Gibney v. Gibney

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Gibney v. Gibney

78 A.D.2d 647, 433 N.Y.S.2d 994, 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13142

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 14, 1980

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 78 A.D.2d 647 (Gibney v. Gibney) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Gibney v. Gibney, 78 A.D.2d 647, 433 N.Y.S.2d 994, 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13142 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1980).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action, inter alia, for a divorce, defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, dated May 21, 1980, which denied their motion to dismiss the complaint. Order affirmed, without costs or disbursements. Special Term, the affidavits of the parties at Special Term, and the briefs on [648]*648appeal have treated that part of the motion to dismiss as to the "first”, "second” and "third” causes of action as one for summary judgment; therefore, we will treat that part of the motion as such. (See Maybrown v Malveme Distrs., 57 AD2d 548, 549, mot for lv to app den 42 NY2d 804.) We agree with Special Term that the record presents questions of fact concerning the validity of the separation agreement which require a trial. In addition, we find that the allegations in the "fourth” and "fifth” causes of action are legally sufficient. (Cf. Simonds v Simonds, 45 NY2d 233; Janke v Janke, 47 AD2d 445, affd 39 NY2d 786, on the opn of Mr. Justice Goldman at the App Div.) Damiani, J. P., Gulotta, Martuscello and O’Connor, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In an action, inter alia, for a divorce, defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, dated May 21, 1980, which denied their motion to dismiss the complaint. Order affirmed, without costs or disbursements. Special Term, the affidavits of the parties at Special Term, and the briefs on [648]*648appeal have treated that part of the motion to dismiss as to the "first”, "second” and "third” causes of action as one for summary judgment; therefore, we will treat that part of the motion as such. (See Maybrown v Malveme Distrs., 57 AD2d 548, 549, mot for lv to app den 42 NY2d 804.) We agree with Special Term that the record presents questions of fact concerning the validity of the separation agreement which require a trial. In addition, we find that the allegations in the "fourth” and "fifth” causes of action are legally sufficient. (Cf. Simonds v Simonds, 45 NY2d 233; Janke v Janke, 47 AD2d 445, affd 39 NY2d 786, on the opn of Mr. Justice Goldman at the App Div.) Damiani, J. P., Gulotta, Martuscello and O’Connor, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

78 A.D.2d 647, 433 N.Y.S.2d 994, 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13142, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gibney-v-gibney-nyappdiv-1980.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack