G.I. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 6, 2016
• Docket: 49A05-1504-JV-166
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Jan 06 2016, 8:44 am Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Joel M. Schumm Gregory F. Zoeller Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Alexander Van Gorp Christina D. Pace Certified Legal Intern Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

G.I., January 6, 2016

Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A05-1504-JV-166 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court. The Honorable Geoffrey Gaither, State of Indiana, Magistrate. Appellee-Petitioner. Cause No. 49D09-1501-JD-27

Friedlander, Senior Judge

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1504-JV-166 | January 6, 2016 Page 1 of 5 [1] G.I. appeals her adjudication as a juvenile delinquent based upon a true finding

for the offense of receiving stolen auto parts, a Level 6 felony if committed by 1 an adult. We reverse.

[2] G.I. presents one issue for our review, which we restate as: whether there was

sufficient evidence to support her juvenile delinquency adjudication for

receiving stolen auto parts.

[3] On December 28, 2014, India Simms’ silver Monte Carlo automobile was

stolen. Two days later on December 30, 2014, M.B. asked her friend P.D. to

hang out and ride with M.B. when she drove her cousins to a party. P.D.

agreed, and M.B. arrived to pick up P.D. driving a silver car in which G.I. was

a passenger. At some point after picking up P.D., M.B. stopped the car and got

in the back seat with P.D. while G.I. drove. Due to a non-illuminated

headlight, Officer Rabensteine initiated a traffic stop on the silver Monte Carlo

being driven by G.I. He also performed a check of the license plate on the

Monte Carlo, which showed that the plate was stolen. Before Officer

Rabensteine exited his car, a door of the Monte Carlo opened, and M.B. and

P.D. fled from the car. Another officer chased M.B. and P.D. while Officer

Rabensteine approached the car to speak with G.I., who had remained in the

car. Officer Rabensteine performed a check of the Monte Carlo’s VIN, which

showed that the car was stolen, and G.I. was arrested.

1 Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2.5 (c) (2014).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1504-JV-166 | January 6, 2016 Page 2 of 5 [4] The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that G.I. had committed the

offense of receiving stolen auto parts, a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult.

Following a fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court entered a true finding. G.I.

was placed on formal probation, and this appeal followed.

[5] G.I. contends the State failed to prove that she knew the car was stolen. When

the State seeks to have a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent for committing an

act that would be a crime if committed by an adult, the State must prove every

element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. C.L. v. State, 2 N.E.3d 798

(Ind. Ct. App. 2014). When reviewing on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting a juvenile adjudication, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge

the credibility of the witnesses. Z.A. v. State, 13 N.E.3d 438 (Ind. Ct. App.

2014). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the

reasonable inferences therefrom, and we will affirm if the evidence and those

inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative value to support the

judgment. C.L., 2 N.E.3d 798.

[6] In order to make a true finding of delinquency against G.I. for receiving stolen

auto parts, the State must have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that G.I. (1)

knowingly or intentionally (2) received, retained, or disposed of (3) Simms’

silver Monte Carlo (4) that had been the subject of theft. See Ind. Code § 35-43-

4-2.5 (c). In addition to proving the explicit elements of the crime, the State

must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person knew the property

was stolen. Fortson v. State, 919 N.E.2d 1136 (Ind. 2010). Knowledge that

property is stolen may be established by circumstantial evidence; however, such

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1504-JV-166 | January 6, 2016 Page 3 of 5 knowledge may not be inferred solely from the unexplained possession of

recently stolen property. Id.

[7] Simms testified at the fact-finding hearing that her silver Monte Carlo was

stolen while it was running with the keys in the ignition. She also testified that

the car was damaged prior to it being stolen, including damage to the driver’s

side and the front bumper and that there was further damage when her car was

returned to her, including ashes and food on the inside, damaged air vents,

paint scratches on one side, and a door not closing completely. P.D. testified

that M.B. contacted her to “come and chill” and ride with her when she took

her cousins to a party. Tr. p. 12. M.B. was driving G.I. and another girl when

they picked up P.D. in a two-door gray car that P.D. had not seen before. At

some point, M.B. and P.D. got into the back seat together, and G.I. drove. The

fourth girl was dropped off before they were stopped by Officer Rabensteine.

P.D. testified that when they were pulled over, M.B. suggested they run, and

she followed M.B. P.D. further testified that she did not know who owned the

car. Officer Rabensteine testified that M.B. told him that P.D. had stated the

car belonged to her. M.B. did not testify at the fact-finding hearing.

[8] Here, it is reasonable to infer from the evidence presented at the fact-finding

hearing that G.I. believed the car to belong to M.B. Teenagers driving a used

car and/or one that is messy and has bumps and scrapes is not unusual.

Further, the evidence shows the car was stolen with the keys in it, and there

was no evidence presented of any damage to the steering column or other

components which would be indicative of a stolen vehicle. Moreover, G.I. did

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1504-JV-166 | January 6, 2016 Page 4 of 5 not flee when the car was stopped by Officer Rabensteine. From this evidence

we determine that the circumstances do not support a reasonable inference that

G.I. knew, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the car she drove only briefly was

stolen. We therefore conclude that the evidence presented to support G.I.’s

delinquency adjudication was not sufficient.

[9] Reversed.

[10] Riley, J., and Bradford, J., concur.

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