Gibbs v. Gaimel

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Gibbs v. Gaimel

127 S.E.2d 271, 257 N.C. 650, 1962 N.C. LEXIS 409

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedSeptember 19, 1962

Docket22

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 127 S.E.2d 271 (Gibbs v. Gaimel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Gibbs v. Gaimel, 127 S.E.2d 271, 257 N.C. 650, 1962 N.C. LEXIS 409 (N.C. 1962).

Pincite

Opinion

HiggiNS, J.

The evidence permits these inferences: The defendant’s vehicle was defective. He knew of the defect, but permitted the plaintiff to use it without disclosing the defect, of which she had no knowledge. The defective condition of the accelerator occasionally permitted the gasoline to continue to flow into the engine after the release of pressure on the accelerator pedal. The defendant had found out the danger of a racing engine could be overcome by “patting” the pedal. But he neither informed the plaintiff of the defect nor explained the manner by which the danger could be avoided. Thus, when the accelerator jammed, the plaintiff was unprepared for what confronted her. The result was a damaged house, a demolished automobile, and a permanently injured driver.

The evidence was sufficient to support a finding the owner had breached his duty to give the plaintiff notice of the defective condition of the automobile he was permitting her to use. “He who puts a thing in charge of another which he knows, or in the exercise of prudence he should have known, to be dangerous, or to possess characteristics which, in the ordinary course of events, are likely to produce injury, owes a duty to such person to give reasonable warning or notice of such danger.” Austin v. Austin, 252 N.C. 283, 113 S.E. 2d 553; Honeycutt v. Bryan, 240 N.C. 238, 81 S.E. 2d 653; Sears v. Interurban Transp. Co., 125 So. 748, 752 (La.); Cronin v. Swett, 157 Neb. 662, 61 N.W. 2d 219.

In order to make out a case, “Direct evidence of negligence is not required, but the same may be inferred from acts and . . . circumstances . . .” Frazier v. Gas Co., 247 N.C. 256, 100 S.E. 2d 501; Shepard v. Mfg. Co., 251 N.C. 751, 112 S.E. 2d 380; Young v. Koger, 94 Ga. App. 524, 95 S.E. 2d 385.

The evidence was insufficient to show the plaintiff’s contributory negligence as a matter of law. Bell v. Maxwell, 246 N.C. 257, 98 S.E. 2d 33. The jammed accelerator confronted her with a sudden emergency which she did not create. Hence she cannot be held for failure to pursue the wisest choice of conduct. Bundy v. Belue, 253 N.C. 31, 116 S.E. 2d 200; Hennig v. Booth and Naugle v. Booth, 4 N.J. Misc. 150, 132 A. 294.

We have carefully examined and found without merit all assignments of error which comply with Rule 19(3). Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486; Nichols v. McFarland, 249 N.C. 125, 105 S.E. 2d 294; Rules *653 of Practice in the Supreme Court 19(3), 254 N.C. 797. The cause presented issues of fact for the jury. McFalls v. Smith, 249 N.C. 123, 105 S.E. 2d 297. The record discloses

No error.

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HiggiNS, J.

The evidence permits these inferences: The defendant’s vehicle was defective. He knew of the defect, but permitted the plaintiff to use it without disclosing the defect, of which she had no knowledge. The defective condition of the accelerator occasionally permitted the gasoline to continue to flow into the engine after the release of pressure on the accelerator pedal. The defendant had found out the danger of a racing engine could be overcome by “patting” the pedal. But he neither informed the plaintiff of the defect nor explained the manner by which the danger could be avoided. Thus, when the accelerator jammed, the plaintiff was unprepared for what confronted her. The result was a damaged house, a demolished automobile, and a permanently injured driver.

The evidence was sufficient to support a finding the owner had breached his duty to give the plaintiff notice of the defective condition of the automobile he was permitting her to use. “He who puts a thing in charge of another which he knows, or in the exercise of prudence he should have known, to be dangerous, or to possess characteristics which, in the ordinary course of events, are likely to produce injury, owes a duty to such person to give reasonable warning or notice of such danger.” Austin v. Austin, 252 N.C. 283, 113 S.E. 2d 553; Honeycutt v. Bryan, 240 N.C. 238, 81 S.E. 2d 653; Sears v. Interurban Transp. Co., 125 So. 748, 752 (La.); Cronin v. Swett, 157 Neb. 662, 61 N.W. 2d 219.

In order to make out a case, “Direct evidence of negligence is not required, but the same may be inferred from acts and . . . circumstances . . .” Frazier v. Gas Co., 247 N.C. 256, 100 S.E. 2d 501; Shepard v. Mfg. Co., 251 N.C. 751, 112 S.E. 2d 380; Young v. Koger, 94 Ga. App. 524, 95 S.E. 2d 385.

The evidence was insufficient to show the plaintiff’s contributory negligence as a matter of law. Bell v. Maxwell, 246 N.C. 257, 98 S.E. 2d 33. The jammed accelerator confronted her with a sudden emergency which she did not create. Hence she cannot be held for failure to pursue the wisest choice of conduct. Bundy v. Belue, 253 N.C. 31, 116 S.E. 2d 200; Hennig v. Booth and Naugle v. Booth, 4 N.J. Misc. 150, 132 A. 294.

We have carefully examined and found without merit all assignments of error which comply with Rule 19(3). Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486; Nichols v. McFarland, 249 N.C. 125, 105 S.E. 2d 294; Rules *653 of Practice in the Supreme Court 19(3), 254 N.C. 797. The cause presented issues of fact for the jury. McFalls v. Smith, 249 N.C. 123, 105 S.E. 2d 297. The record discloses

No error.

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Bluebook (online)

127 S.E.2d 271, 257 N.C. 650, 1962 N.C. LEXIS 409, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gibbs-v-gaimel-nc-1962.

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