Gianna Castro v. Department of Justice

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJanuary 23, 2023
DocketAT-0752-17-0200-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Gianna Castro v. Department of Justice (Gianna Castro v. Department of Justice) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gianna Castro v. Department of Justice, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

GIANNA CASTRO, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-0752-17-0200-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DATE: January 23, 2023 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Angelo Filippi, Esquire, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for the appellant.

Jeffrey N. Poulin, Springfield, Virginia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to clarify why the suitability regulations of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) are not a source of jurisdiction over this appeal , we AFFIRM the initial decision. ¶2 Approximately 4 months into her excepted-service appointment, the appellant was terminated during her trial period for her alleged lack of candor in her application for employment with the agency. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 7-9, Tab 2 at 3. On appeal to the Board, she argued, among other things, that her termination constituted a suitability action. IAF, Tab 9 at 1 3-15. The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction, and he dismissed her appeal without holding the requested hearing. IAF, Tab 11, Initial Decision (ID). He concluded that she had failed to nonfrivolously allege that she had accrued adverse action appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75, ID at 2-4, or that she was denied procedures set forth in 5 C.F.R. § 315.805 concerning terminations for conditions arising preappointment, 2 ID at 4-5. He further determined that she had failed to make a

2 The appellant has not challenged these findings on review, and we find no material error in the administrative judge’s analysis. Because the appellant was serving in the excepted service, the regulatory right of appeal on the limited grounds set forth in 5 C.F.R. § 315.806 may not have even been available to her. See 5 C.F.R. § 210.101(b). Regardless, we find no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s 3

nonfrivolous allegation that she was in a position covered by OPM’s suitability regulations at 5 C.F.R. part 731 or that she had been subjected to a suitability action as defined in those regulations. ID at 5-6. ¶3 On petition for review, the appellant argues that her position was covered by the suitability regulations and that her termination was a suitability action. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 3-6. A position in the excepted service where the incumbent can be noncompetitively converted to the competitive service constitutes a covered position. 5 C.F.R. § 731.101(b). The Standard Form 50 (SF-50) documenting the appellant’s appointment states that her appointment may be converted to a career appointment in not less than 3 years and not more than 4 years. IAF, Tab 10 at 22. Thus, as the agency seems to acknowledge on review, it appears the appellant was in a covered position. PFR File, Tab 3 at 11. ¶4 We nevertheless find that she failed to nonfrivolously allege that her termination was a suitability action under OPM’s regulations. 3 As a preliminary matter, we find no documents or alleged facts in the record that would support the appellant’s claim that this was a suitability action. For instance, t he proposal and decision letters make no reference to the agency making a suitability determination, taking a suitability action, or otherwise finding that the appellant had made a material, intentional false statement, or deception or fraud in examination or appointment. IAF, Tab 1 at 7-10, Tab 2 at 3. The SF-50

alternative analysis that the process provided to the appellant satisfied the requirements of 5 C.F.R. § 315.805. 3 A nonfrivolous allegation is an assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter at issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s). An allegation generally will be considered non frivolous when, under oath or penalty of perjury, an individual makes an allegation that is more than conclusory, is plausible on its face, and is material to the legal issues in the appeal. Id. 4

documenting her termination referenced 5 C.F.R. § 315.805, rather than part 731, as the legal authority for the action. 4 IAF, Tab 2 at 4. ¶5 The appellant asserts that the agency’s finding that she lacked candor in her application is akin to a finding that she had made a “material, intentional false statement, or deception or fraud in examination or appointment,” which is a factor upon which a suitability action may be taken. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5; see 5 C.F.R. § 731.202(b)(3). However, the appellant has failed to allege facts that, if proven, would show that the agency’s lack-of-candor finding was equivalent to a finding of a “material, intentional false statement, or deception or fraud in examination or appointment.” IAF, Tab 9 at 13-15; PFR File, Tab 1 at 3-6; see, e.g., Ludlum v. Department of Justice, 278 F.3d 1280, 1283-85 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining that lack of candor and falsification are different, though related, forms of misconduct).

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Related

Andrew Ludlum v. Department of Justice
278 F.3d 1280 (Federal Circuit, 2002)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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Gianna Castro v. Department of Justice, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gianna-castro-v-department-of-justice-mspb-2023.