Gershteyn v. ICAO

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 15, 2026
• Docket: 25CA0265
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0265 Gershteyn v ICAO 01-15-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0265 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 14657-2024

Pavel Gerhsteyn,

Petitioner,

v.

Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado,

Respondent.

ORDER SET ASIDE AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division B Opinion by JUDGE LUM Tow and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 15, 2026

Pavel Gershteyn, Pro Se

No Appearance for Respondent ¶1 In this unemployment benefits case, Pavel Gershteyn seeks

review of a final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel),

which, among other things, disallowed his claim for benefits during

the week of February 18-24, 2024. We set aside that portion of the

Panel’s order regarding Gershteyn’s benefits eligibility during that

week.

I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History

¶2 In December 2023, Gershteyn’s former employer eliminated

his position and placed him on a furlough. Gershteyn filed a claim

for benefits with the Division of Unemployment Insurance

(Division).

¶3 Shortly after filing his claim, Gershteyn called the Division to

ask whether his status as a furloughed employee rendered him

“job-attached” within the meaning of Division Regulations 2.4.4-

2.4.6 and therefore exempted him from the general requirement

that claimants actively search for new employment while receiving

benefits. See § 8-73-107(1)(g)(I), C.R.S. 2025. A Division employee

told Gershteyn that only a start date for employment triggered “job-

attached” status. Acting on this advice, Gershteyn engaged in job

search activities through Friday, February 9, 2024, when he

1 accepted a job offer from a new employer and received a start date

of March 4, 2024 — approximately three weeks after he accepted

the job offer.

¶4 As the record in companion case number 24CA1513 shows, a

deputy for the Division issued a notice of determination, holding

that Gershteyn was not eligible to receive benefits the week of

February 11-17 (Week 1) because he had not engaged in job search

activities during that week.1 The record in the instant case shows

the deputy issued a second notice of determination, finding

Gershteyn ineligible for benefits during the following week —

February 18-24 (Week 2) — because he failed to engage in job

search activities that week as well. Gershteyn requested

evidentiary hearings as to both determinations, per section 8-74-

103(1), C.R.S. 2025.

¶5 The Division’s hearing office scheduled a hearing on the

deputy’s Week 1 determination. Gershteyn provided the only

testimony at that hearing, which focused entirely on facts related to

his eligibility for benefits during Week 1. After reviewing the

1 We make take judicial notice of court files in related proceedings.

See Harriman v. Cabela’s Inc., 2016 COA 43, ¶ 64.

2 evidence, the hearing officer issued an order finding that Gershteyn

had failed to perform any job search activities during Week 1. The

hearing officer agreed with the deputy that “job-attachment” status

was triggered only upon an offer from a claimant’s former employer,

and, thus, Gershteyn’s acceptance of new employment had no effect

on his job-attachment status. The hearing officer then concluded

that Gershteyn was ineligible for benefits during Week 2 and made

no conclusion regarding his eligibility during Week 1.

¶6 Gershteyn appealed the hearing officer’s decision to the Panel,

which determined that the hearing officer had misconstrued the

law. The Panel explained that section 8-73-107(1)(g)(I) generally

conditions eligibility on the claimant’s active efforts to secure

employment. However, the Panel noted, Division Regulations 2.4.4-

2.4.6 provide a two-week exemption from this requirement when a

claimant accepts a job offer from a new employer. According to the

Panel, since Gershteyn’s “start date for his new job was March 4,

2024, he was not required to perform job search activities for a

maximum of two weeks before that start date, which would be

Sunday, February 18, 2024, through Saturday, March 2, 2024.”

However, the Panel found Gershteyn “was required to perform job

3 search activities during the week before this period; i.e., February

11-17, 2024.” Thus, the Panel modified the hearing officer’s order

to disallow benefits for only Week 1.

¶7 Gershteyn appealed the Panel’s decision to this court.

Gershteyn v. ICAO, slip op. at ¶ 1 (Colo. App. No. 24CA1513,

January 23, 2025) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). We

held that the Panel had misconstrued the law. Id. at ¶¶ 12-14. We

noted that, under Regulation 2.4.4’s plain language, because

Gershteyn accepted the employment offer on February 9, 2024, his

job-attachment period began that week. Id. at ¶ 13. And, under

Regulation 2.4.5, it extended through the following week of

February 11-17. Id. Thus, Gershteyn was exempted from

searching for work during Week 1. Id. at ¶ 14. We set aside the

Panel’s order. Id. at ¶ 15.

¶8 The Panel then issued a reconsidered final order. That order

noted that Gershteyn had appealed “two deputy’s decisions” — one

concerning Gershteyn’s eligibility during Week 1 and the other

regarding Week 2. The Panel observed that “the hearing officer’s

findings related to [Week 1] but her conclusions related to [Week 2].”

The Panel concluded that, though job-attached through Week 1,

4 Gershteyn enjoyed no such job-attachment in Week 2 and was

therefore required to perform job search activities that week. The

Panel determined that the hearing officer had correctly concluded

that Gershteyn was ineligible for benefits during Week 2. It further

held that Gershteyn was eligible for benefits during Week 1.

II. Discussion

¶9 Gershteyn appeals the Panel’s reconsidered final order as to

Week 2, arguing that he never received a hearing on his appeal of

the deputy’s decision regarding eligibility for Week 2 and is entitled

to one. We agree.

¶ 10 We may set aside the Panel’s order where the decision “is

erroneous as a matter of law” or where “the findings of fact do not

support the decision.” § 8-74-107(6), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 11 Section 8-74-103 requires the hearing officer to conduct an

evidentiary hearing in any appeal from a deputy’s decision before

issuing an order. § 8-74-103(3) (“[A]fter affording all interested

parties a reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing . . ., [the hearing

officer] shall make a decision on each relevant issue raised. . . .”);

see Lucero v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 812 P.2d 1191, 1193 (Colo.

App. 1991) (interpreting section 8-74-103 to “require[]” a hearing on

5 any appeal of a deputy’s decision). By affirming the hearing officer’s

order on Week 2 — rendered without a hearing on that issue — the

Panel erred as a matter of law.

¶ 12 Moreover, as the Panel pointed out, the hearing officer never

made any factual findings regarding Week 2; all her findings

concerned Week 1. Accordingly, the factual findings in her order do

not support her conclusion regarding Week 2, and the Panel erred

in affirming it. § 8-74-107(6).

III. Disposition

¶ 13 With respect to its holding regarding Gersteyn’s eligibility for

Week 2, we set the Panel’s order aside and remand to the Panel

with instructions to remand for a hearing regarding Gershteyn’s

eligibility for benefits during the week of February 18-24, 2024, and

for factual findings on that issue. We do not disturb the findings

and conclusions Gershteyn has not explicitly appealed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.