Gettysburg National Bank v. Chisolm

32 A. 730, 169 Pa. 564, 1895 Pa. LEXIS 1130
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 18, 1895
DocketAppeal, No. 210
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 32 A. 730 (Gettysburg National Bank v. Chisolm) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gettysburg National Bank v. Chisolm, 32 A. 730, 169 Pa. 564, 1895 Pa. LEXIS 1130 (Pa. 1895).

Opinion

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Green,

It was an entirely undisputed fact in this case that the defendant’s obligation in suit was altered, after it left him, and without his knowledge or consent. The alteration was made by a visible interlineation of the words “ with interest at six per cent.” That this alteration was not merely a fraud, but was also a criminal forgery of the instrument, is manifest upon the present state of the testimony. From the evidence given on the trial it appears that the alteration was made by the payees’ agent, and as the payees are chargeable with knowledge of the state of the instrument when it came to them, and also [569]*569when it was used by them in bank, they must accept responsibility for the alteration. So far as the legal effect of the alteration is concerned it is quite as important, as if the note had been changed from sixty-six dollars to sixty-six hundred dollars. It is as much an alteration of the defendant’s contract iii the one case as it would have been in the other, and the alteration must be regarded as being made by the payees. There is no room for an inference, and there is no proof in the cause, that the alteration was made innocently. It was certainly done for the purpose of increasing the liability of the defendant, and that alone stamps the transaction with fraud and with guilt. It is not disputed, indeed is conceded, that there could be no recovery on this instrument by the payees. It is urged however that the plaintiff, being an innocent holder for value, can recover notwithstanding the alteration, because they propose to recover only the. amount of the note as it was before the alteration. If such were the law forgeries by alteration would be protected by the law. The fraudulent payee would run no risk of loss because he would only have to transfer the note to an indorsee who might recover the original amount of the note by simply proving that he was innocent of the fraud. But the law is not so charitable to this class of persons. So far as the indorsee is concerned in this case, the note was not innocently acquired, because the interlineation was apparent on the face of the note, and was notice sufficient to put the plaintiff upon inquiry. The words “ with interest at 6 per cent,” do not occupy the whole line, but only a little more than half of it. These words look as if they were interlined and in point of fact they were so.

In Simpson v. Stackhouse, 9 Pa. 186, the added words were “ Payable at the Bank of Pittsburg,” but they were written at the end of the instrument, and the only circumstance upon which we held the plaintiff, the indorsee, responsible for the alteration was that the added words were in a different handwriting from the rest of the instrument, which was written by the defendant. Gibson, C. J., said in the opinion, “ The principle of the English cases is that an alteration so far apparent on the face of a bill or note as to raise a suspicion of its purity, makes it incumbent on the plaintiff to prove that it is still available, and that it is not incumbent on the defendant to dis[570]*570prove it. . . . He who takes a blemished bill or note takes it with its imperfections on its head. He becomes sponsor for them and though he may act honestly he acts negligently. . . . Mr. Chitty says in his Treatise on Bills, p. 213, that a drawee ought not to aceept a bill which has the least appearance of alteration, and it was not disputed at the trial that this note had that appearance or that the alteration was in a material part of it."

In Kennedy v. Bank, 18 Pa. 347, the action was brought by a bank, as holder, against the indorser, and it appeared that the date of the note had been altered from the 12fch to the 13th of August. It was held that this alteration vitiated the note although the bank officers purged themselves of all knowledge of the alteration. We decided that it was not sufficient for the holder to show that the date was not altered after he received it; in order to recover, it was necessary for him to show that the alteration existed when the defendant indorsed it, or that he assented to the alteration.

In the ease of Paine v. Edsell, 19 Pa. 178, the action was brought by an innocent holder against the indorser and it was alleged the date had been altered. The court below admitted the note in evidence sajdng, “ But this note presents no such marks of alteration as make it necessary for the plaintiff to offer explanatory proofs. The date is disfigured by a blot, on which one of the figures is made, and very few written instruments are free from similar defects." But Black, C. J., said “ In Simpson v. Stackhouse, 9 Pa. 186, it is decided on principles perfectly satisfactory, that an apparent alteration in a material part of a negotiable instrument avoids it, unless it be proved that such alteration was lawfully made, and the burden of proving how it was made is on the holder. That the note in question was altered in its date can be seen at a glance, and, inasmuch as no evidence was given to explain it the jury should have been instructed that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover."

This note, also, was in the hands of an indorsee of the payee, but that circumstance did not help his right of recovery. As it was not proved, and probably is not possible to prove, in the case at bar, that the alteration was lawfully made, it is difficult to see how, under the foregoing decisions, there can be any recovery.

[571]*571In Neff v. Horner, 63 Pa. 327, the instrument upon which' suit was brought was a promissory note in form, but the parties signed it with seals, making it substantially a bond. The parties'signing it were a.principal debtor and four sureties. When the paper was brought to the payee he declined to receive it unless the words, “interest semi-annually,” were added. The principal debtor then added at the end of the instrument the words, “ interest to be paid semi-annually,” without obtaining the consent of the sureties. We held the instrument avoided by the alteration. Agnew, J., said, “It seems to be settled that a voluntary alteration of a bond, note or other instrument under seal, in a material part, to the prejudice of the obligor, or maker avoids it, unless done with the assent of the parties to be affected by it, (citing numerous authorities). . . . In respect to bills, notes or other commercial paper, the rule is even more stringent, the law casting on the holder the burthen of disproving any apparent material alteration on the face of the paper.” We held also that there could be no recovery of the principal without the interest. The court below had held that this could be done but in this respect we reversed the judgment saying, “ The note was, therefore, avoided as to the sureties, and the court erred in holding that the plaintiff could recover the principal from all the parties, disregarding his claim for the interest. It is argued that a recovery of the principal sum does no harm, for to that extent the sureties bound themselves. But the conclusive answer is that stated by Mr. Greenleaf, supra, sec. 565. The ground of th'e rule is public policy to insure the protection of the instrument from fraud and substitution. The writing goes into the hands of the party who claims its benefit, and the purpose is to take away the motive for alteration, by forfeiting the instrument on discovery of the fraud. When the sureties signed it they had a right to have it delivered unaltered to the plaintiff. He was bound to know that the alteration was rightfully done, and that the penalty of his negligence, or his wrongful act, was the loss of the security.”

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
32 A. 730, 169 Pa. 564, 1895 Pa. LEXIS 1130, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gettysburg-national-bank-v-chisolm-pa-1895.