Gibson v. Chouteau

75 U.S. 314, 19 L. Ed. 317, 8 Wall. 314, 1868 U.S. LEXIS 1103

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: April 12, 1869
• Status: Published

Opinion

Mr. Justice MILLER

delivered the opinion of the court

The record presented to the Supreme Court questions the validity of Mrs. McRee’s title, the transfer of her titlé to plaintiff, the trust asserted by which plaintiff’s title enured to the benefit of defendants, and the statute of limitations. On all these the court below must have found for plaintiff, for such a finding was essential to his recovery. The first judgment of the Supreme Court affirming the judgmeut of the Land Court must also have found all these issues for the plaintiff.

We arc asked now to hold that the second judgment of the Supreme Court, which reversed that of tiie Laud Court, was founded on the question of limitation. If we look to the language used in the judgment of the court in setting aside its judgment of affirmance and granting a rehearing, or in the final judgment of reversal, we can see nothing to justify that inference.

Tins court has decided, in the case of Rector v. Ashley, * following Williams v. Norris, † that the opinion of the court cannot be resorted to for the purpose of showing that a question of Federal cognizance was decided by the State court. In the present case it is said that the application for a rehearing was based exclusively on the question of the statute of limitation. That which is here called a motion for a rehearing is merely an argument of counsel setting forth numerous decisions of the courts, and many reasons of counsel why the statute should be held to be a bar; and it insists that this question had not received sufficient attention at the hands of the court. It is not easy to see how this argument can be regarded as a part of the record of the ease.' It can have no better claim to be so regarded than the opiuion of the court, which accompanies the record.

If, however, it could be treated as part of the record) it. affords no conclusive evidence that the reheftring was granted on that ground.

But if we could infer that the rehearing was granted because the court was of opiuion that it had not well considered that question, it is to be remembered that the' reargument took place four months afterwards, that there is nothing to show what might then have been presented by counsel on either side, or what might have been considered by the court, for the case was fully opened, by setting aside the former judgment, to every consideration which cóuld rightfully influence the decision. It is hardly a reasonable inference, under these circumstances, that the court did decide the case on the question of the statute of limitation, and certainly it does not appear that the case was uecessarily decided on that quostiou, or that the proposition was essential to the judgment.

It is our opinion, therefore, that under the repeated decisions of this court, this record presents no case of which we have jurisdiction. The writ of error is therefore

Dismissed.

* 6 Wallace, 142.

† 12 Wheaton, 117.