Ghidorzi Construction, Inc. v. Town of Chapel Hill

342 S.E.2d 545, 80 N.C. App. 438, 1986 N.C. App. LEXIS 2215
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
DecidedMay 6, 1986
Docket8515SC997
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 342 S.E.2d 545 (Ghidorzi Construction, Inc. v. Town of Chapel Hill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ghidorzi Construction, Inc. v. Town of Chapel Hill, 342 S.E.2d 545, 80 N.C. App. 438, 1986 N.C. App. LEXIS 2215 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).

Opinion

COZORT, Judge.

This appeal arises out of the denial of an application for a special use permit. In August of 1984, petitioner Ghidorzi Construction, Inc., applied to the respondents Town of Chapel Hill for a special use permit for the construction of ninety-one dwelling units on a 15.2-acre tract in Chapel Hill to be known as Windy Hill. On 19 November 1984 respondents met in a regular session to conduct a public hearing concerning petitioner’s application. The Planning Board of the Town of Chapel Hill, the Appearance *439 Commission of the Town of Chapel Hill, and the Town Manager all recommended that the petitioner’s application be approved on the condition that Erwin Road be widened by the petitioner. On 10 December 1984, respondents met in regular session to consider the evidence presented at the 19 November meeting. The Town Manager again recommended that the Council approve the application. The Town Council ordered an additional public hearing on the application, which was held on 18 March 1985. Following this hearing, the Town Council voted to refer the proposed development to the Town Manager for additional study. On 9 April 1985, the matter again came before the Town Council. The Town Manager again recommended approval of the development; however, the Town Council adopted a resolution denying the application.

Petitioner appealed the Council’s denial by filing a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Superior Court of Orange County. After the writ was issued, the superior court judge reviewed the transcripts of hearing and other materials before the Town Council. The superior court reversed the denial of the special use permit. Respondents appealed.

The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the Town Council’s denial of the special use permit is supported by substantial, material, and competent evidence when viewed in light of the entire record.

In reviewing a municipality’s decision on an application for a special use permit, the court’s scope of review includes:

(1) Reviewing the record for errors in law,
(2) Insuring that procedures specified by law in both statute and ordinance are followed,
(3) Insuring that appropriate due process rights of a petitioner are protected including the right to offer evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and inspect documents,
(4) Insuring that decisions of town boards are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence in the whole record, and
(5) Insuring that decisions are not arbitrary and capricious.

*440 Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 299 N.C. 620, 626, 265 S.E. 2d 379, 383, reh’g denied, 300 N.C. 562, 270 S.E. 2d 106 (1980). A denial of a special use permit should be based on findings which are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence appearing in the record. Application of Goforth Properties, Inc., 76 N.C. App. 231, 233, 332 S.E. 2d 503, 504 (1985). The question before this Court is not whether the evidence before the superior court supported that court’s order but whether the evidence before the Town Council supported the Council’s action. Id. The superior court is not the trier of fact. That is the function of the Town Council. Id. In determining the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the Council’s decision, we apply the whole record test considering not only the evidence which justifies the Council’s decision but also that which fairly detracts from it. Thompson v. Board of Education, 292 N.C. 406, 233 S.E. 2d 538 (1977). The whole record test does not allow this Court or the superior court to replace the Council’s judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views. Id.

Sec. 8.3 of the Chapel Hill Development Ordinance provides that no special use permit shall be approved by the Town Council unless each of the following findings is made concerning the proposed special use or planned development:

(a) That the use or development is located, designed, and proposed to be operated so as to maintain or promote the public health, safety, and general welfare;
(b) That the use or development complies with all required regulations and standards of this chapter, including all applicable provisions of Articles 4, 5, and 6 and the applicable specific standards contained in Sections 8.7 and 8.8, and with all other applicable regulations;
(c) That the use or development is located, designed, and proposed to be operated so as to maintain or enhance the value of contiguous property, or that the use or development is a public necessity; and
(d) That the use or development conforms with the general plans for the physical development of the Town as embodied in this chapter and in the Comprehensive Plan.

*441 The Town Council must find that all of the above exist or the application must be denied. In denying petitioner’s application for a special use permit, the Town Council found that the proposed project did not satisfy subsections (a) and (b). The Council stated the following reasons for denying the application:

(1) [T]he proposal lacks sufficient separation and open areas among buildings and recreation facilities to provide effective livability space that avoids a sense of overcrowdedness, (2) the public traffic safety would not be maintained or promoted on Erwin Road in the vicinity of the proposed development, (3) the site design does not adequately consider the relationship of the development to natural topography ....

Petitioner contends that it produced competent, material, and substantial evidence of each of the elements required by the ordinance and that the Council’s reasons for denying the application were not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence. Because all four findings must be made to receive a permit, we need only consider whether any one of the Council’s reasons for failing to make a required finding was supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in order to affirm the Council’s decision. See Application of Goforth Properties, Inc., supra.

The first condition is “that the use or development is located, designed, and proposed to be operated so as to maintain or promote the public health, safety, and general welfare.” In regard to this condition the Council found that public traffic safety would not be maintained or promoted on Erwin Road in the vicinity of the proposed development and that the proposal failed to provide adequate livability space. Petitioner contends it offered evidence showing that the proposed development would maintain and promote public traffic safety. The proposed development would affect primarily three thoroughfares in Chapel Hill: Weaver Dairy Road, Erwin Road, and U.S. 15-501. Petitioner submitted two Traffic Impact Reports in its application for a special use permit. These reports analyzed the effect of the proposed development on traffic. One report stated, inter alia, the following:

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Bluebook (online)
342 S.E.2d 545, 80 N.C. App. 438, 1986 N.C. App. LEXIS 2215, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ghidorzi-construction-inc-v-town-of-chapel-hill-ncctapp-1986.