Gibbs, Doris v. EXPRESS SERVICES, INC., aka ) EXPRESS EMPLOYMENT ) PROFESSIONALS

2020 TN WC 103
CourtTennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
DecidedOctober 20, 2020
Docket2020-03-0219
StatusPublished

This text of 2020 TN WC 103 (Gibbs, Doris v. EXPRESS SERVICES, INC., aka ) EXPRESS EMPLOYMENT ) PROFESSIONALS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gibbs, Doris v. EXPRESS SERVICES, INC., aka ) EXPRESS EMPLOYMENT ) PROFESSIONALS, 2020 TN WC 103 (Tenn. Super. Ct. 2020).

Opinion

FILED Oct 20, 2020 08:40 AM(ET) TENNESSEE COURT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION IN THE COURT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS AT KNOXVILLE

DORIS GIBBS, ) Docket No. 2020-03-0219 Employee, ) v. ) EXPRESS SERVICES, INC., aka ) EXPRESS EMPLOYMENT ) PROFESSIONALS, ) Employer, ) NEW HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE ) State File No. 118452-2019 COMPANY, ) Carrier, ) And ) ABIGAIL HUDGENS, Administrator ) of the Bureau of Workers' ) Compensation and SUBSEQUENT ) Judge Pamela B. Johnson INJURY FUND. )

COMPENSATION ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Express Services, Inc. (ESI) and the Subsequent Injury Fund (SIF) moved for summary judgment on grounds that no genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Ms. Gibbs's right-leg injury arose primarily out of her employment. Ms. Gibbs disagreed. For the reasons below, the Court holds that ESI and SIF are entitled to summary judgment.

History of Claim

On December 12, 2019, Ms. Gibbs struck her right leg on two storage totes while working. ESI provided temporary disability benefits and ultimately authorized treatment with Dr. Christine Seaworth. After ESI denied further benefits, Ms. Gibbs sought unauthorized treatment.

She filed a Petition for Benefit Determination and Request for Expedited Hearing seeking additional medical and temporary disability benefits. The Expedited Hearing was

1 postponed by agreement due to incomplete discovery, outstanding medical reports, and Ms. Gibbs's hiring of counsel. The Court set a Status Conference for October 1, 2020, to discuss the parties' readiness for the Expedited Hearing and to potentially set it.

In the interim, ESI and the SIP filed this joint summary judgment motion, arguing that no disputed issues of material fact exist. They filed an unsigned physician panel purportedly showing that Ms. Gibbs selected Dr. Seaworth for authorized treatment. They also submitted Dr. Seaworth's affidavit, who stated that Ms. Gibbs's right-leg complaints are at least 50% related to her pre-existing condition. ESI and SIP asserted that Ms. Gibbs did not show through an expert opinion that her current complaints are greater than 50% related to her employment.

Ms. Gibbs opposed the motion, arguing that it was premature because no scheduling deadlines have been set. She asserted that Dr. Seaworth's opinion is not presumed correct because she did not sign the panel nor did ESI and SIP offer testimony proving that Ms. Gibbs selected Dr. Seaworth from the panel. She further argued that the "purported affidavit . . . is undated, unsworn, and does not meet the requirements of a Rule 72 Declaration in lieu of a sworn affidavit." Moreover, she contended that she was forced to seek treatment on her own when ESI stopped providing benefits, and her treating physicians have not given causation opinions because diagnostic testing and treatment are ongomg.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04 (2019).

When a party who does not bear the burden of proof at trial files a motion for summary judgment, it must do one of two things to prevail: (1) submit affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim, or (2) demonstrate that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. Tenn. Code Ann.§ 20-16-101 (2019); see also Rye v. Women's Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 264 (Tenn. 2015).

If the moving party successfully meets one of those elements, the nonmoving party must respond by producing affidavits, pleadings, depositions, responses to interrogatories, or admissions that set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06. If the nonmoving party fails to do so, "summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the [nonmoving] party." Id.

The Court first addresses Ms. Gibbs's argument that the Court should deny the

2 summary judgment motion as premature and finds this argument unpersuasive.

Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 56.02 expressly recognizes that "a party against whom a claim ... is asserted [may] at any time, move ... for a summary judgment in the party's favor[.]" Johnson v. Loomis Armored, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 60, at *8-9 (Nov. 21, 2018) (emphasis added). However, Rule 56.07 provides a mechanism to guard against premature grants of summary judgment. If the nonmoving party needs more time to oppose the motion, it is that party's responsibility to file a motion to continue with an accompanying affidavit stating the reasons for a continuance. Id. Here, if Ms. Gibbs did not file a motion for a continuance.

Turning to the merits of the motion, ESI and SIP asserted that they submitted affirmative evidence negating an essential element of Ms. Gibbs' s claim and showed that her evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of her claim. They relied on Dr. Seaworth's affidavit arguing her causation opinion is presumed correct as the panel- selected authorized treating physician. In contrast, Ms. Gibbs argued that the Court should not apply the presumption to Dr. Seaworth's opinion because the panel was unsigned, and ESI and SIP offered no proof that Ms. Gibbs' selected Dr. Seaworth from the panel.

Under the Workers' Compensation Law, the opinion of a "treating physician" is only entitled to a presumption of correctness if that physician was "selected by the employee from the employer's designated panel of physicians." See Rhodes v. Amazon.com, LLC, 2019 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at *20 n.4 (Jun. 11, 2019).

Here, Ms. Gibbs did not sign the panel, and ESI and SIP did not offer an affidavit that Ms. Gibbs selected Dr. Seaworth over the telephone. Therefore, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Gibbs, the Court finds that no presumption of correctness attaches to Dr. Seaworth's opinion.

Ms. Gibbs additionally contended that the Court could not consider Dr. Seaworth's affidavit because the "purported affidavit ... is undated, unswom, and does not meet the requirements of a Rule 72 Declaration in lieu of a sworn affidavit." The Court disagrees.

Dr. Seaworth's affidavit begins with, "PERSONALLY APPEARED before the undersigned, an officer duly authorized by law to administer oaths, Dr. Christine Seaworth, who being duly sworn, deposes and says on oath as follows[.]" Dr. Seaworth then stated that she is over 18 years of age, has personal knowledge of the facts in the affidavit, and is competent to testify. After offering her causation opinion, Dr. Seaworth signed in the presence of a notary public, who also signed and certified "[s]worn to and subscribed before me this the 28[th] day of July, 2020." The Court finds Dr. Seaworth's affidavit is both sworn and dated, so it was not necessary for her statement to satisfy Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 72 for declarations under penalty of perjury in lieu of an affidavit.

3 Considering Dr. Seaworth' s opinion without a presumption of correctness, she stated that Ms. Gibbs's complaints are at least 50% related to her pre-existing complaints and symptoms. The essential elements of Ms.

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Related

Michelle RYE Et Al. v. WOMEN’S CARE CENTER OF MEMPHIS, MPLLC Et Al.
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2020 TN WC 103, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gibbs-doris-v-express-services-inc-aka-express-employment-tennworkcompcl-2020.