NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 18 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GERARDO GUZMAN-GUTIERREZ, No. 20-71979
Petitioner, Agency No. A205-699-392
v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 12, 2026** Seattle, Washington
Before: W. FLETCHER and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and HINDERAKER,*** District Judge.
Gerardo Guzman-Gutierrez petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”)
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable John Charles Hinderaker, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation. decision denying his application for cancelation of removal under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo the
BIA’s determination of legal questions and due process challenges to final orders
of removal. Padilla-Martinez v. Holder, 770 F.3d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 2014)
(citations omitted). We review whether the BIA erred in applying the exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship standard for substantial evidence. Gonzalez-Juarez
v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2025). We deny the petition.
1. During a removal proceeding, “the alien shall have a reasonable
opportunity to examine the evidence against the alien, to present evidence on the
alien’s own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government.”
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B). Noncitizens in removal proceedings have a due process
right to a full and fair proceeding, Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir.
2000), but to proceed on a procedural due process claim, a noncitizen must show
the violation caused him prejudice. Gomez-Velazco v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 989, 993
(9th Cir. 2018).
Petitioner has not established that the IJ’s conduct prejudiced him. To
demonstrate prejudice in a removal proceeding, a petitioner must show “that the
outcome of the proceeding may have been affected by the alleged violation.”
Zamorano v. Garland, 2 F.4th 1213, 1226 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Pangilinan v.
Holder, 568 F.3d 708, 709 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)). The IJ did not allow
2 Petitioner’s ten-year-old son, A.G., to testify because the IJ thought it would have
been too traumatic. The IJ did allow Petitioner and Petitioner’s lawful permanent
resident (“LPR”) parents to testify, however. These three witnesses testified about
Petitioner’s relationship with A.G., A.G.’s health conditions, and the difficulties
A.G. would face in adjusting to life in Mexico were he to go with his father. These
are the same subjects Petitioner’s counsel proffered A.G. would have testified
about. See AR 471 (A.G. would “testify about how he suffers from asthma and
how he is excelling in school . . . [and] as to all the things his father does for him
and most importantly how he feels safe with his father”). Nothing in the record
indicates that any additional testimony A.G. would have offered about his
relationship with his father, the difficulty he would face moving to Mexico, or his
medical conditions—which were not causing any notable impairments at the time
of the hearing—could have changed the IJ’s decision when the IJ had already
heard testimony and reviewed evidence concerning each of these topics. And, in
view of the tenuous nature of Petitioner’s claim for cancelation of removal, there is
no reasonable possibility that the testimony would have carried such emotional
sway as to potentially affect the proceeding’s outcome. See Zamorano, 2 F.4th at
1226.
2. In evaluating whether a petitioner has met the exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship standard, an IJ considers “the ages, health, and circumstances of
3 qualifying lawful permanent resident and United States citizen relatives.” In re
Monreal, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 63 (BIA 2001). To constitute exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship, “the hardship must be out of the ordinary and
exceedingly uncommon. It must deviate, in the extreme, from the norm. The
agency must compare the hardship in a given case to the hardship that results in the
usual, ordinary course when an alien is removed.” Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi,
137 F.4th 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2025). “[A]ll hardship factors should be considered
in the aggregate when assessing exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” In
re Monreal, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 63.1
Petitioner has not met this “very demanding” standard. de Garcia v. Holder,
621 F.3d 906, 913 (9th Cir. 2010). Though Petitioner’s son and parents will
undoubtably experience hardship resulting from Petitioner’s removal, A.G. does
1 Though Petitioner contends the IJ applied the wrong legal standard by failing to consider the harm to all Petitioner’s qualifying family members in the aggregate, he is mistaken. The IJ’s decision recited the requirement that “[a]ll hardship factors should be considered in the aggregate” and found “the circumstances described by [Petitioner were] not exceptional and extremely unusual.” AR 74, 80. The BIA adopted the IJ’s reasoning and found that, “[c]onsidering the evidence individually and cumulatively,” Petitioner had not shown his qualifying relatives would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. AR 3. Both the IJ and the BIA cited the Monreal decision that Petitioner invokes for his argument in applying the hardship standard. See Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he IJ expressly cited and applied Monreal in rendering its decision, which is all our review requires.”), abrogated on other grounds by Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024).
4 not have “very serious health issues, or compelling needs in school,” and
Petitioner’s parents are not “solely dependent upon him for support.” In re
Monreal, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 63–64 (giving examples of applicants who would
likely have a strong case). The evidence does not show that the hardship to
Petitioner’s parents and son would be “‘substantially’ beyond the ordinary
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 18 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GERARDO GUZMAN-GUTIERREZ, No. 20-71979
Petitioner, Agency No. A205-699-392
v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 12, 2026** Seattle, Washington
Before: W. FLETCHER and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and HINDERAKER,*** District Judge.
Gerardo Guzman-Gutierrez petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”)
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable John Charles Hinderaker, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation. decision denying his application for cancelation of removal under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo the
BIA’s determination of legal questions and due process challenges to final orders
of removal. Padilla-Martinez v. Holder, 770 F.3d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 2014)
(citations omitted). We review whether the BIA erred in applying the exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship standard for substantial evidence. Gonzalez-Juarez
v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2025). We deny the petition.
1. During a removal proceeding, “the alien shall have a reasonable
opportunity to examine the evidence against the alien, to present evidence on the
alien’s own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government.”
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B). Noncitizens in removal proceedings have a due process
right to a full and fair proceeding, Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir.
2000), but to proceed on a procedural due process claim, a noncitizen must show
the violation caused him prejudice. Gomez-Velazco v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 989, 993
(9th Cir. 2018).
Petitioner has not established that the IJ’s conduct prejudiced him. To
demonstrate prejudice in a removal proceeding, a petitioner must show “that the
outcome of the proceeding may have been affected by the alleged violation.”
Zamorano v. Garland, 2 F.4th 1213, 1226 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Pangilinan v.
Holder, 568 F.3d 708, 709 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)). The IJ did not allow
2 Petitioner’s ten-year-old son, A.G., to testify because the IJ thought it would have
been too traumatic. The IJ did allow Petitioner and Petitioner’s lawful permanent
resident (“LPR”) parents to testify, however. These three witnesses testified about
Petitioner’s relationship with A.G., A.G.’s health conditions, and the difficulties
A.G. would face in adjusting to life in Mexico were he to go with his father. These
are the same subjects Petitioner’s counsel proffered A.G. would have testified
about. See AR 471 (A.G. would “testify about how he suffers from asthma and
how he is excelling in school . . . [and] as to all the things his father does for him
and most importantly how he feels safe with his father”). Nothing in the record
indicates that any additional testimony A.G. would have offered about his
relationship with his father, the difficulty he would face moving to Mexico, or his
medical conditions—which were not causing any notable impairments at the time
of the hearing—could have changed the IJ’s decision when the IJ had already
heard testimony and reviewed evidence concerning each of these topics. And, in
view of the tenuous nature of Petitioner’s claim for cancelation of removal, there is
no reasonable possibility that the testimony would have carried such emotional
sway as to potentially affect the proceeding’s outcome. See Zamorano, 2 F.4th at
1226.
2. In evaluating whether a petitioner has met the exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship standard, an IJ considers “the ages, health, and circumstances of
3 qualifying lawful permanent resident and United States citizen relatives.” In re
Monreal, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 63 (BIA 2001). To constitute exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship, “the hardship must be out of the ordinary and
exceedingly uncommon. It must deviate, in the extreme, from the norm. The
agency must compare the hardship in a given case to the hardship that results in the
usual, ordinary course when an alien is removed.” Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi,
137 F.4th 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2025). “[A]ll hardship factors should be considered
in the aggregate when assessing exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” In
re Monreal, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 63.1
Petitioner has not met this “very demanding” standard. de Garcia v. Holder,
621 F.3d 906, 913 (9th Cir. 2010). Though Petitioner’s son and parents will
undoubtably experience hardship resulting from Petitioner’s removal, A.G. does
1 Though Petitioner contends the IJ applied the wrong legal standard by failing to consider the harm to all Petitioner’s qualifying family members in the aggregate, he is mistaken. The IJ’s decision recited the requirement that “[a]ll hardship factors should be considered in the aggregate” and found “the circumstances described by [Petitioner were] not exceptional and extremely unusual.” AR 74, 80. The BIA adopted the IJ’s reasoning and found that, “[c]onsidering the evidence individually and cumulatively,” Petitioner had not shown his qualifying relatives would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. AR 3. Both the IJ and the BIA cited the Monreal decision that Petitioner invokes for his argument in applying the hardship standard. See Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he IJ expressly cited and applied Monreal in rendering its decision, which is all our review requires.”), abrogated on other grounds by Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024).
4 not have “very serious health issues, or compelling needs in school,” and
Petitioner’s parents are not “solely dependent upon him for support.” In re
Monreal, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 63–64 (giving examples of applicants who would
likely have a strong case). The evidence does not show that the hardship to
Petitioner’s parents and son would be “‘substantially’ beyond the ordinary
hardship that would be expected when a close family member leaves this country.”
Id. at 62.
3. The BIA may “not engage in factfinding in the course of deciding
appeals.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv). The BIA did not engage in factfinding by
stating that Petitioner’s sibling sponsoring their parents’ visa petition required
accepting financial responsibility for them. The IJ’s decision noted Petitioner’s
parents received their green cards after another son married a U.S. citizen and later
became a U.S. citizen himself. Such sponsorship necessarily requires the sponsor
to agree “to provide support to maintain the sponsored alien” at a threshold income
for a statutorily-mandated period. 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1)(A).
Petitioner correctly notes that the IJ’s decision does not mention the
possibility that Petitioner may be able to adjust or immigrate to the United States in
the future. However, the BIA’s decision overwhelmingly focused on A.G.’s lack of
serious health issues and the ability of Petitioner’s siblings in the United States to
care for his parents. Accordingly, to the extent the BIA’s reference to this
5 possibility constituted factfinding, it was harmless error because there is “no
indication that . . . [it] changed the result here.” Salgado v. Sessions, 889 F.3d 982,
989 (9th Cir. 2018).
PETITION DENIED.