Gernard D. Chestnut v. Ricky D. Dixon, etc.

• Court: Supreme Court of Florida
• Decided: October 26, 2023
• Docket: SC2023-0719
• Status: Published

Opinion

Supreme Court of Florida ____________

No. SC2023-0719 ____________

GERNARD D. CHESTNUT, Petitioner,

vs.

RICKY D. DIXON, etc., Respondents.

October 26, 2023

PER CURIAM.

Gernard Chestnut, an inmate in state custody, filed a pro se

petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction. 1 We

denied the petition, retained jurisdiction, and directed Chestnut to

show cause why he should not be sanctioned for his repeated

misuse of our limited resources. Chestnut v. Dixon, No. SC2023-

0719, 2023 WL 4990924 (Fla. Aug. 4, 2023); see Fla. R. App. P.

9.410(a) (Sanctions; Court’s Motion). Chestnut responded to our

show cause order. We now find that Chestnut has failed to show

1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const. cause why he should not be barred, and we sanction him as set

forth below.

Chestnut was convicted in the Circuit Court of the Second

Judicial Circuit, in and for Leon County, Florida, of attempted

second-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon in case number 372010CF000410AXXXXX. He was sentenced

by the circuit court to life in prison on the second-degree murder

count and to 15 years’ imprisonment on the possession of a firearm

by a convicted felon count. The First District Court of Appeal

affirmed his convictions and sentences on August 14, 2014.

Chestnut v. State, 145 So. 3d 193 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).

Since 2011, Chestnut has engaged in a pattern of vexatious

filing of meritless pro se requests for relief in this Court related to

his convictions and sentences. Including the petition in this case,

-2- Chestnut has filed 31 2 pro se petitions with this Court. 3 The Court

has never granted Chestnut the relief sought in any of his filings

here; each of the petitions was transferred, dismissed, or denied.4

His petition in this case is no different. Chestnut argued that

his conviction was unlawful because the jury was incorrectly

instructed and he believed he was entitled to relief under

Montgomery v. State, 39 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 2010). He complained that

the district court denied his Montgomery claim and dismissed his

petition under Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 2004). These

are the same arguments Chestnut raised in Chestnut v. Dixon, No.

SC2022-1391, 2023 WL 141953 (Fla. Jan. 10, 2023). Because this

2. Days before the Court issued the show cause order in this case, Chestnut filed two more petitions with this Court, case numbers SC2023-1083 and SC2023-1087, that were not included in the list of 29 cases in the show cause order but have since been dismissed.

3. Chestnut v. Dixon, No. SC2023-0719, 2023 WL 4990924 (Fla. Aug. 4, 2023).

4. Although Chestnut repeatedly cites to this Court’s July 10, 2019, order in Chestnut v. Inch, No. SC2019-0657, 2019 WL 3026897 (Fla. July 10, 2019), as a basis for this Court finding a manifest injustice in his case, we transferred the case to the district court for consideration and specifically stated in the order that “[t]he transfer of this case should not be construed as an adjudication or comment on the merits of the petition . . . .”

-3- Court had already considered these arguments and determined

Chestnut was not entitled to relief and this Court generally follows a

policy of denying extraordinary writ petitions that seek the same

relief that the Court has previously addressed in prior petitions filed

by the petitioner, the Court denied the petition under Topps v.

State, 865 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2004), and directed Chestnut to show

cause why he should not be barred from filing any further pro se

requests for relief in this Court.

Chestnut filed a response to the show cause order in which he

continues to challenge his conviction and assert his Montgomery

claim, arguing that the district court improperly dismissed his case

under Baker. In his response, he failed to express any remorse for

his repeated misuse of this Court’s limited resources nor

acknowledge the frivolous nature of his repeated filings. Upon

consideration of Chestnut’s response, we find that he has failed to

show cause why sanctions should not be imposed. Therefore,

based on Chestnut’s extensive history of filing pro se petitions and

requests for relief that were meritless or otherwise inappropriate for

this Court’s review, we now find that he has abused the Court’s

limited judicial resources. See Pettway v. McNeil, 987 So. 2d 20, 22 -4- (Fla. 2008) (explaining that this Court has previously “exercised the

inherent judicial authority to sanction an abusive litigant” and that

“[o]ne justification for such a sanction lies in the protection of the

rights of others to have the Court conduct timely reviews of their

legitimate filings”). If no action is taken, Chestnut will continue to

burden the Court’s resources. We further conclude that Chestnut’s

habeas petition filed in this case is a frivolous proceeding brought

before the Court by a state prisoner. See § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat.

(2023).

Accordingly, we direct the Clerk of this Court to reject any

future pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Gernard

Chestnut related to case number 372010CF000410AXXXXX, unless

such filings are signed by a member in good standing of The Florida

Bar. Furthermore, because we have found Chestnut’s petition to be

frivolous, we direct the Clerk of this Court, pursuant to section

944.279(1), Florida Statutes (2023), to forward a copy of this

opinion to the Florida Department of Corrections’ institution or

facility in which Chestnut is incarcerated.

No motion for rehearing or clarification will be entertained by

this Court. -5- It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.

Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus

Gernard D. Chestnut, pro se, Raiford, Florida,

for Petitioner

No appearance for Respondent

-6-