Gibson v. Lemke

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Oklahoma
DecidedAugust 2, 2024
Docket6:24-cv-00230
StatusUnknown

This text of Gibson v. Lemke (Gibson v. Lemke) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gibson v. Lemke, (E.D. Okla. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

DIMITRIUS GEORGE GIBSON,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 24-CV-230-JFH-JAR

JOHNSON & JOHNSON, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Dimitrius George Gibson (“Gibson”) is a pro se state prisoner in the custody of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections who is incarcerated at Howard McLeod Correctional Center in Atoka, Oklahoma. He filed this civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking relief for alleged constitutional violations at his present facility and the “Holdenville facility.” Dkt. No. 1. The defendants are Johnson & Johnson, located in Montgomery, Texas; the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (“ODOC”); Howard McLeod Medical Facility; Holdenville Correction Facility; and Howard McLeod Correctional Center. Id. at 3-4. I. Screening/Dismissal Standards Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The pleading standard for all civil actions was articulated in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must present factual allegations, assumed to be true, that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint also must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A court must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true,

even if doubtful in fact, and must construe the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 555-56. “So, when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” the cause of action should be dismissed. Id. at 558. The Court applies the same standard of review for dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) that is employed for Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (10th Cir. 2007). See also Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that § 1915A dismissals are reviewed under the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard for stating a claim for relief). A pro se plaintiff’s complaint must be broadly construed under this standard. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The generous

construction given to the pro se litigant’s allegations, however, “does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Notwithstanding a pro se plaintiff’s various mistakes or misunderstandings of legal doctrines or procedural requirements, “if a court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so . . . .” Id. A reviewing court need not accept “mere conclusions characterizing pleaded facts.” Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1390 (10th Cir. 1990). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a

2 plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotations and citations omitted). The Court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s

behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997). II. Improper Defendants Gibson’s complaint concerns the circumstances surrounding his receiving the COVID vaccine in July 2022 and the adverse effects he allegedly suffered. Dkt No. 1 at 5-6. He also alleges he has received improper medication at the McLeod facility. Id. at 6. He is seeking monetary damages. Id. at 7. Gibson’s claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which states: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Id. (emphasis added). Gibson has not named any “persons” in his lawsuit. Instead, he has named Johnson & Johnson, the ODOC, and prison facilities. The ODOC, a state agency, is entitled to dismissal under the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court against a state, regardless of the relief sought. When a state agency is named as a defendant, the Eleventh Amendment continues to bar the action “if the state is the real, substantial party in interest.” Oklahoma has not consented to be sued in 3 federal court, see Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 152.1, and § 1983 does not abrogate states’ sovereign immunity, see Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Because the Eleventh Amendment involves sovereign immunity, the official-capacity claims are dismissed “without prejudice” rather than “with prejudice.” Rural Water Sewer & Solid Waste Mgmt., Dist. No. 1,

Logan County, Okla. v.

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
491 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Sutton v. Utah State School for the Deaf & Blind
173 F.3d 1226 (Tenth Circuit, 1999)
Kay v. Bemis
500 F.3d 1214 (Tenth Circuit, 2007)
Gallagher v. Shelton
587 F.3d 1063 (Tenth Circuit, 2009)
Gregory Turley v. Dave Rednour
729 F.3d 645 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Archuleta v. McShan
897 F.2d 495 (Tenth Circuit, 1990)
Bryson v. City of Edmond
905 F.2d 1386 (Tenth Circuit, 1990)
Gilles v. United States
906 F.2d 1386 (Tenth Circuit, 1990)
Hall v. Bellmon
935 F.2d 1106 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)
Miller v. Glanz
948 F.2d 1562 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
Gibson v. Lemke, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gibson-v-lemke-oked-2024.