Ghina Hamad v. Hanan Sarsour

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: February 19, 2025
• Docket: 3D2024-2285
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed February 19, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D24-2285 Lower Tribunal No. 24-8461-CA-01 ________________

Ghina Hamad, Appellant,

vs.

Hanan Sarsour, Appellee.

An Appeal from a nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Daryl E. Trawick, Judge.

Joey Gonzalez, Attorney, P.A. and Joey D. Gonzalez, for appellant.

Sarsour Law, LLC and Nader O. Sarsour (Chagrin Falls, OH), for appellee.

Before EMAS, SCALES, and MILLER, JJ.

MILLER, J. This dispute stems from the failure to disclose unpaid sales and use

taxes in the purchase and sale agreement of a Mediterranean restaurant.

Appellant, Ghina Hamad, the seller, appeals an order granting a preliminary

injunction, enjoining her from alienating or transferring her real property and

dissipating her assets. 1 The contended basis for the injunction was that she

intended to flee to Venezuela to avoid liability for any judgment. We have

jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(B). Finding that appellee,

Hanan Sarsour, the buyer, failed to establish the lack of an adequate legal

remedy, we reverse.

BACKGROUND

Hamad and Sarsour were close friends and regularly attended

religious services at a local mosque together. Hamad agreed to sell Sarsour

her restaurant, Pita Grill & Market, Inc., for a specified sum.

The parties entered into a purchase and sale agreement and a bill of

sale in conjunction with the acquisition. In the documents, Hamad warranted

that the books and records “accurately set forth all liabilities, assets, and

other matters regarding the financial condition of the Business.” She further

1 Although styled as petition for certiorari, this is an appeal from a reviewable nonfinal order. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.040(c) (“If a party seeks an improper remedy, the cause must be treated as if the proper remedy had been sought . . . .”). 2 “promise[d] and agree[d] to convey good, clear, and marketable title to all

the property to be sold [t]hereunder, the same to be free and clear of all liens

and encumbrances.”

Months later, Sarsour discovered that the business was indebted to

the Florida Department of Revenue for unpaid sales and use tax in the

amount of $112,621.43. The liability was incurred during a three-year period

long predating the sale of the business.

Sarsour filed a three-count complaint in the circuit court alleging breach

of contract and fraudulent inducement and seeking voluntary binding

arbitration pursuant to the acquisition documents. In her prayer for relief,

she sought “an arbitration award and judgment against [Hamad] in the

amount for $112,621.43, plus taxable costs, interest, attorney fees and any

such further relief as the Court deems necessary and just.”

Sarsour learned from fellow worshippers that Hamad intended to sell

her property and return to Venezuela, her country of origin. Sarsour moved

for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Hamad from alienating,

encumbering, or transferring her real property and dissipating any of her

other assets. The trial court granted the motion. Hamad unsuccessfully

moved to dissolve the injunction, and this appeal ensued.

3 STANDARD OF REVIEW

We apply a hybrid standard in reviewing an order granting or refusing

to dissolve an injunction. To the extent factual findings are implicated, we

defer to the trial court and will not reverse absent a showing of abuse of

discretion. Bay N Gulf, Inc. v. Anchor Seafood, Inc., 971 So. 2d 842, 843

(Fla. 3d DCA 2007). Legal conclusions, however, are subject to de novo

review. Surgery Ctr. Holdings, Inc. v. Guirguis, 318 So. 3d 1274, 1277 (Fla.

2d DCA 2021).

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Although a trial court is afforded broad discretion, “a temporary

injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted only

sparingly.” Heslop v. Moore, 716 So. 2d 276, 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). A

party seeking an injunction must demonstrate that (1) irreparable injury will

result if relief is not granted; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law; (3) the

party has a clear legal right to relief; and (4) entry of an injunction serves the

public interest. See Finkelstein v. Se. Bank, N.A., 490 So. 2d 976, 980 (Fla.

4th DCA 1986). The moving party must furnish competent, substantial

evidence satisfying each prong. See SunTrust Banks, Inc. v. Cauthon &

McGuigan, PLC, 78 So. 3d 709, 711 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).

4 Irreparable injury and no adequate remedy at law are distinct, but

interrelated, prongs. Fla. Ass’n of Realtors v. Orange County, 350 So. 3d

115, 130 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022). Whether an injury is irreparable within this

context is wholly dependent on the existence of an adequate remedy at law.

See Surgery Ctr. Holdings, Inc., 318 So. 3d at 1282. Stated differently, “what

makes an injury irreparable is that no other remedy can repair it.” Weinstein

v. Aisenberg, 758 So. 2d 705, 708 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (Gross, J., concurring

specially) (quoting Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Inj. Rule,

103 Harv. L. Rev. 687, 694 (1990)). Consistent with this concept, the movant

must establish an injury that cannot be compensated by after-the-fact money

damages. See Supreme Serv. Station Corp. v. Telecredit Serv. Ctr., Inc.,

424 So. 2d 844, 844 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). Such harm is necessary to warrant

the clear and present need for equitable relief. See id.

In the case at hand, Sarsour adduced evidence that Hamad intended

to dispose of her property and abscond to establish irreparable injury. The

trial court found this was sufficient to justify injunctive relief because Sarsour

“would not be able to collect monetary damages should [Hamad] dispose of

her assets.”

We agree with the trial court’s reasoned observation, but the courts of

this state have consistently distinguished between the inability to obtain a

5 judgment and the inability to collect on a judgment. The former supports

injunctive relief, while the latter does not. Although the idea that an

uncollectible judgment provides an adequate remedy at law may seem a bit

of a legal fiction, it is the mere availability of the judgment itself that defeats

a finding of irreparable harm. See Tampa & G.C.R. Co. v. Mulhern, 74 So.

297, 298–99 (Fla. 1917) (holding legal, not equitable, relief was proper when

available even where a defendant is insolvent); Supreme Serv. Station

Corp., 424 So. 2d at 844 (“A civil complaint which alleges that

defendant . . . has defrauded plaintiff . . . and is about to remove its assets

beyond the jurisdiction of the court does not warrant a temporary

injunction.”); Weinstein, 758 So. 2d at 706 (“A claim for money damages

does not provide a sufficient basis for injunctive relief. Even where the party

seeking injunctive relief alleges that the opposing party may dissipate bank

assets, a judgment for money damages is adequate and injunctive relief is

improper, notwithstanding the possibility that a money judgment will be

uncollectible.”) (citation omitted); Mary Dee’s, Inc. v. Tartamella, 492 So. 2d

815, 816 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (citing St. Lawrence Co., N.V. v. Alkow Realty,

Inc., 453 So. 2d 514, 514 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)) (“The test of [the] inadequacy

of [a] remedy at law is whether a judgment can be obtained, not whether,

6 once obtained, it will be collectible.”). Accordingly, we are constrained to

reverse the order under review and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.