Gibson v. Sheldon

90 S.W.2d 841
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJanuary 10, 1936
DocketNo. 13292.
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 90 S.W.2d 841 (Gibson v. Sheldon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gibson v. Sheldon, 90 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Ct. App. 1936).

Opinions

BROWN, Justice.

We adopt the statement of the nature and result of this suit' from the brief of appellant as follows:

[842]*842On January 23, 1935, appellant, S. P. Gibson, instituted this suit against appel-lees, C. P. Sheldon, W. P. Bolding, Ven-Mex Oil Company, a Texas corporation, C. A. Everts, C. -T. Everts, and W. W. Jamison. There were two counts in appellant’s petition. . The first count was in ordinary form of trespass to try title by appellant against appellees for the recovery of the following described tracts of land situated in Wichita county, Tex., to wit:

First tract: South one-half of block No. 301, Waggoner Colony lands, containing 80 acres of land.

Second tract: All of block No. 302 of the Waggoner Colony lands, containing 160 acres of land..

In the second count appellant alleged that he was the owner in fee simple of the 240 acres of land described in the first count of the petition, and was entitled to the possession of the same, and the ap-pellees were unlawfully setting up some kind of claim to this property in opposition to the rights of the appellant, and casting a cloud upon the title of appellant to said premises; that on or about June 8, 1929, appellant and his wife executed to appellee C. P. Sheldon an ordinary oil and gas lease on said 240 acres of land; that said lease was for a term of one year; that the lease provided for the usual one-eighth royalty, and if no well be commenced on the land on or before the 8th day of-June, 1930, it should terminate as to both parties; that the appellees are asserting a claim to said premises under and by virtue of said lease; that the ap-pellees and each of them have abandoned said premises, and have made no effort to develop the same for more than four years prior to the filing of this suit. That appellant had demanded of appellees the development of said premises, which they had failed to do, and that the claim of the appellees on said premises under said lease cast a cloud upon appellant’s title and prevented him from having said premises developed for oil. That said lease has terminated, and has been forfeited and abandoned. Appellant prayed under the first count of his petition that he be decreed judgment for the possession of said premises, and under the second count of the petition that he have judgment against the appellees and each of them for a cancellation of the lease described in the second count of the petition, and for costs and general relief.

Appellees C. P. Sheldon, W. P. Bold-ing, and Ven-Mex Oil Company filed a joint answer to appellant’s petition, asserting a general exception, a general denial, and a plea of not guilty.

Appellees C. A. Everts, C. T. Everts, and W. W. Jamison filed an answer herein, alleging a disclaimer on the part of C. A. Everts as to any ownership in the oil and gas lease describ'ed in appellant’s petition.

C. T. Everts and W. W. Jamison disclaimed any interest in any of the premises described in appellant’s petition save and except the title to the said oil lease on the southwest 40 acres of subdivision No. 302, Waggoner Colony lands.

That said last-named appellees were producing oil from two wells on said premises and appellant was receiving his royalty therefrom; and the said appellees, C. T. Everts and W. W. Jamison, disclaimed any interest in any other land described in appellant’s petition.

Appellees C. T. Everts and W. W. Ja-mison prayed that they be decreed the owners of the said oil and gas lease on the southwest 40 acres above described.

Appellee C. A. Everts prayed that no judgment be rendered against him.

On March 20, 1935, the court, without the intervention of a jury, rendered judgment for appellees'; that at the time of the rendition of the judgment the court rendered an opinion that the oil and gas lease in controversy was valid and subsisting, and in force, and that the appellant was not entitled to a cancellation of said lease, but that subject to the lease the appellant is the owner of said land and entitled to the possession thereof.

The court further decreed that the appellant recover title and possession of the land described in his petition against all of the appellees, “but subject to said oil and gas lease on said land described and referred to in the second count of plaintiff’s said petition, but that plaintiff be denied cancellation of said lease or any part thereof,” to which judgment the appellant then and there excepted and gave notice of appeal to this court.

The court prepared and filed his findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the appellant then and there in open court excepted to said findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellant timely filed his appeal bond, and now prosecutes his appeal to this court.

[843]*843The findings of fact and conclusions of law filed by the trial court are as follows:

“Findings of Fact.
“1. I find that on the 8th day of June, 1929, the plaintiff, S. P. Gibson, and wife, Bettie Gibson, executed, duly acknowledged, and delivered to defendant, C. P. Sheldon, an oil and gas lease, the material parts of which, omitting signatures and acknowledgments, were as follows, towit:
“ ‘Agreement made and entered into on the 8th day of June, 1929, by and between S. P. Gibson and wife, Bettie Gibson, of Hunt County, Texas, hereinafter called lessor (whether one or more), and C. P. Sheldon, hereinafter called lessee:
“‘Witnesseth: 'That the said lessor, for and in consideration of Ten and no/100 Dollars, cash in hand paid, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and of the covenants and agreements hereinafter contained on the part of the lessee to be paid, kept and performed, have granted, demised, leased and let, and by these presents do grant, lease and let unto the said lessee for the sole and only purpose of mining and operating for oil and gas and of laying pipe lines and of building tanks, power stations, and structures thereon to produce, save and take care of said products, all that certain tract of land situated in the County of Wichita, State of Texas, described as follows, towit:
“ ‘The South eighty (80) acres of subdivision Number 301 and all of Sub. 302, Waggoner Colony Lands, and containing 240 acres of land, more or less.
“ ‘It is agreed that this lease shall remain in force for a term of one year from this date,, and as long thereafter as oil or gas, or either of them is produced from said land by lessee.
“ ‘In consideration of the premises the said lessee covenants and agrees:
“ ‘1st. To deliver to the credit of lessor, free of cost, in the pipe line to which he may connect any wells, the equal one-eighth part of all oil produced and saved from the leased premises.
“ ‘2nd. To pay to the lessor ⅛⅛ of net proceeds at mouth of the well, each year, for the gas from each well where gas only is found, while the same is being used off the premises, and lessor to have gas free of cost from any such well for all stoves and all inside lights in the principal dwelling house on said land during the time by making their own connections with the well at their own risk and expense.
“ ‘3rd.

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90 S.W.2d 841, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gibson-v-sheldon-texapp-1936.