Gerst v. Cain

379 S.W.2d 699, 1964 Tex. App. LEXIS 2554
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMay 20, 1964
Docket11214
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 379 S.W.2d 699 (Gerst v. Cain) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gerst v. Cain, 379 S.W.2d 699, 1964 Tex. App. LEXIS 2554 (Tex. Ct. App. 1964).

Opinion

HUGHES, Justice.

L. D. Cain and others, appellees, filed an application with R. A. Benson, 1 at the time, Savings and Loan Association Commissioner of Texas, for the issuance of a charter for, and for permission to open and operate in downtown Houston, a savings and loan association under the name of Metropolitan Savings Association. The proposed location is in the Memorial Professional Building at the corner of Lamar and Louisiana Streets. In the downtown or central business district of Houston there are seven loan and savings associations, eight if Gibraltar Savings Association is considered as being so located. The Commissioner denied the application and an appeal was taken by appellees (Metropolitan) to the Court below.

Surety Savings and Loan Association, Home Savings and Loan Association, Houston First Federal Savings and Loan Association and Ben Franklin Savings Association, with downtown locations, and Gibraltar Savings Association intervened and aligned themselves with the Commissioner.

Surety Savings and Loan Association is. located within two and one half blocks of the location proposed for Metropolitan.

San Jacinto Savings Association, Guaranty Federal Savings and Loan Association and Farm and Home Savings Association, located in downtown Houston and some nearer to Metropolitan than some of inter-veners did not protest the application of Metropolitan and did not intervene in this; suit.

The Trial Court, sitting nonjury, found that the order of the Commissioner denying the application of Metropolitan was arbitrary and without substantial evidence tO' support it and judgment, in the nature of mandamus, was entered directing the Commissioner to issue a charter to Metropolitan-pursuant to its application.

It was stipulated that all of the requirements for the issuance of a charter had' been met by Metropolitan except (1) The “public convenience and advantage will be-promoted” by granting the charter (2) the-population of the area where the association is to be located affords “reasonable promise of adequate support” for the association, and (3) the granting of the charter “will not unduly injure” any other existing association in the area.

*701 Appellants present four points under which they make a single statement and argument. We will treat them together. These points are (1) that the Commissioner’s finding that the public convenience and advantage will not he promoted by granting Metropolitan’s application since there are presently seventeen savings and loan associations in the neighborhood and surrounding country and the incorporation of Metropolitan would “result in an excessive number of savings and loan associations operating there and increased competition among such associations would be unduly injurious to all such associations” is supported by substantial evidence, (2) the Commissioner’s finding that the “population of the neighborhood of the place where the proposed association is to he located and the population of the surrounding country does not afford a reasonable promise of adequate support for the proposed association taking into consideration that the neighborhood and surrounding country is presently being served by seventeen savings and loan associations, each operating in said neighborhood,” is supported by substantial evidence, (3) the Commissioner’s action in denying the application of Metropolitan is supported by substantial evidence “reflecting the difficulty encountered by existing savings and loan associations in lending at satisfactory rates the hugh amounts of savings available for loans, a difficulty which would be increased by allowing Metropolitan to compete for such loans,” and (4) that the action of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence showing that “competition from Metropolitan would injure Surety, a new association in downtown Houston, by making it more difficult for Surety to increase its volume of savings to a satisfactory level.”

While appellant’s point two is to the effect that the population of the area to be served by Metropolitan is insufficient to afford a reasonable promise of adequate support for Metropolitan we, after reading appellant’s briefs, are of the opinion that appellants concede that the population of Houston, its growth and economic condition, present and prospective, would justify the issuance of a charter to Metropolitan. We quote from appellant’s brief:

“In what might be called a ‘chamber of commerce’ brief, appellees attempt to overwhelm the Court with statistical data proving the strength and growth of the Houston economy, the growth of Houston’s population in the past and as anticipated for the future, the vitality of the central business district, the growth of the total assets of Houston associations, and the financial soundness of such associations, all as of July 18, 1963. We use the descriptive phrase ‘chamber of commerce’ not by way of criticism, but by way of compliment. In all frankness, we admit that if the burden of befitting Houston and its economy rested upon us, we might be in difficulty.
“But, we respectfully submit, this litigation is not to he determined upon the basis of the statistical data just mentioned. The controlling issue is whether on July 18, 1963, conditions in the savings and loan industry were such as to justify, in the public interest, the issuance of a charter for an eighth (a ninth if Gibraltar be included) association in the central business district of Houston. To be more precise: Should this Court find that conditions were such that the public interest required the Commissioner to issue the charter when his exercise of discretion to the contrary is tested by application of the substantial evidence rule? Appellants say that the Commissioner’s action is supported, not only by substantial evidence, but by the great weight of the evidence reflecting the imbalance between available mortgage money, on the one hand, and the demand for such funds, on the other hand.”

In view of the position taken by appellants, we will not recite nor discuss the mass of evidence produced by appellees *702 bearing on the population, growth or economic status of Houston, except to say that it appears to be phenomenal. See Chimney Rock Nat. Bk. of Houston v. State Banking Board, 376 S.W.2d 595, Austin Civ.App., no writ history.

It is the contention of appellants that there is substantial evidence to the effect that there is a tremendous amount of money available in Houston for making mortgage loans and such a scarcity of such loans in the market that the competition for them is so great now among the lending institutions that existing savings and loan associations and the public interest will suffer injury if such condition persists and that such injury will be augmented by the grant of a charter to Metropolitan.

Interwoven in this contention is the predicament in which savings and loan associations find themselves when the spread between what they pay for the use of savings (called dividends) and what the mortgage loan market will pay the association for the use of the same money is too small for the association to operate at a profit. This spread is referred to in the record as the “squeeze.”

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

TEXAS HEALTH FAC. COMM'N v. Baptist Gen. Convention
573 S.W.2d 575 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1978)
SPRING BRANCH SAVINGS & LOAN ASS'N v. Gerst
420 S.W.2d 618 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1967)
Gerst v. Adam
403 S.W.2d 832 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1966)
Gerst v. Cain
388 S.W.2d 168 (Texas Supreme Court, 1965)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
379 S.W.2d 699, 1964 Tex. App. LEXIS 2554, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gerst-v-cain-texapp-1964.