Gigantelli v. Gigantelli

992 So. 2d 825, 2008 WL 4330024
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedSeptember 24, 2008
Docket2D07-3450
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 992 So. 2d 825 (Gigantelli v. Gigantelli) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gigantelli v. Gigantelli, 992 So. 2d 825, 2008 WL 4330024 (Fla. Ct. App. 2008).

Opinion

992 So.2d 825 (2008)

Saundra GIGANTELLI, Appellant,
v.
Frank GIGANTELLI, Appellee.

No. 2D07-3450.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

September 24, 2008.
Rehearing Denied October 28, 2008.

*826 Mark Schleben, Clearwater, for Appellant.

Mary Ellen Borja of Mary Ellen Borja, P.A., Clearwater, for Appellee.

FULMER, Judge.

Saundra Gigantelli (the Wife) challenges a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage, raising six issues. We reverse the provisions of the final judgment pertaining to the marital home and child support. In all other respects, we affirm.

In their pleadings, the Wife sought exclusive use and possession of the marital home and Frank Gigantelli (the Husband) sought partition. However, at trial both parties requested the trial court to order that the house be sold and the proceeds divided equally between the parties. Because the parties assumed that a sale would be ordered, neither presented any testimony directed toward an award of exclusive use and possession. Nevertheless, the trial court awarded exclusive use and possession of the marital home to the Wife conditioned on the minority of the children or the death or remarriage of the Wife. The trial court also ordered that $600, representing one-half of the rental value of the home, would be added to the gross income of the Wife for the purpose of calculating child support, notwithstanding the fact that no evidence was presented as to rental value. In making this award, the trial court stated:

Since both parties anticipated that the Court would approve their agreement to sell the marital home and divide the proceeds, there was no evidence submitted as to the reasonable rental value. The Wife did testify that she anticipated renting an adequate apartment at the cost of $1,200 per month. As that is the amount of savings the Wife will realize by not incurring a rental expense, the court would conservatively estimate that amount reasonably corresponds to a rental value of the home.

The trial court also made a finding that "it is in the best interest of the children that they remain in the former marital home to minimize the disruption resulting from the parents' marital dissolution." Neither party presented any evidence directed to the issue of whether it is in the best interest of the children to remain in the marital home. In fact, in a motion for rehearing the Wife explained that she did not address the issue at trial because the parties were in agreement that the house would be sold. The Wife requested the opportunity to present evidence to demonstrate that remaining in the marital home was not in the best interest of the children for a variety of reasons. The trial court denied her request.

"A marital settlement agreement as to alimony or property rights which is entered before the dissolution of marriage is binding upon the parties. Moreover, an oral agreement reached by the parties and announced to the trial court is a fully enforceable settlement agreement." Dowie v. Dowie, 668 So.2d 290, 292 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (citation omitted); see also Alvarez v. Alvarez, 404 So.2d 200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (reversing trial court's award of personal property to husband because it should have been awarded to the wife based on the parties' oral settlement agreement). Because the trial court failed to enforce the parties' agreement to sell the marital home, we reverse and remand for the trial court to reconsider the equitable distribution of the marital home.

*827 The record suggests that at the time of trial, the parties were anticipating moves and school placement changes that may have been hampered by the trial court's ruling on the marital home. If the passage of time has changed the parties' agreement that the home should be sold, the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to address the equitable distribution of the marital home.

We also reverse the child support award because of several errors. First, the trial court failed to set forth factual findings to support and explain the income imputed to the Wife. The final judgment states: "The Wife's net monthly income is imputed at minimum wage to be $2,374.52 (Child Support Guidelines 47%) pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines Worksheet attached hereto."[1] At first glance, it is apparent that this number far exceeds full-time employment at minimum wage.[2] A review of the child support guidelines worksheet reflects the following calculation:

   Gross Monthly (Non-Taxable) Income   $   600.00
   Gross Monthly (Taxable) Income         2,156.13
   Fed., State, Loc. Tax                    216.67
   FICA                                     164.94
                                        __________
   Net Monthly Inc.                       2,374.52

The source of the $600 income was previously explained in the final judgment as imputed income representing one-half the rental value of the marital home. Although the trial court failed to explain the source of the $2156.13 income, we assume that $1000 of that number reflects the $1000 per month alimony that the trial court awarded, which leaves $1156.13 as the amount that the trial court actually imputed as the Wife's minimum wage income. At oral argument, neither party could explain how the trial court calculated the Wife's imputed income.

At trial the Wife testified that she was working 20 hours per week as a cosmetologist and her monthly salary averaged $578.07.[3] She was paid either on a per-hour basis at a minimum wage rate of $6.67 per hour or on the basis of a 40% commission, whichever was greater. She had not yet increased her speed enough to reach the commission level. She also received tips that averaged $1.95 per hour. She anticipated that her salary would increase as she became more proficient, and she testified that she was ready to begin working full time, which would be 35 hours per week. When asked by the trial court to estimate what her full-time salary would be, she indicated it could possibly exceed $10 per hour.

On her financial affidavit, the Wife listed $1109.03 as her monthly gross income. At trial, her counsel explained that this number was a mistake because it was higher than the $578 per month she was actually making on her part-time schedule. However, counsel asked the trial court to use the number on the financial affidavit because "we believe that she'll be there very shortly."

Needless to say, the trial court had a range of numbers to work with in determining the Wife's net monthly income, and *828 the number selected does fall within the possible high and low numbers in the range. The deficiency in the final judgment is that there is no explanation for how the trial court arrived at the number it used as imputed income. The trial court did specify that its imputation was based on minimum wage, which the Wife testified was $6.67 per hour. However, the trial court failed to set forth findings to explain the number of hours per week that were being imputed and the amount of tips, if any, that was included or whether some other basis was used to calculate the imputed income. Meaningful appellate review is hampered by the trial court's failure to make findings that explain how it arrived at the income imputed to the Wife. See McCants v. McCants, 984 So.2d 678, 682 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

The next error in the child support calculation is the fact that the trial court applied a child care credit in its determination of the Husband's child support obligation.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
992 So. 2d 825, 2008 WL 4330024, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gigantelli-v-gigantelli-fladistctapp-2008.