Giddings v. Giddings
This text of 10 N.W. 673 (Giddings v. Giddings) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
I. The judgment entry is as follows: “And now, to-wit: April 29, 1881, this cause comes on for the judgment of the court, the same having been heretofore taken [298]*298under advisement, and the court being fully advised and satisfied in the premises, it is therefore considered and judged that the plaintiff herein have and recover of and from the defendant judgment for the sum of--dollars, together with interest thereon at the rate of----per cent per annum, and the further sum of $33.65, taxed as costs of this proceeding. * * * * 55
It is urged by counsel for appellant that the judgment should be reversed because it is indefinite and uncertain. It is certain that the only amount enforceable under the judgment as it now stands, without correction, is the amount of costs taxed against defendant. The plaintiff does not complain of the informality of the judgment. He has taken no appeal therefrom. Counsel for the respective parties have argued the question as to the proper method of correcting a judgment of this character, and whether or not any correction thereof can be made. These questions are not presented by the record before us. They are matters we cannot consider. The court evidently intended, as appears by the special finding, to render judgment for plaintiff for the amount of the note and order. What the plaintiff’s remedy is we are not called upon to determine.
In the course of the examination of the defendant as a witness, his counsel asked him whether the plaintiff had been at any time since the execution of the note, in such a condition that the note could have been collected. An objection to this question was sustained, and this ruling of the court is assigned as error. It appears to us that the plaintiff’s ability to pay was a very remote question in the case. It may be it would, in some slight degree, serve to explain the defendant’s delay in enforcing the note, and rebut such inference of its invalidity as might arise from delay in its collection. But the defendant was permitted to state that the plaintiff had been insolvent eight or ten years. This was certainly sufficient upon that point.
Aeeirmed.
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10 N.W. 673, 57 Iowa 297, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/giddings-v-giddings-iowa-1881.