.N.Y.). This action is one of the newly opened actions. By order dated December 1, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. BACKGROUND In Lee v. Brann, 20-CV-8407, plaintiff Michael Lee initially sought to bring a class action on behalf of himself and other VCBC detainees, including the plaintiff in this action, Ricardo Gil-Cabrera. The plaintiffs sued the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Correction, Cynthia Brann; “Health Director Commissioner” Patsy Yang; and Board of

Correction Executive Director Margaret Egan. The plaintiffs also may have intended to sue the New York City Department of Correction (DOC). In the original complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that they have been forced into unsafe living conditions, including by being housed in units without appropriate capacity limitations to allow for social distancing. (ECF No. 2 at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that inmates are less than 3-4 inches apart in sleeping areas and that 50 inmates share toilets, sinks, and showers. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that certain other detainees have contracted or been exposed to COVID-19 as a result of these conditions. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff seeks an improvement of conditions, including a reduction in housing capacity; monetary damages; and the release of detainees who meet certain criteria. (Id. at 6-7.)

On November 24, 2020, Lee filed an amended complaint in Lee v. Brann, which Plaintiff also signed. ECF 1:20-CV-8407, 14. At Judge Aaron’s direction, the amended complaint was docketed in each of the severed actions, including this one. ECF 1:20-CV-8407, 19. The amended complaint provides fewer details than the original complaint and does not specify how Defendants specifically violated any of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. DISCUSSION A. Department of Correction In the original complaint and the amended complaint, Plaintiff includes DOC in the caption of the complaint. Whether he intended to sue this agency is unclear, but in any event, the claims against DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the

recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). B. Remaining Defendants To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).

If Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the events giving rise to his claims, the claims arise under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If he was a convicted prisoner, his claims arise under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n.16 (1979); Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017). Whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner, he must satisfy two elements to state such a claim: (1) an “objective” element, which requires a showing that the challenged conditions are sufficiently serious, and (2) a “mental” element, which requires a showing that the officer acted with at least deliberate indifference to the challenged conditions. Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29. The objective element of a deliberate indifference claim is the same for pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners – “the inmate must show that the conditions, either alone or in combination, pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health” or safety, which

“includes the risk of serious damage to ‘physical and mental soundness.’” Id. at 30 (citing Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013), and quoting LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972)); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (“A prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.”). “[P]rison officials violate the Constitution when they deprive an inmate of his basic human needs such as food, clothing, medical care, and safe and sanitary living conditions.” Walker, 717 F.3d at 125 (internal quotation marks omitted). The second element – the “subjective” or “mental” element – varies depending on whether a plaintiff is a pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner. A convicted prisoner must allege

that a correction official “kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both [have been] aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also [have] draw[n] the inference.” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 32 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). A pretrial detainee must allege “that the defendant-official acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety.” Id. at 35. The mere negligence of a correction official is not a basis for a claim of a federal constitutional violation under § 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986). Because the amended complaint does not contain sufficient facts to state a claim, the Court directs Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint.

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Gil-Cabrera v. Department of Corrections, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

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Related

Bell v. Wolfish
441 U.S. 520 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Daniels v. Williams
474 U.S. 327 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Davidson v. Cannon
474 U.S. 344 (Supreme Court, 1986)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Walker v. Schult
717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Emerson v. City of New York
740 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D. New York, 2010)
Darnell v. City of New York
849 F.3d 17 (Second Circuit, 2017)
Jenkins v. City of New York
478 F.3d 76 (Second Circuit, 2007)
LaReau v. MacDougall
473 F.2d 974 (Second Circuit, 1972)