Gibson v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: February 3, 2026
• Docket: S25A0984
• Status: Published

Opinion

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: February 3, 2026

S25A0984. GIBSON v. THE STATE.

ELLINGTON, Justice.

On September 9, 2024, Jeremy Wade Gibson (“Gibson”)

entered a non-negotiated plea of guilty but mentally ill to malice

murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of

his wife, Amy Gibson. Gibson appeals from the order of the Superior

Court of Dawson County denying his motion to withdraw his guilty

plea, contending that the attorney who represented him in his

efforts to withdraw his guilty plea was ineffective because of a

potential conflict of interest that prevented him from adequately

investigating the grounds for withdrawal. He also contends that the

trial court committed reversible error by refusing to allow counsel

an adequate opportunity to present evidence in support of the

motion to withdraw Gibson’s guilty plea and by failing to inquire

into counsel’s conflict of interest. As explained below, because Gibson has not demonstrated any error, we affirm the trial court’s

order.

1. In his first claim of error, Gibson contends that he “was

denied effective assistance of counsel” when the attorney who was

appointed to represent him at his motion to withdraw his guilty plea

“chose not to investigate due to a stated conflict of interest.” The

record below does not support this contention.

Our review of the record shows that the shooting, which

occurred on July 29, 2019, was witnessed by several people,

including the Gibsons’ two minor children. Immediately after the

shooting, Gibson surrendered to the police and confessed to killing

his wife. A Dawson County Grand Jury indicted Gibson on

September 9, 2019, for the offenses of malice murder (Count 1),

felony murder (Counts 2 and 3), aggravated battery (Count 4),

family violence aggravated assault, (Counts 5, 6, 7, 15 and 17),

aggravated assault (Counts 8, 9, and 10), terroristic acts (Count 11),

possession of a firearm during commission of a felony (Count 12),

cruelty to children in the first degree (Count 13 and 14), and robbery

2 by force (Count 16).

On August 2, 2019, Gibson applied for an appointed attorney.

Shortly thereafter, Brock Johnson of the Northeastern Judicial

Circuit Public Defender’s Office entered an appearance on Gibson’s

behalf. On November 4, 2019, Adam Levin and Erin Wallace of the

Northeast Georgia Regional Capital Defender’s Office were

substituted as counsel for Gibson. The State filed a Notice of Intent

to Seek the Death Penalty on December 4, 2019. Thereafter, counsel

filed over 80 motions on Gibson’s behalf. In October 2021, Wallace

was allowed to withdraw because she had left her employment with

the Public Defender’s Office. Several other attorneys with the

Northeast Georgia Regional Public Defender’s Office represented

Gibson in various hearings, including Jerilyn Bell, Laura Cobb, and

Nathaniel Studelska. Christian Lamar of the Georgia Capital

Defender Metro Division also participated in Gibson’s

representation.

On May 21, 2024, Gibson’s defense team reached an agreement

with prosecutors whereby the State would withdraw its intention to

3 seek the death penalty in exchange for Gibson waiving his right to

a jury trial and for certain evidentiary concessions (i.e., waiving his

right to confront and cross-examine his minor children). The trial

court accepted the agreement and scheduled the case for a bench

trial to take place on September 9, 2024.

On the day the trial was scheduled to begin, Gibson decided to

plead guilty and enter a non-negotiated plea of guilty but mentally

ill to all charges. Gibson stipulated that a factual basis existed for

the plea and he waived his right to withdraw his guilty plea prior to

sentencing. During the plea hearing, Gibson informed the court that

he was comfortable with his decision, that he understood the charges

against him, and that his attorneys had done nothing that affected

his ability or willingness to enter the plea. The trial court advised

Gibson of the rights he waived by pleading guilty, and Gibson said

that he understood the consequences of his decision and affirmed

that his decision to plead guilty was knowing and voluntary. The

judge reviewed Gibson’s medical and mental health records prior to

accepting the plea. Studeleska, Gibson’s lead plea counsel, stated

4 that he was satisfied that Gibson was competent to enter his plea,

that Gibson was entering his plea voluntarily, and that a factual

basis existed for the plea. On September 12, 13, and 17, 2024, the

trial court conducted hearings, admitted evidence, and entertained

arguments from both parties concerning the appropriate sentence.

On September 17, 2024, the court sentenced Gibson to serve life in

prison without the possibility of parole as well as an additional 75

years of consecutive prison time for his other crimes.

On October 15, 2024, Gibson filed a “Motion to Withdraw Plea

of Guilty and to Appoint Conflict-free Counsel.” The motion did not

indicate what the conflict was. The court held a status conference on

November 1, 2024. Upon learning that Gibson intended to raise

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court said it would

appoint the Northeastern Judicial Circuit Public Defender’s Office

to represent Gibson. The court noted that because Gibson’s original

counsel, Johnson, had left that office, there should be no conflict of

interest. However, the court suggested that new counsel could raise

such a claim if counsel believed a conflict existed. The court reduced

5 its decision to writing in an order filed on November 4, 2024.

The trial court rescheduled the hearing on Gibson’s motion to

withdraw his guilty plea to December 13, 2024. On December 11,

2024, Sarah Willis of the Northeastern Judicial Circuit Public

Defender’s Office stated in a written motion for a continuance: “After

discussions with the Court, it was determined that there would be

no conflict were the public defender to represent Mr. Gibson.” On

December 13, Robert McNeill, from the same public defender’s

office, appeared before the trial court, noted that he had spoken with

Willis, entered an appearance on Gibson’s behalf, and then

requested a continuance. The court granted defense counsel’s

request for a continuance and rescheduled the hearing to January

3, 2025.

On January 2, 2025, McNeill filed a “Motion for Continuance

or, in the Alternative, Motion to Withdraw as Counsel.” The

following day, just before the rescheduled hearing on Gibson’s

motion to withdraw his guilty plea commenced, counsel filed an

“Amended Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty and to Obtain

6 Conflict-Free Counsel.” In the amended motion, Gibson argued that

the court’s alleged refusal to allow Gibson to “unfreeze” funds to hire

private counsel violated his Sixth Amendment right to hire conflict-

free counsel.1 The amended motion, however, did not specify what

McNeill’s potential conflict of interest was. The court denied the

motion in a written order entered on January 8, nunc pro tunc to

January 3. The court found, among other things, that McNeill was

an experienced attorney and that he had access to all the documents

necessary to represent Gibson. Additionally, the court noted that

Gibson had requested appointed counsel on November 1, 2024, and

had represented to the court at the hearing on December 13, 2024,

that he “had heard good things” about McNeill. The court concluded

that Gibson had shown no basis for the requested continuance,

finding Gibson’s motion to be a “dilatory tactic.” Further,

the Court does not find the testimony of the Defendant

1 The record does not show that Gibson had previously moved the trial

court in his criminal case for an order to unfreeze funds to retain private counsel. In its written order, the trial court noted that Gibson “had filed a Motion in Dawson County Civil Action File Number 2021-CV0313, a wrongful death case, seeking to release $10,000.00 of $189,000.00 in frozen funds, to retain Michael A. Schwartz, a private attorney, in this matter[.]” 7 credible as to his “intentions” to retain private counsel, but for the civil case order that froze his funds, as the Defendant’s own testimony was that he had a significant amount of funds available to him, outside of the “frozen funds” which he utilized to pay for the services of his civil attorney.

Having denied the motion for a continuance, the court

proceeded to hear Gibson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

During the hearing, Gibson made conflicting statements about his

ability to hire private criminal defense counsel, saying he was either

prevented by his previous public defenders from doing so (because

he was “misled” by their “inadequate” advice) or that he wanted to

preserve his funds to “give to [his] children.” The record shows that

Gibson had retained private counsel in a related civil suit, and that

this attorney could represent him in matters pertaining to the funds

that had been frozen. McNeill, likewise, made conflicting

statements, e.g., stating that “[w]e’re prepared to go ahead,” but,

during closing argument, argued that he was unprepared for the

hearing. Although McNeill asserted that Gibson was entitled to

conflict-free counsel, he did not explain what his alleged conflict was

8 or make any legal argument based on his alleged conflict of interest.

The trial court orally denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea

from the bench, stating, among other things: “I find it not credible

that you at any point in time were intending to retain anyone else.”

The court entered an order denying Gibson’s motion to withdraw his

guilty plea on January 16, 2025. Gibson filed a Notice of Appeal from

that order on February 18, 2025.

In its January 16, 2025, written order denying Gibson’s motion

to withdraw his guilty plea, the court recounted the procedural

history of the case and addressed each of Gibson’s grounds for relief.

Although the court did not specifically address the assertion that

McNeill or any other attorney had a potential conflict of interest, the

court did address what was presented as the basis for the claimed

conflict: that Gibson wished to hire private counsel. The court ruled:

Finally, whatever Defendant’s stated preference might be, he has not yet hired private counsel, specifically indicated to this Court that he wanted appointed counsel on November 1, 2024, and on December 13, 2024, indicated that he had “heard good things” about Mr. McNeill. The Court finds that Defendant has not met any burden in the context of his Motion to Withdraw his guilty

9 plea, that Mr. McNeill’s representation was ineffective.

The court found that Gibson had access to substantial funds as well

as the opportunity to hire private counsel prior to his funds being

frozen in the civil suit. Instead, he chose to direct those funds to

other uses and to request appointed counsel. The court also found

that Gibson’s testimony lacked credibility, concluding that he was

“simply not worthy of belief.” Finally, the court concluded that

Gibson “failed to show that he actually has access to sufficient funds

to retain counsel [at the time he filed his motion to withdraw] and

has also failed to show how additional time would have helped him

or how he was harmed by the denial of the continuance.”

As part of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective

assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions, a defendant has the

right to representation that is free of an actual conflict of interest.

See Adams v. State, 317 Ga. 342, 350 (2023). For purposes of

evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on this basis,

an actual conflict of interest means a conflict that significantly and

adversely affected counsel’s representation of the defendant. It was

10 Gibson’s burden to demonstrate the existence of such a conflict. See,

e.g., Hall v. Jackson, 310 Ga. 714, 720 (2021) (explaining that, to

carry his burden of proving that his appellate counsel provided

ineffective assistance based on a conflict of interest, the appellant

was required to show an actual conflict of interest that significantly

and adversely affected counsel’s representation of him); State v.

Abernathy, 289 Ga. 603, 607 (2011) (“[I]n order to establish

ineffective assistance arising from a conflict of interest, a defendant

must show the existence of an actual conflict that adversely affected

counsel’s performance.”). Moreover, “mere speculation about

potential conflicts of interest cannot establish that a conflict

significantly and adversely affected counsel’s performance[.]” Moss

v. State, 312 Ga. 202, 210 (2021).

In this case, Gibson baldly asserts that McNeill had a conflict

of interest, but he does not explain what that conflict was or how it

affected counsel’s performance. The record shows, instead, that the

crux of Gibson’s argument below was that he desired to hire his own

11 attorney.2 Gibson does not present any argument or citation of

authority to support the conclusion that his desire to hire private

counsel rendered his appointed counsel conflicted. The record simply

does not support a finding that counsel articulated an actual conflict

of interest, nor does the record show that McNeill was prevented by

any conflict from investigating the case, reviewing the record,

exploring potential bases for withdrawing the plea, or otherwise

zealously representing Gibson. Consequently, this claim of error

fails.

2. In his second claim of error, Gibson argues that the trial

court, by denying his motion for a continuance, improperly denied

him “an adequate opportunity to present evidence in support of his

motion to withdraw his plea.” “All applications for continuances are

addressed to the sound legal discretion of the court and … shall be

granted or refused as the ends of justice may require.” OCGA § 17-

2 We note that Gibson has not argued on appeal that either McNeill or

the plea court should have taken any action to unfreeze his funds. The record shows that Gibson’s civil attorney had moved to unfreeze those funds in the civil suit. 12 8-22. See also Anglin v. State, 312 Ga. 503, 510 (2021) (“A trial court

has broad discretion in granting or denying a motion for

continuance.”). Absent a clear showing by Gibson of an abuse of this

broad discretion, this Court will not disturb the trial court’s decision

to deny the motion for continuance. See Phoenix v. State, 304 Ga.

785, 788 (2018).

The record in this case shows that Gibson had been litigating

his criminal case for over five years, that he had adequate time and

funds to hire private counsel prior to his funds being frozen, and that

he had done so in a related civil suit. The court also found that

Gibson’s testimony with respect to his desire to hire private counsel

lacked credibility. The record shows that McNeill was a senior public

defender who had the opportunity to familiarize himself with the

record in Gibson’s case and to prepare for the hearing on the motion

to withdraw Gibson’s guilty plea. McNeill had already been granted

one continuance, he did not move for the second until the eve of the

scheduled hearing, and the rationale for that motion was that

Gibson wanted to hire his own attorney. McNeill told the court that

13 he was prepared to proceed at the beginning of the hearing. During

the hearing, McNeill gave a thorough presentation, examined

Gibson, and posited several grounds for why Gibson should be

allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. Given these circumstances,

Gibson has not shown that the trial court clearly abused its broad

discretion in denying the motion for a continuance. See id.

3. In his final claim of error, Gibson contends that the trial

court’s “failure to inquire into Mr. McNeill’s stated conflict of

interest warrants a new hearing.” The record does not support

Gibson’s contention that the trial court failed to inquire into

McNeill’s alleged conflict of interest. Rather, it shows that McNeill

never articulated an actual conflict of interest; but instead, he used

“conflict” as shorthand for his client’s desire to hire private counsel.

And the trial court did, in fact, address that claim. In this case, as

in Williams v. State, “[n]ot only did Appellant’s counsel not

represent to the court before [the hearing] that a conflict of interest

existed that could adversely affect his representation, counsel’s

conduct during the [hearing] demonstrated that there was no actual

14 conflict of interest that adversely affected his representation of

Appellant.” 302 Ga. 404, 411 (2017). Consequently, this claim of

error fails.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.