Gibson v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: September 4, 2025
• Docket: 4:24-cv-00464
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Kellie Gibson, No. CV-24-00464-TUC-JCH (BGM)

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Before the Court is Plaintiff Kellie Gibson’s appeal of the Social Security 16 Administration Commissioner’s denial of her application for disability benefits (Doc. 1). 17 The Court has reviewed the Opening Brief, Answering Brief, and administrative record 18 (“AR”) (Docs. 13, 14, 17). For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s appeal is denied. 19 PROCEDURAL HISTORY 20 On August 7, 2018, Kellie Gibson filed an application for disability insurance 21 benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”). AR 71, 370–73. Gibson 22 alleged she had been disabled and unable to work since August 9, 2017, due to depression, 23 attention deficit disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, back injuries, arthritis, poor 24 eyesight, and periodontal disease. AR 73. Before August 9, 2017, Gibson worked in 25 prepress graphic design for approximately 11 years. AR 82. Gibson’s disability application 26 was denied upon initial review and upon reconsideration. AR 101–04, 106–10. After 27 denial on reconsideration, Gibson requested a hearing in front of an administrative law 28 judge (“ALJ”). AR 114–15. 1 First Administrative Hearing 2 On June 23, 2021, Gibson’s first administrative hearing was held. See AR 34–70. 3 After the hearing, ALJ Deborah Van Vleck found that Gibson had the severe impairments 4 of obesity and aggravating mild degenerative disc disease of the spine. AR 15. The ALJ 5 determined that Gibson had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform medium 6 work with limitations. AR 21. She also found that Gibson was capable of performing her 7 past relevant work as a graphic designer, data entry clerk, and instant print operator. AR 27. 8 The ALJ concluded Gibson was not disabled under the Act. AR 28. The Appeals Council 9 denied Gibson’s request for review, AR 1, and Gibson appealed the decision to the United 10 States District Court for the District of Arizona. See AR 1071–75. 11 District Court Remand 12 On March 20, 2023, United States District Judge Dominic Lanza reversed the ALJ’s 13 decision and remanded Gibson’s case back to the Commissioner for further consideration. 14 See AR 1077–96. Judge Lanza concluded the ALJ erred by failing to support her rejection 15 of Nurse Practitioner (“NP”) Dena Wampler’s medical assessment with substantial 16 evidence. See AR 1094–95. Judge Lanza found the ALJ had erroneously concluded that 17 NP Wampler’s assessment lacked supportability because the assessment was supported by 18 Wampler’s own treatment notes. See AR 1094. The Court instructed the ALJ to determine 19 whether to credit Wampler’s assessment in light of her extensive treatment notes on 20 remand. AR 1096. 21 Second Administrative Hearing 22 On November 29, 2023, ALJ Peter Baum presided over a second administrative 23 hearing. See AR 999–1028. At the hearing, medical expert Dr. Linda Miller testified to 24 assist the ALJ in evaluating Gibson’s medically determinable mental impairments. 25 See AR 1006. Dr. Miller testified that in addition to the medically determinable mental 26 impairment of bipolar disorder, Gibson frequently used marijuana and had the medically 27 determinable mental impairment of marijuana use disorder. See AR 1007–20. After the 28 hearing, ALJ Baum completed a five-step disability evaluation followed by a five-step drug 1 addiction and alcohol (“DAA”) materiality determination.1 AR 967–90. 2 In the materiality determination, the ALJ analyzed whether Gibson would be 3 disabled if she stopped using marijuana. See AR 981–89. The ALJ found that Gibson would 4 have the same severe medically determinable impairments without her marijuana use and 5 that none of her impairments met the criteria of a listed impairment under the Act. 6 See AR 981–83. The ALJ determined that, if she stopped using marijuana, Gibson would 7 have the RFC to perform medium work with limitations. AR 983–88. The ALJ also found 8 that Gibson remained unable to perform past relevant work without using marijuana, 9 AR 988, but she would be able to perform work that existed in significant numbers in the 10 national economy. AR 988–89. The ALJ thus concluded that Gibson’s marijuana use was 11 material to the disability determination, and Gibson was not disabled. AR 989. The Appeals 12 Council denied Gibson’s exceptions to the ALJ’s decision. See AR 956–60. 13 Second District Court Appeal 14 On September 17, 2024, Gibson filed her appeal with this Court asserting that the 15 Commissioner’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence and is contrary to law 16 (Doc. 1). On November 15, 2024, the Commissioner filed a certified copy of the 17 administrative record (Doc. 13). On December 13, 2024, Gibson filed her Opening Brief 18 (Doc. 14), and on February 12, 2025, the Commissioner filed his Answering Brief 19 (Doc. 17). Gibson did not file an optional reply. This Order follows. 20 BACKGROUND 21 Born in 1959, Gibson was 58 years old when she last filed for disability benefits. 22 See AR 370. Gibson earned her high school diploma and completed some undergraduate 23 courses at Pima Community College and the University of Arizona, among other 24 educational institutions. AR 402. She worked several jobs from 2001 through July 2018, 25 nearly all of them involving graphic design responsibilities. See AR 403, 1279–84. Gibson 26 testified that she has been disabled since July 4, 2018, when she left her customer service 27

28 1 The five-step disability evaluation and separate materiality determination are discussed in greater detail under the Claim Evaluation and Administrative Decision headings. 1 position at the Castle Club Casino. AR 1003. She also testified that she tried to find 2 freelance graphic design work after July 2018, but that there were no available positions 3 for non-degree holding applicants. AR 1014. Gibson further testified that she has been 4 using marijuana four or five days a week since it became legal in Arizona and that her use 5 allows her to get along with other people, “kill the time,” and calm her anxiety. AR 1008, 6 1021. Until she began collecting retirement benefits at age sixty-two, Gibson had been 7 receiving financial support from her mother. AR 1004. 8 CLAIM EVALUATION 9 To determine whether a claimant is disabled under the Social Security Act, an ALJ 10 follows a five-step sequential evaluation. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 11 2020). The burden of proof is carried by the claimant at steps one through four. Id. 12 At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial 13 gainful activity.” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987). Substantial gainful activity 14 is “work done for pay or profit that involves significant mental or physical activities.” 15 Ford, 950 F.3d at 1148 (quoting Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 515 (9th Cir. 2001)). If the 16 claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the evaluation proceeds to step two. 17 Bowen, 482 U.S. at 140. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a 18 “medically severe impairment or combination of impairments.” Id. at 140–41. An 19 impairment is “severe” if it significantly limits the claimant’s “physical or mental ability 20 to do basic work activities.” Ford, 950 F.3d at 1148 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(a)). If 21 the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments, the 22 evaluation proceeds to step three. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141. At step three, the ALJ 23 determines whether the medically severe impairment meets or equals one of the Act’s listed 24 impairments. Id. If the severe impairment does not meet or equal one of the listed 25 impairments, the evaluation proceeds to step four. Id. Between steps three and four, the 26 ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC. Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 27 1222–23 (9th Cir. 2009). A claimant’s RFC is what the claimant can do despite her physical 28 and mental limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). At step four, the ALJ determines 1 whether the severe impairment prevents the claimant from performing her past work. 2 Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141. If the claimant cannot perform her past work, the evaluation 3 proceeds to step five. Id. at 142. At step five, the burden shifts to the ALJ to show that the 4 claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy in view of her age, 5 education, and work experience. Ford, 950 F.3d at 1149. The claimant is entitled to 6 disability benefits only if she is unable to perform other work in the national economy. 7 Bowen, 482 U.S. at 142. 8 When a claimant has documented medical evidence of alcoholism or drug addiction, 9 a disabled finding under the five-step inquiry does not automatically qualify her for 10 disability benefits. Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2001); 11 SSR 13-2P, 2013 WL 621536, at *4 (Feb. 20, 2013). A claimant will not be considered 12 disabled if her drug addiction or alcoholism is found to be a “contributing factor material 13 to the Commissioner's determination that the individual is disabled.” Bustamante, 262 F.3d 14 at 954 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535(a), 416.935(a)). To determine whether drug 15 addiction is a contributing factor material to the determination of disability, the ALJ must 16 decide whether the claimant would still be disabled if she were not using drugs. SSR 13-2P, 17 2013 WL 621536, at *4–5. This determination, called a DAA materiality determination, 18 involves the ALJ repeating the five-step evaluation and separating out the impact of the 19 drug addiction from the other non-substance related impairments. See Ball v. Massanari, 20 254 F.3d 817, 822–23 (9th Cir. 2001). If the claimant’s remaining limitations would be 21 disabling without the drug-related impairments, then the drug addiction is not material to 22 the determination of disability and the claimant is disabled.2 Id. at 821. If the remaining 23 limitations would not be disabling without the drug-related impairments, the drug addiction 24 2 See also Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 955 (cleaned up) (“In other words, an ALJ must first 25 conduct the five-step inquiry without separating out the impact of … drug addiction. If the 26 ALJ finds that the claimant is not disabled under the five-step inquiry, then the claimant is not entitled to benefits and there is no need to proceed with the analysis[.] If the ALJ finds 27 that the claimant is disabled and there is medical evidence of his or her drug addiction or 28 alcoholism, then the ALJ should proceed … to determine if the claimant would still be found disabled if he or she stopped using alcohol or drugs.” (quotations omitted)). 1 is a contributing factor material to the determination of disability and the claim is denied. 2 Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 2007). In materiality determinations, the 3 claimant bears the burden of proving her drug addiction is not a contributing factor material 4 to the disability determination. Ball, 254 F.3d at 821. 5 ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION 6 In the initial five-step disability evaluation, which included Gibson’s marijuana use, 7 the ALJ found that Gibson met the insured status requirements for disability benefits 8 through June 30, 2026. AR 968. At step one, the ALJ determined Gibson had not engaged 9 in substantial gainful activity since her alleged disability onset date of July 4, 2018. 10 AR 970. At step two, he found Gibson had the medically determinable severe impairments 11 of obesity, mild degenerative disc disease of the spine, bipolar type II disorder with anxiety, 12 and marijuana use disorder. Id. At step three, the ALJ determined none of Gibson’s severe 13 impairments were disabling. Id. The ALJ next determined Gibson had the RFC to perform 14 medium work with limitations. AR 973. The limitations included no interaction with the 15 general public or customers, no teamwork doing final product work, no assembly work, no 16 strict quotas, and an inability to sustain simple routine tasks if working outside the 17 home. Id. At step four, the ALJ determined Gibson was unable to perform any past relevant 18 work. AR 979. At step five, the ALJ found there were no jobs that existed in significant 19 numbers in the national economy that Gibson could perform when using marijuana. 20 AR 980. The ALJ concluded Gibson was disabled when considering her marijuana use 21 disorder. AR 981. 22 At step two of the subsequent materiality determination, which omitted Gibson’s 23 marijuana use disorder, the ALJ determined Gibson’s severe impairments were the same 24 as initially determined. AR 981. At step three, the ALJ found none of Gibson’s severe 25 impairments were disabling if she stopped using marijuana. Id. The ALJ next determined 26 that Gibson had the RFC to perform medium work with limitations. AR 983–84. The 27 limitations included no interaction with the public or customers, no teamwork doing final 28 product work, no assembly work, and no strict quotas. Id. At step four, the ALJ found 1 Gibson was unable to perform any past relevant work even without using marijuana. AR 2 988. However, at step five, the ALJ found there were jobs that existed in the national 3 economy that Gibson could perform when she was not using marijuana, including cleaner, 4 dishwasher, and lab equipment cleaner. AR 988–89. The ALJ thus determined Gibson’s 5 marijuana use was a contributing factor material to the determination of disability and she 6 was not disabled. Id. 7 LEGAL STANDARD 8 Federal court review of social security decisions is limited. Treichler v. Comm'r of 9 Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014). The Commissioner’s denial of 10 benefits may be set aside only when his findings are “based on legal error or are not 11 supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Schneider v. Comm'r of Soc. 12 Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000). “Substantial evidence is more than a mere 13 scintilla but less than a preponderance—it is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind 14 might accept as adequate to support the conclusion.” Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749 15 (9th Cir. 1994). In determining whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by 16 substantial evidence, courts are to consider the record as a whole, “weighing both the 17 evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s 18 conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). Where the evidence is 19 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, courts must uphold the 20 Commissioner’s decision. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 1995). 21 Courts review only those issues raised by the challenging party when deciding whether to 22 reverse the Commissioner’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 23 2001). 24 DISCUSSION 25 Gibson raises three arguments for remand to the Commissioner. See Doc. 14 at 2.3 26 Gibson argues the ALJ committed harmful error by: (i) omitting Dr. Miller’s recommended 27 simple and repetitive work limitation in the RFC; (ii) failing to account for Gibson’s 28 3 Citations are to CM/ECF page numbers unless otherwise indicated. 1 moderate mental functioning limitation in adapting and managing oneself in the RFC; and 2 (iii) failing to reference a period of abstinence from marijuana to support his materiality 3 determination. See generally Doc. 14 at 8–21. The Court finds that Gibson mischaracterizes 4 Dr. Miller’s hearing testimony; it was not erroneous to omit some of Dr. Miller’s 5 recommended work limitations in the residual functional capacity assessment; the 6 assessment is supported by substantial evidence; the ALJ’s written decision complies with 7 the special psychiatric review technique; and it is unnecessary to reference a period of 8 abstinence in a materiality determination. This Order addresses Gibson’s arguments in the 9 order they are raised. 10 I. Recommended Work Limitation Omission Not Harmful Error 11 Gibson first asserts the ALJ erred by omitting Dr. Miller’s alleged work restriction 12 that she be limited to “simple and repetitive tasks” when not using marijuana from the 13 residual functional capacity assessment. See Doc. 14 at 12. Gibson also contends the RFC 14 failed to include any limitation that she was restricted from performing tasks directly with 15 a coworker. Id. Gibson argues the omission of these limitations without explanation is 16 harmful error. Id. at 13. The Court disagrees. 17 A. Mischaracterization of Evidence 18 The first problem with Gibson’s claim is that it mischaracterizes the evidence. At 19 Gibson’s November 29, 2023 disability hearing, Dr. Miller testified as a medical expert. 20 See AR 1005–20. Her testimony was used to assist the ALJ in evaluating Gibson’s 21 medically determinable mental impairments. AR 1006. Dr. Miller testified that Gibson had 22 the medically determinable mental impairments of bipolar disorder and marijuana use 23 disorder. AR 1007. Dr. Miller concluded Gibson’s bipolar disorder could be exacerbated 24 by her marijuana use, and she would accordingly need to evaluate Gibson both with and 25 without the use of marijuana. See AR 1015. Dr. Miller then testified: 26 I would have [Gibson] work simple and repetitive tasks. She should not have to work with the public. She shouldn't have to work in a setting where she is 27 part of a team that has to come up with the final work product. . . . [S]he would not be able to do [assembly-type work]. 28 1 AR 1016. Dr. Miller then clarified her recommended work limitation, testifying: 2 I don’t think [Gibson] would be limited to simple and repetitive-type work if she didn’t have to work with the public, didn’t have to work against strict 3 quotas, didn’t have to work in teams with coworkers or directly with a coworker. I think she would probably not be limited to do simple and 4 repetitive tasks. 5 AR 1016–17. The ALJ asked Dr. Miller whether the limitations applied to Gibson’s 6 capabilities “with or without the marijuana use disorder,” to which Dr. Miller replied, 7 “[t]hat’s without the marijuana use disorder.” AR 1017. 8 Considering the context of Dr. Miller’s testimony, it is a mischaracterization of the 9 evidence to claim that Dr. Miller recommended a work limitation that restricted Gibson 10 only to “simple and repetitive tasks” when she was not using marijuana. See Doc. 14 at 11. 11 The hearing transcript shows Dr. Miller modified her restrictive work limitation by 12 testifying that Gibson would not be limited to simple and repetitive work if she did not 13 have to work with the public, work in teams or directly with a coworker, and work against 14 strict quotas. AR 1016–17. Accordingly, Gibson’s argument that the ALJ erroneously 15 rejected portions of Dr. Miller’s testimony is based on a false premise. 16 B. Assessment Supported By Substantial Evidence 17 Even if Dr. Miller had recommended that Gibson be exclusively restricted to simple 18 and repetitive tasks when not using marijuana, the ALJ’s RFC assessment would still be 19 valid because the assessment discussed the supportability and consistency factors of 20 Dr. Miller’s opinion, and the RFC is supported by substantial evidence. Gibson fails to 21 support her argument with controlling caselaw that requires an ALJ to fully adopt a medical 22 expert’s recommended limitations when the residual functional capacity assessment is 23 otherwise adequately supported. See Doc. 14 at 11–13. Contrary to Gibson’s argument, it 24 is not erroneous for an ALJ’s RFC to be consistent with but not identical to a physician’s 25 assessed limitations of a claimant. See Lewis v. Colvin, No. 3:15-CV-02307, 2017 WL 26 252284, at *4 (D. Or. Jan. 19, 2017) (citing Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 613 27 F.3d 1217, 1222–23 (9th Cir. 2010)) (“When an ALJ's findings are consistent with but not 28 identical to a physician's assessed limitations of the claimant, those findings do not 1 constitute a rejection of the physician's opinion.”). 2 An ALJ may discount a medical doctor’s opinion by offering substantial evidence 3 that the opinion is unsupported and inconsistent. See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 4 (9th Cir. 2022). In doing so, the ALJ must articulate how persuasive he finds the opinion 5 and explain how he considered its supportability and consistency in reaching his findings. 6 Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b), (b)(2). “Supportability concerns how a medical source 7 supports a medical opinion with relevant evidence, while consistency concerns how a 8 medical opinion is consistent with the evidence from other medical and nonmedical 9 sources.” Kitchen v. Kijakazi, 82 F.4th 732, 740 (9th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). A medical 10 opinion can be rejected if it is conclusory, brief, and unsupported by the record as a whole 11 or by objective medical findings. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 12 1195 (9th Cir. 2004). A conflict between treatment notes and a treating provider’s opinion 13 and inconsistencies between the opinion and the claimant’s daily activities may also 14 constitute adequate reasons to discredit the opinion of a physician or other medical 15 provider. See Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2014), superseded by statute 16 on other grounds. The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in the medical record, 17 including conflicts among physicians’ opinions. Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 18 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008). 19 Here, the ALJ’s determination that Gibson had the RFC to perform medium work 20 with limitations if she stopped using marijuana is supported by substantial evidence. 21 See AR 983–88. In calculating the RFC, the ALJ referenced Gibson’s daily activities of 22 driving, cooking, caring for pets, volunteering, shopping, socializing, doing laundry, 23 running a dishwasher, and emptying trash. AR 984. He included normal findings by 24 NP Wampler that included a cooperative attitude, logical thought process, normal 25 perceptions, and within-normal-limits insight, thought content, and cognition. 26 See AR 984–87. The ALJ cited observations that Gibson’s mood was stable with 27 medications, she was organizing her house and doing yardwork while on Cymbalta, and 28 that while she reported depression and anxiety, her mood and affect were normal on exam. 1 AR 985. The ALJ noted that in 2022 and 2023, Gibson reported improved mental 2 symptoms that coincided with normal mental health examinations. AR 985. The ALJ 3 incorporated Dr. Miller’s opinion that without marijuana use Gibson had no limitation in 4 understanding, remembering, or applying information; mild limitation in interacting with 5 others and in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and moderate limitation in 6 adapting and managing oneself. AR 986. In adopting the majority of Dr. Miller’s 7 recommended work limitations, the ALJ adequately addressed the supportability and 8 consistency of her opinion. See id. The ALJ found Dr. Miller’s opinion supportable because 9 it incorporated Gibson’s improvement when she was compliant with medications. Id. The 10 ALJ found Dr. Miller’s opinion consistent because the evidence as a whole reflected 11 reports of improvement and stable exam findings when Gibson was not using marijuana. 12 See Id. Accordingly, it was not erroneous for the ALJ to incorporate some but not all of 13 Dr. Miller’s assessed limitations. 14 C. Harmless Error Applies 15 To the extent that the ALJ erred by writing that Dr. Miller limited Gibson only to 16 “simple repetitive tasks” when not using marijuana, see AR 986, the error is harmless. An 17 error is harmless if there remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision and 18 the error does not affect the ultimate nondisability determination. Molina v. Astrue, 674 19 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). 20 To decide whether harmless error applies, courts are instructed to “look at the record as a 21 whole to determine whether the error alters the outcome of the case.” Id. Harmlessness 22 does not require the court to determine what ultimate decision the ALJ would have made 23 absent the error, but only to ask whether the remaining bases for the decision are sufficient 24 to support the determination. Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162. As previously indicated, 25 substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC assessment and any error in the ALJ’s written 26 decision is inconsequential to his nondisability determination. See AR 983–88. The ALJ 27 made valid evidentiary inferences, weighed medical opinions with other medical evidence 28 in the record, and sufficiently analyzed the supportability and consistency factors of 1 Dr. Miller’s opinion. See, e.g., AR 986. Accordingly, Gibson’s first claim is denied. 2 II. Decision Adheres to Special Psychiatric Review Technique 3 Gibson next asserts that the residual functional capacity assessment is not supported 4 by substantial evidence because the assessment fails to include a moderate mental 5 functioning limitation in adapting or managing oneself. Doc. 14 at 14–17. Gibson argues 6 Dr. Miller restricted her to simple and routine work to account for her moderate limitation 7 in adapting or managing oneself, and the ALJ erred by rejecting the limitation without 8 explanation. See id. at 15. Again, the Court disagrees. 9 A. Technique Defined 10 In step two of the disability determination, an ALJ must determine whether the 11 claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. Bowen, 12 482 U.S. at 140–41. To determine whether the claimant suffers from a medically 13 determinable mental impairment, an ALJ is required to follow a special psychiatric review 14 technique. See Keyser v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 2011). To 15 follow the technique, the ALJ must: (i) determine whether an applicant has a medically 16 determinable mental impairment; (ii) rate the degree of functional limitation in four 17 functional areas; (iii) determine the severity of the mental impairment; and then, if the 18 impairment is severe, (iv) proceed to step three of the disability analysis to determine if the 19 impairment meets or equals a specific listed mental disorder. Id. (citations omitted). This 20 technique is documented in a psychiatric review technique form (“PRTF”). Id. An ALJ’s 21 written decision must incorporate pertinent findings and conclusions based on the 22 technique and include a specific finding as to the degree of limitation in each of the 23 functional areas. Id. In other words, the regulations contemplate that an ALJ’s written 24 decision should contain a narrative rationale, instead of the checklist of conclusions found 25 in a PRTF. Id. 26 B. Decision Follows Technique 27 Here, the ALJ’s written decision demonstrates that the ALJ followed the special 28 psychiatric review technique as required by social security regulations. See AR 981–83. 1 The ALJ determined Gibson suffered from the medically determinable mental impairments 2 of bipolar type II disorder and marijuana use disorder. AR 970. The ALJ rated the degree 3 of Gibson’s functional limitations without the marijuana use disorder in the four functional 4 areas. AR 982–83. The ALJ found that Gibson had “no limitation” in understanding, 5 remembering, or applying information; “mild limitation” in interacting with others; “mild 6 limitation” with regard to concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and “moderate 7 limitation” for adapting or managing oneself. Id. The ALJ reiterated that Gibson’s mental 8 impairments were severe and that if she stopped using marijuana, she would not have an 9 impairment or combination of impairments that would meet one of the Acts’s listed 10 impairments. AR 981. In formulating Gibson’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ 11 provided that Gibson should not have interaction with the general public or customers, she 12 should not have to engage in teamwork doing final product work such as assembly work, 13 and that she should not have to work against strict quotas. AR 983–84. 14 C. Counterargument Unsupported and Unpersuasive 15 Gibson argues the ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment as it concerns her 16 mental functioning limitations is insufficient as a matter of law because the RFC does not 17 address her limitations in the ability to adapt and manage oneself. Doc 14 at 16. Contrary 18 to Gibson’s assertion, the ALJ’s written decision incorporates pertinent findings and 19 conclusions based on the functional limitations of Gibson’s medically determinable mental 20 impairments and is supported by substantial evidence. See AR 982–83. To the extent that 21 the ALJ failed to adopt any one of Dr. Miller’s recommended work limitations verbatim, 22 this fails to render the ALJ’s RFC assessment invalid. See Keyser, 648 F.3d at 726 (finding 23 harmful error where the ALJ’s written decision failed to document the application of the 24 special psychiatric review technique and did not include specific findings as to the degree 25 of limitation in any of the four functional areas). Furthermore, “[n]othing in the regulations 26 suggests that the ALJ is required to provide one-to-one RFC limitations based on the broad 27 paragraph B categories used in the severity and listing steps.” Mary M. v. Kijakazi, 28 No. 20-CV-1457, 2022 WL 891445, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2022). Accordingly, 1 Gibson’s second claim is denied. 2 III. ALJ’s Materiality Determination Supported by Substantial Evidence 3 Gibson finally argues the ALJ’s finding that her marijuana use is material to the 4 determination of disability is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ did 5 not cite to any evidence from a period of sobriety to establish that her condition would 6 improve in the absence of marijuana use. Doc. 14 at 17. Instead, Gibson argues, the ALJ 7 impermissibly relied exclusively on Dr. Miller’s testimony to conduct his determination 8 since no other credible evidence existed. Id. at 19. The Court finds Gibson mischaracterizes 9 the evidence and misinterprets the standard governing materiality determinations. 10 A. DAA Materiality Determinations 11 Under the Act, a claimant “shall not be considered to be disabled . . . if alcoholism 12 or drug addiction would . . . be a contributing factor material to the Commissioner’s 13 determination that the individual is disabled.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(J). In a case where 14 drug addiction is a factor, the ALJ must first conduct the five-step inquiry without 15 separating out the drug addiction’s impact. Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 955. If the ALJ 16 concludes that the claimant is disabled, the ALJ must conduct another five-step inquiry to 17 determine whether the disability would remain if the claimant stopped using drugs. Id. 18 When determining whether a co-occurring mental disorder would remain, the ALJ must 19 rely on “evidence in the case record” that establishes the claimant would not be disabled in 20 the absence of the substance abuse. SSR 13-2P, 2013 WL 621536, at *9. Such evidence 21 includes objective medical findings, consultative examinations, and evidence from non- 22 medical sources (e.g., family, friends, the claimant). Id. at *10–11. When the record lacks 23 evidence of a period of abstinence, the Commissioner may consider the opinion of an 24 acceptable medical source to be sufficient evidence regarding materiality. See id. at 9. If, 25 after conducting a materiality determination, the ALJ determines the claimant would not 26 be disabled absent the substance abuse, then substance abuse is material to the disability 27 determination and benefits must be denied. 20 C.F.R. § 416.935(b)(2)(i). Again, the 28 claimant bears the burden of proving that substance abuse is not a contributing factor 1 material to her disability. Parra, 481 F.3d at 748. 2 B. ALJ’s Materiality Determination 3 As part of his materiality determination, the ALJ determined that if Gibson stopped 4 using marijuana, she would be capable of making a successful adjustment to work that 5 exists in significant numbers in the national economy. AR 988–89. To support his finding, 6 the ALJ referenced objective medical evidence and evidence from non-medical sources. 7 See, e.g., AR 984 (referencing statements by Gibson’s mother and friend that indicated she 8 was able to engage in relatively normal levels of activities when not using marijuana); 9 AR 984–85 (referencing NP Wampler’s clinical findings that Gibson exhibited normal 10 behavior, attitude, and mood on numerous occasions); AR 985 (referencing progress notes 11 and treatment records that indicated normal mental status examinations and Gibson’s own 12 statements that she continued to improve with medication and had increased energy); 13 AR 986 (referencing Dr. Miller’s supported assessment that Gibson improved when 14 compliant with medication and Dr. Miller’s review of Gibson’s stable exam findings); 15 AR 987 (referencing Dr. Tromp’s examination findings of good grooming, hygiene, and 16 physical appearance and no attention or concentration problems). This evidence provides 17 sufficient information to explain the rationale supporting the ALJ’s DAA materiality 18 determination “so that a subsequent reviewer considering all of the evidence in the case 19 record is able to understand the basis for the materiality finding and the determination of 20 whether the claimant is disabled.” SSR 13-2P, 2013 WL 621536, at *2. As such, the ALJ’s 21 materiality determination is supported by substantial evidence. 22 C. Counterarguments Unavailing 23 The Court finds Gibson’s arguments to the contrary inaccurate and unavailing. 24 Gibson argues the ALJ’s materiality findings are not supported by substantial evidence 25 because he did not reference any medical evidence from a period of sobriety to establish 26 that her condition would improve in the absence of marijuana use. Doc. 14 at 17. But the 27 regulations guiding materiality determinations do not require evidence of a period of 28 sobriety to make a determination and provide that it is a claimant’s burden to prove 1 disability not the ALJ’s. See SSR 13-2P, 2013 WL 621536, at *4 (“[I]t is our longstanding 2 policy that the claimant continues to have the burden of proving disability throughout the 3 DAA materiality analysis. There does not have to be evidence from a period of abstinence 4 for the claimant to meet his or her burden of proving disability.”); Timothy S. v. Kijakazi, 5 No. 1:20-CV-03114, 2022 WL 17364279, at *6 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 2022) (reiterating 6 that “SSR 13-2p does not require a period of abstinence,” and ruling that “although there 7 is no period of abstinence, Plaintiff ha[d] not met his burden in demonstrating his substance 8 use [was] not material”); Quill v. Colvin, No. 2:13-CV-3097, 2014 WL 3608894, at *10 9 (E.D. Wash. July 22, 2014) (observing that the “[p]laintiff’s contention that the ALJ 10 incorrectly analyzed the DAA determination because no evidence exists of a period of 11 abstinence is not well taken.”). Gibson’s argument that the ALJ erred by relying 12 exclusively on Dr. Miller’s testimony to determine her limitations in the absence of 13 marijuana use also fails. See Doc. 14 at 18. As indicated above, the ALJ’s residual 14 functional capacity assessment and DAA materiality determinations are supported by 15 substantial evidence, and even a cursory review of the record demonstrates that the ALJ 16 did not exclusively rely on Dr. Miller’s opinion or testimony to support his findings. 17 See AR 984–88. Accordingly, Gibson’s final argument, and her appeal in its entirety, is 18 denied. 19 /// 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 ORDER 2 Accordingly, 3 IT IS ORDERED withdrawing the reference to Magistrate Judge Bruce G. Macdonald (Doc. 12). 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED affirming the decision of the Commissioner and 6|| directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 7 Dated this 4th day of September, 2025. 8 9 f 4) 10 ae □□ □□ ll / / John C. Hinderaker _/United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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