Germer v. Churchill Downs Management, Etc.

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedJuly 13, 2016
Docket14-2695
StatusPublished

This text of Germer v. Churchill Downs Management, Etc. (Germer v. Churchill Downs Management, Etc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Germer v. Churchill Downs Management, Etc., (Fla. Ct. App. 2016).

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed July 13, 2016. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D14-2695 Lower Tribunal No. 13-39642 ________________

Patrick Germer, Appellant,

vs.

The Churchill Downs Management, etc., et al., Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Jose M. Rodriguez, Judge.

Lindsey M. Tenberg, P.A., and Lindsey M. Tenberg (Lighthouse Point), for appellant.

Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, and James H. Wyman, for appellees.

Before SHEPHERD, LAGOA and SCALES, JJ.

SCALES, J. Appellant, plaintiff below, Patrick Germer appeals a summary judgment

entered by the trial court in favor of Appellees, defendants below, Pinecrest

Stables, Inc., Parsons Pinecrest Farm, Inc., Santa Cruz Ranch, Inc., and Juan Pedro

Rizo Patron (collectively “Defendants”). We affirm because Florida’s Equine

Activities Liability Act (the “Act”) immunizes Defendants for the injuries

occasioned by a horse biting Germer while Germer was engaged in an equine

activity.

I. Facts

On September 26, 2012, Germer, a former licensed jockey, and his

roommate Tomislav Zivanovich decided to visit the Santa Cruz Ranch in Ocala,

Florida to see Zivanovich’s horse. Because Germer’s jockey license had expired,

Germer was required to obtain a guest pass in order to enter the stables. While

Germer was en route through the barn to see Zivanovich’s horse, another horse

named Forever Happy jumped out of his stall and bit Germer’s chest.

Approximately a year and a half later on December 27, 2013, Germer filed

suit against the owners of the stables and the owner of Forever Happy, alleging that

Defendants were negligent in allowing Forever Happy to bite Germer. Defendants

filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the Act, codified in chapter 773

of the Florida Statutes, immunized Defendants from any liability to Germer.

Defendants’ motion asserted that Germer was a “participant engaged in an equine

2 activity” and, therefore, pursuant to section 773.02 of the Florida Statutes, was

statutorily precluded from recovering damages. After conducting a hearing, the

trial court held that the Act immunized Defendants, and entered a final summary

judgment in favor of Defendants from which Germer takes this timely appeal.

II. Analysis1

A. The Act’s relevant provisions

The operative immunity provision of the Act is codified in section 773.02 of

the Florida Statutes, which reads, in relevant part, as follows:

Except as provided in s. 773.03, an equine activity sponsor, an equine professional, or any other person, which shall include a corporation or partnership, shall not be liable for an injury to . . . a participant resulting from the inherent risks of equine activities and, except as provided in s. 773.03, no participant . . . shall have any claim against or recover from any equine activity sponsor, equine professional, or any other person for injury . . . of the participant resulting from any of the inherent risks of equine activities.

The Act defines a “participant” as “. . . any person, whether amateur or

professional, who engages in . . . an equine activity, whether or not a fee is paid to

participate in the equine activity.” § 773.01(7), Fla. Stat. (2012). The Act

specifically defines “engages in an equine activity” as

riding, training, assisting in veterinary treatment of, driving, or being a passenger upon an equine, whether mounted or unmounted, visiting or touring or utilizing an equine facility as part of an organized event or activity, or any person assisting a participant or show management. 1 We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Quarantello v.

Leroy, 997 So. 2d 648, 651 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).

3 The term “engages in an equine activity” does not include being a spectator at an equine activity, except in cases where a spectator places himself or herself in an unauthorized area.

§ 773.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2012). (emphasis added)

B. The issue on appeal

The critical, indeed dispositive, issue in this case is whether Germer was

“visiting an equine facility as part of an organized event or activity” when he was

bitten by Forever Happy. If, as Defendants argue and as the trial court held,

Germer was engaged in such an organized event or activity, then Germer was a

“participant engaged in an equine activity” and Defendants are statutorily

immunized from Germer’s claim for personal injuries. § 773.02, Fla. Stat. (2012).

C. The parties’ respective arguments

Germer argues that his visit to the stables did not constitute an organized

activity or event because Germer’s decision to visit the stables with his roommate

was made on the spur of the moment and was not coordinated with the stable

owners prior to the visit. Defendants argue that Germer’s visit was “organized” by

Zivanovich, an owner of a horse housed at the stables. Defendants further argue

that the stable’s requirement that all guests obtain a guest pass prior to entering the

horse barn – combined with the statutorily required warning posted at the stable2 –

2In order for an equine facility to avail itself of section 773.02’s exculpation, the Act requires the posting of the following warning notice:

WARNING

4 constitutes the requisite “organization” so as to immunize Defendants from

Germer’s personal injury claims.

D. Legislative intent

While the Legislature meticulously defined virtually every other operative

term in section 773.02, the statute does not provide a definition for “organized

event or activity.” Therefore, we are called upon to construe the provision,

consistent with the Act’s legislative intent. Bautista v. State, 863 So. 2d 1180, 1185

(Fla. 2003).

In order to ascertain legislative intent, we look at the statutory scheme, as a

whole, and interpret the specific provision consistent with the theme evidenced by

its statutory structure. State v. Moreno-Gonzalez, 18 So. 3d 1180, 1182 (Fla. 3d

DCA 2009) (stating that courts are “guided by the rule of statutory construction

that all parts of a statute must be read together in order to achieve a consistent

whole.”).

Plainly, the Act’s general intent is to limit the liability of Florida’s equine

facilities for injuries resulting from inherent risks associated with equine activities.

To effectuate this intent, the Legislature broadly defined those activities

Under Florida law, an equine activity sponsor or equine professional is not liable for an injury to, or the death of, a participant in equine activities resulting from the inherent risks of equine activities.

§ 773.04(2), Fla. Stat. (2012).

5 constituting an equine activity. Indeed, the Legislature carved out only one specific

exception from this broad definition, i.e., spectators in an authorized area. §

773.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2012). See Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976)

(pursuant to the principle of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio

alterius, “the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another”). Thus, against

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Related

State v. Moreno-Gonzalez
18 So. 3d 1180 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2009)
Thayer v. State
335 So. 2d 815 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1976)
Bautista v. State
863 So. 2d 1180 (Supreme Court of Florida, 2003)

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