[Cite as Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Horizon Natl. Contract Servs., L.L.C., 2012-Ohio-1841.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 96610
GIANT EAGLE, INC., ET AL. PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
vs.
HORIZON NATIONAL CONTRACT SERVICES, LLC DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-702325
BEFORE: Keough, J., Boyle, P.J., and Celebrezze, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 26, 2012 -i-
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS
For Giant Eagle, Inc.
Michael J. Roche Rademaker, Matty, McClelland & Greve 55 Public Square Suite 1775 Cleveland, OH 44113
For Linda Hach
Lawrence W. Corman 55 Public Square Suite 1717 Cleveland, OH 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Thomas J. Cabral Darlene White Colleen A. Mountcastle Gallagher Sharp 6th Floor, Bulkley Building 1501 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, OH 44115 -i-
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
{¶1} Plaintiffs-appellants, Giant Eagle, Inc. and Linda Hach, appeal from the
trial court’s judgment granting the motion for summary judgment of defendant-appellee,
Horizon National Contract Services, LLC (“Horizon”). For the reasons that follow, we
reverse and remand.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} At approximately 4:00 a.m. on August 24, 2007, appellant Hach, a 20-year
employee of Giant Eagle, entered the Giant Eagle store located at 4428 Broadview Road,
Richfield, Ohio. Hach managed the bakery at the Richfield store and was coming in
early to prepare a special order.
{¶3} In her deposition, Hach stated that as she entered the store with the
“cleaning guy,” she saw the “flooring guy” standing by a floor-waxing machine next to
the cash registers. Because there were no cones or caution tape placed
in the area, Hach approached the man who was standing by the machine and asked him
which way she should go to get to the bakery. He told her to go to the right and pointed
in that direction. As Hach walked in the direction she had been directed to take, she
slipped on a puddle of wet wax. Both the “cleaning guy” and the “flooring guy” came
over to assist Hach, who had injured her arm, head, and back in her fall.
{¶4} As a result of her fall, Hach required surgery for a herniated lumbar disc. Because of numerous surgical complications and several additional surgeries, Hach has
been unable to resume her employment. Hach filed a claim with the Bureau of Workers’
Compensation; Giant Eagle, as a self-insured employer, paid in excess of $25,000 as a
result of her claim.
{¶5} On August 24, 2009, Hach and Giant Eagle filed suit against Horizon,
alleging that Horizon was negligent in (1) creating or permitting the existence of a
dangerous condition at Giant Eagle’s store; (2) failing to properly and adequately warn
appellants about the defect and dangerous condition; and (3) failing to properly screen,
interview, hire, train, and monitor its employees and/or agents. Hach sought damages for
her injuries caused by Horizon’s alleged negligence; Giant Eagle sought reimbursement
for workers’ compensation and medical payments it had made as a result of Hach’s
injuries.
{¶6} Horizon answered the complaint and denied liability. It subsequently filed
a motion for summary judgment. In its motion, Horizon admitted that at the time of
Hach’s fall, Horizon had a contract with Giant Eagle to provide floor-cleaning services.
Horizon argued that it was not liable, however, because an employer is not liable for the
negligent acts of an independent contractor. Horizon contended that it was “undisputed”
that Horizon had subcontracted the cleaning services to Premier Image Enterprises, LLC
(“Premier”), and that at the time of Hach’s fall, Premier was performing such services at
the Richfield Giant Eagle store pursuant to the Horizon–Premier contract. Horizon also argued that appellants’ claim failed because they had not joined Premier as a necessary
and indispensable party to the suit.
{¶7} In their brief in opposition to Horizon’s motion, appellants argued that
Horizon did not produce credible evidence that Premier was working at the Richfield
store on the day in question. Appellants argued further that even if Horizon had retained
an independent contractor to work at the store, Horizon was liable because the contract
between Giant Eagle and Horizon gave rise to a non-delegable duty by Horizon. Finally,
appellants argued that Horizon was liable because a principal cannot delegate its duty
regarding inherently dangerous work.
{¶8} The trial court subsequently granted Horizon’s motion. Appellants now
appeal from the trial court’s judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Horizon.
II. Standard of Review
{¶9} Civ.R. 56(C) provides that summary judgment is appropriate when (1) there
is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law, and (3) after construing the evidence most favorably for the party against
whom the motion is made, reasonable minds can reach only a conclusion that is adverse
to the nonmoving party. Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc. 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 369-370,
696 N.E.2d 201 (1998); Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364
N.E.2d 267 (1977). We review the trial court’s judgment de novo, using the same
standard that the trial court applies under Civ.R. 56(C). Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996).
{¶10} It is well established that the party moving for summary judgment bears the
burden of demonstrating that no material issues of fact exist for trial. Dresher v. Burt, 75
Ohio St.3d 280, 292-93, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). The moving party bears the initial
responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying
those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a
material element of the nonmoving party’s claim. Id. The nonmoving party has a
reciprocal burden of specificity and must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. Id. The reviewing court evaluates the record in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Saunders v. McFaul, 71 Ohio App.3d 46, 50, 593
N.E.2d 24 (8th Dist.1990). Any doubts must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving
party. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 358-359, 604 N.E.2d 138 (1992).
III. Analysis
{¶11} In their first assignment of error, appellants contend that the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment to Horizon.
{¶12} They first contend that the evidence relied upon by Horizon to support its
motion for summary judgment did not meet the requirements of Civ.R. 56(E), which
provides, in pertinent part, that:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts of papers referred to in an affidavit shall be attached to or served with the affidavit. * * *
{¶13} As exhibits to its motion for summary judgment, Horizon presented its
answers to appellants’ first set of interrogatories, the Giant Eagle–Horizon contract, the
Horizon–Premier Subcontractor Agreement, and the affidavit of Ronald Swertfager,
Premier’s owner. Appellants argue that Swertfager’s affidavit and Horizon’s answers to
interrogatories did not meet the “personal knowledge” requirement of Civ.R. 56(E), and
that the Horizon–Premier Subcontractor Agreement was “unauthorized and
unauthenticated” because there was no affidavit attesting that the contract was what it
purported to be. Therefore, they contend that the trial court erred in considering the
documents.
{¶14} Appellants did not raise these arguments in the trial court, however, and
thus have waived them for purposes of appeal. It is a fundamental rule of appellate
procedure that a reviewing court will not consider as error any issue that a party failed to
bring to the trial court’s attention. Schade v. Carnegie Body Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 207, 210,
436 N.E.2d 1001 (1982); Stores Realty Co. v. Cleveland, 41 Ohio St.2d 41, 43, 322
N.E.2d 629 (1975).
{¶15} Moreover, this court has held that when ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, a court in its discretion may consider documents not properly qualified per
Civ.R. 56 when no objection has been made by the opposing party. Biskupich v. Westbay
Manor Nursing Home, 33 Ohio App.3d 220, 222, 515 N.E.2d 632 (8th Dist.1986), citing Brown v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 63 Ohio App.2d 87, 90, 409 N.E.2d 253 (8th Dist.1978);
Rodger v. McDonald’s Restaurants of Ohio, Inc., 8 Ohio App.3d 256, 456 N.E.2d 1262
(8th Dist.1982), paragraph one of the syllabus. Appellants raised no objection to the
documents below and thus the trial court had discretion to consider them in rendering its
summary judgment decision.
{¶16} Nevertheless, we find that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment to Horizon. The gist of Horizon’s motion for summary judgment was that it
had subcontracted the janitorial services for Giant Eagle to Premier and, therefore, it was
not liable for any injury to Hach resulting from her fall. We agree with Horizon’s
contention that, as a general rule, one who engages an independent contractor is not liable
for the negligent acts of the contractor or its employees. Pusey v. Bator, 94 Ohio St.3d
275, 762 N.E.2d 968 (2002). But we cannot agree with Horizon’s contention that it was
“undisputed” that at the time of Hach’s fall, Premier, and not Horizon, was performing
janitorial services at Giant Eagle’s Richfield store.
{¶17} To support its assertion that Premier was performing subcontracting
services at Giant Eagle’s Richfield store on the date in question, Horizon pointed to its
answers to appellants’ first set of interrogatories, the Giant Eagle–Horizon contract, the
Horizon–Premier Subcontractor Agreement, and the affidavit of Ronald Swertfager, all of
which were attached as exhibits to its motion for summary judgment.
{¶18} Horizon’s answers to interrogatories stated the following, in pertinent part: At the time of the events described in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Horizon was in the contract management business. Horizon provided nationwide retail customers with floor maintenance through a network of qualified subcontractors.
Horizon provided subcontractors to Giant Eagle from approximately January 1, 2003 through approximately December 1, 2007, when it was sold through an asset purchase.
Upon information and belief, the employer of the person supervising the cleaning crew on the evening of August 23, 2007 through August 24, 2007, was the subcontractor Horizon retained to service the store, Premier Image Enterprises, Inc.[sic] * * *.
Upon information and belief, all individual[s] working in the store were employees of the subcontractor, Premier Image Enterprises, Inc., then located at 383 Moccasin Trial, Girard, Ohio, 44420.
{¶19} The Horizon–Premier Subcontractor Agreement stated that Premier would provide facilities maintenance and cleaning services to Horizon on a subcontractor basis. With respect to the location of such services, the Subcontractor Agreement stated:
Services shall be performed by the Subcontractor only at the locations specified in a service specification addendum (Exhibit 1) given by Horizon to the Subcontractor. Subcontractor agrees not to render services to Horizon or for or on behalf of any Customer unless the same are listed in Exhibit 1, and Horizon shall not be liable to pay the Subcontractor for any services which are not listed in Exhibit 1.
Although referenced, no exhibits were attached to the SubcontractorAgreement.
{¶20} Swertfager’s affidavit stated that in October 2010, he received a subpoena
from appellants’ counsel requesting that Premier produce “the names and addresses of all
employees and supervisors of Premier Image Enterprises, LLC working at Giant Eagle,
Store #179, located at 4428 Broadview Road, West[sic] Richfield, Ohio on the evening of
August 23, 2007 through the morning of August 24, 2007 and any and all time card or other records evidencing their employment on said dates,” as well as any incident reports
related to Hach’s fall.
{¶21} Swertfager averred that Premier maintains records in the usual course of
business and that, pursuant to the subpoena, he had gone through all of Premier’s records
for the years 2006 through 2009. He stated that he had “exhausted all possible means of
locating responsive information or documents,” but that he had been
unable to locate any records related to work done at Giant Eagle, Store #179, located at 4428 Broadview Road, West[sic] Richfield, Ohio, for the requested time period or otherwise including, but not limited to, the requested names and addresses of all employees and supervisors of Premier Image Enterprises, Inc., evidence of their employment, and incident reports for the specific time period and location.
{¶22} Swertfager further averred that upon his “independent recollection and
belief,” another contractor by the name of Alexander Kryachkov “may have been
subcontracted with Premier Image Enterprises, LLC for work at the subject location
during the subject time period. * * * However,” Swertfager stated, “I have no information
independent of my recollection to confirm that he was, in fact, the independent contractor
working at the subject location on the specific date.”
{¶23} So who was working at the Richfield Giant Eagle store on the day in
question? As appellants pointed out in their brief in opposition to Horizon’s motion, the
Horizon–Premier Subcontractor Agreement was missing all of its referenced exhibits and
addenda. Significantly, “Exhibit 1,” which would have identified the locations at which
Premier was to act as a subcontractor for Horizon, was missing. Also missing from the pages of the Subcontractor Agreement was any reference whatsoever to Giant Eagle. A
person reading the Agreement would have no basis to conclude that it covered cleaning
services at any Giant Eagle store, much less at the Richfield Giant Eagle store where
Hach fell.
{¶24} Furthermore, although Horizon contends that its answers to interrogatories
demonstrate that Premier was working at the store on the day in question, Swertfager’s
affidavit calls that assertion into question. Swertfager averred that he maintained
business records in the normal course of business and had conducted an exhaustive
search of Premier’s business records, but was unable to locate any records whatsoever
related to any work Premier had done at the Giant Eagle Richfield store. Swertfager did
not, as appellants contend, deny that Premier worked at the Richfield store. Nevertheless,
appellants correctly point out that one can draw an inference from Swertfager’s statement
that he keeps records but after an exhaustive search could not locate any records relating
to the Richfield Giant Eagle store, that Premier was not working at the Richfield store on
the day in question and, in fact, never worked at the store at all. Furthermore,
Swertfager’s assertion that Alexander Kryachkov “may” have subcontracted with
Premier to perform the work at Giant Eagle creates even more doubt as to who was
actually working at the store when Hach fell.
{¶25} In their brief in opposition to Horizon’s motion, appellants presented
evidence indicating that agents or employees of Horizon were indeed providing cleaning and waxing services at the store on the morning of August 24, 2007. Attached as an
exhibit to appellants’ brief in opposition to Horizon’s motion was an Incident Report
prepared by Giant Eagle. The report indicates that Hach’s fall was reported to Giant
Eagle at 9:00 a.m. on August 24, 2007, a few hours after it happened. The report states
that “Linda slipped and fell on wax as she came in. We were having the floor recoated,”
and that the witnesses to the incident were “2 members of [the] floor care company
(Horizon).” Also attached to appellants’ brief in opposition was Giant Eagle’s
Management Incident Investigation Report regarding the incident. This report indicates
that Hach “was entering building and slipped on wax — no ‘wet floor’ signs used during
wax” and “floor care person[n]el” that “Horizon oversees” were present and witnessed
Hach’s fall.
{¶26} Despite Horizon’s assertion otherwise, the documents attached to its motion
for summary judgment do not establish that an independent contractor of Horizon was
performing the work at issue, while the documents attached to appellants’ brief in
opposition demonstrate that the floor care personnel working that day were indeed
Horizon employees and not those of an independent contractor. We can only conclude
that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether employees of Horizon or
an independent contractor were working at Giant Eagle’s Richfield store when Hach fell.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Horizon.
{¶27} Appellants also contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Horizon because as an independent contractor of Giant Eagle, Horizon owed
Hach a duty of care to guard against the danger created when it waxed the floor.
Appellants cite Simmers v. Bentley Constr. Co., 64 Ohio St.3d 642, 597 N.E.2d 504
(1992), for the proposition that an independent contractor who creates a dangerous
condition can be held liable for failure to warn of the dangerous condition. In order for
Horizon to be liable under Simmers, appellants must establish that Horizon was the entity
that created the dangerous condition that led to Hach’s fall. Although Horizon asserts
that it did not physically perform the work and the “only evidence” is that Horizon did
not have any employees on-site when Hach fell, we have already determined that there is
an issue of fact as to who was performing the cleaning services at Giant Eagle’s Richfield
store on the morning of August 24, 2007.
{¶28} Appellants also argue that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment to Horizon because even if Horizon subcontracted the work, under the terms of
Horizon’s agreement with Giant Eagle, Horizon had the right to control the manner and
means of performing the work. Therefore, appellants contend, any cleaning personnel
were employees or agents of Horizon, and Horizon is liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior.
Whether an individual performing service for another does so as an independent contractor or as an employee is ordinarily a question of fact, the deciding factor being in whom is vested the right of control or superintendence as to the details of the work. If the right to control the manner or means of performing the work is in the person for whom the service is performed, the relationship is that of employer and employee or master and servant; but if the control of the manner or means of performing the work is delegated to the person performing the service, the relationship is that of independent contractor.
Behner v. Ind. Comm., 154 Ohio St. 433, 96 N.E.2d 403 (1951), paragraph one of the
syllabus.
{¶29} Horizon argues that the Horizon–Premier Subcontractor Agreement
demonstrates that it delegated control of the manner and means of performing the
cleaning services to Premier, and that Premier was thus an independent contractor. The
Subcontractor Agreement provides that Premier “shall be solely responsible for
determing the methods, details, and means of performing services” under the Agreement,
which suggests that Horizon delegated the manner and method of performing the work to
Premier. As discussed above, however, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether Horizon subcontracted the cleaning services for the Richfield Giant Eagle store
to Premier.
{¶30} Appellants also argue that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment because Horizon’s duty of care to Hach arose out of its agreement with Giant
Eagle. Assuming, without deciding, that Hach (who was not a party to the agreement)
has standing to sue under the Giant Eagle–Horizon agreement, Ohio law is clear that a
contract is to be sued upon in contract, not in tort. As this court stated in Lightbody v.
Rust, 8th Dist. No. 80927, 2003-Ohio-3937, ¶ 29:
“Where the duty allegedly breached by the defendant is one that arises out of a contract, independent of any duty imposed by law, the cause of action is one of contract.” Schwartz v. Bank One, 84 Ohio App.3d 806, 810, 619 N.E.2d 10 (1992). * * * “It is not a tort to breach a contract, no matter how willful or malicious the breach.” Salvation Army v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 92 Ohio App.3d 571, 578, 636 N.E.2d 399 (8th Dist.1993).
See also Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 6 Ohio St.3d 272, 276, 452 N.E.2d 1315 (1983)
(“It is no tort to breach a contract, regardless of motive.”)
{¶31} A cause of action in tort for breach of a contract arises “only in those
contract situations where a special or fiduciary relationship exists between the parties and
imposes a duty of good faith” in performance of the contract. Empire-Detroit Steel Div.
Cyclops Corp. v. Penn Elec. Coil, Inc., 5th Dist. No. CA-2903, 1992 WL 173313 (June
29, 1992). That is not the situation here and, accordingly, any tort claim by appellants
based on Horizon’s alleged breach of contract necessarily fails.
{¶32} Nevertheless, because there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether Horizon or another entity was performing the janitorial services at Giant Eagle’s
Richfield store on the morning of August 24, 2007, the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment to Horizon. Appellants’ first assignment of error is sustained.
{¶33} In their second assignment of error, appellants contend that the trial court
erred in denying their motions to compel, for a protective order, and for sanctions. They
contend that it was error for the trial court to deny them access to the information sought
by these motions (the identity of persons who were cleaning the floors when Hach fell
and the relationship of those persons to Horizon) and then grant summary judgment to
Horizon. {¶34} A trial court has broad discretion regarding discovery matters. Kelley v.
Ferraro, 188 Ohio App.3d 734, 2010-Ohio-2771, 936 N.E.2d 986, ¶ 84 (8th Dist.).
Absent an abuse of discretion, an appellate court must affirm a trial court’s disposition of
discovery issues. Id. We find no abuse of discretion here.
{¶35} Appellants’ motion to compel sought supplemental discovery relating to the
identity of Premier. Horizon supplemented its prior discovery responses by disclosing
the name of Premier’s owner one day after appellants filed the motion to compel. Thus,
the motion to compel was moot and properly denied because Horizon had already
supplemented its discovery responses by the time the trial court considered the motion.
{¶36} Appellants sought a protective order to relieve them from any obligation of
responding to Horizon’s request for discovery until Horizon had responded to appellants’
request for supplementation of its discovery responses. This motion likewise was moot
when the trial court considered it because Horizon had already supplemented its
responses.
{¶37} Appellants also filed a motion for sanctions against Swertfager, asserting
that he had not timely responded to the subpoena directing him to produce documents
relating to Premier. But the record demonstrates that Swertfager contacted appellants’
counsel within a few days of receiving the subpoena, and within three weeks responded
to it by providing the only information available to him. The record reflects that
Swertfager diligently attempted to comply with the subpoena and, accordingly, any imposition of sanctions was not warranted.
{¶38} On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
appellants’ discovery motions and the second assignment of error is therefore overruled.
{¶39} This cause is reversed and remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ordered that appellants recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into
execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCURS; MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE OPINION.
MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., DISSENTING:
{¶40} I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the trial court’s judgment.
{¶41} Plaintiffs-appellants, Giant Eagle and Linda Hach, filed a complaint against
Horizon alleging that Horizon was negligent for creating or permitting a dangerous
condition, for failing to warn, and for failing to properly hire and train its employees. The plaintiffs alleged that Hach was injured by Horizon when she slipped and fell on a
“puddle of wet wax” in Giant Eagle. This is a simple negligence case involving a “slip
and fall.”
{¶42} Horizon claims it is not liable because it hired an independent contractor to
clean Giant Eagle’s floors. Giant Eagle and Hach assert that a question of fact remains as
to whether an independent contractor or an employee or agent of Horizon was present
when Hach slipped and fell. Because we must view the evidence in a light most
favorable to plaintiffs, the nonmoving parties, I agree that a question of fact remains as to
whether the “flooring guy” was an agent or employee of Horizon. Nonetheless, I would
still affirm the trial court granting summary judgment to Horizon — because no matter
what company was waxing Giant Eagle’s floors that day, it is my view that the company
would not be liable for Hach’s injuries as a matter of law.
{¶43} Horizon was an independent contractor hired by Giant Eagle to clean its
floors. If Horizon subcontracted the work, then that subcontractor was also an
independent contractor. Thus, no matter what company, our analysis is the same for
purposes of determining liability to Hach.
{¶44} “To prevail in a negligence action, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the
defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, (2) the defendant breached that duty, and
(3) the defendant’s breach proximately caused the plaintiff to be injured.” Lang v. Holly
Hill Motel, 122 Ohio St.3d 120, 2009-Ohio-2495, 909 N.E.2d 120, ¶ 10, citing Robinson v. Bates, 112 Ohio St.3d 17, 2006-Ohio-6362, 857 N.E.2d 1195, ¶ 21. We must
determine if the floor-cleaning company (an independent contractor) owed Hach a duty,
and if so, what the appropriate standard of care was.
{¶45} When an independent contractor does not have a property interest in the
premises, as the floor-cleaning company here, the Ohio Supreme Court explained that
one must “look to the law of negligence to determine [the independent contractor’s] duty
of care[.]” Simmers v. Bentley Const. Co., 64 Ohio St.3d 642, 645, 597 N.E.2d 504
(1992). The high court stated:
Under the law of negligence, a defendant’s duty to a plaintiff depends upon the relationship between the parties and the foreseeability of injury to someone in the plaintiff’s position. * * * Injury is foreseeable if a defendant knew or should have known that its act was likely to result in harm to someone. * * * (Citations omitted.)
{¶46} In Emrich v. Grady Mem. Hosp., 5th Dist. No. 04CAE04030, 2004-Ohio-
6753, the court explained that cleaning floors does not involve an inherently dangerous
activity, and thus, was a delegable duty. The Emrich court further explained the duty
owed by an independent contractor hired by a hospital to provide janitorial services to the
hospital:
The appropriate standard is the duty to care. The duty to appellants in this case depends upon the relationship between the parties and the foreseeability to someone in appellant’s position. It is clear the hallway wherein appellant slipped was a well-traveled corridor in the hospital and Capital Services should have known individuals would traverse the area. The standard of care would be a general negligence standard. Id. at ¶ 32.
{¶47} Hach maintains that the “flooring guy” should have warned her that the floor was slippery or wet. But it was 4:00 a.m.; Hach came in early to prepare for a big
bakery order. The store was closed. I cannot say that failure to post warning signs was
negligent when the store was closed.
{¶48} Further, Hach admitted in her deposition that she knew that floor was being
waxed because she saw a floor-waxing machine and what she thought was a “flooring
guy,” standing next to the machine. She said that she asked the unknown man which way
she should go, and he pointed to the right. But Hach should have known that the floors
could be slippery. She chose to walk in the area where she knew they were cleaning.
{¶49} Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s granting summary judgment to
Horizon.