Gerardo Cabanillas v. City of South Gate et al.

Opinion

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8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California

11 GERARDO CABANILLAS, Case № 2:24-cv-08027-ODW (BFMx)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 13 v. CITY OF SOUTH GATE’S MOTION 14 CITY OF SOUTH GATE et al., TO DISMISS COUNT VI [155]

15 Defendants.

16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 Plaintiff Gerardo Cabanillas brings this civil rights action against Defendants 19 City of South Gate (“South Gate”), City of Huntington Park (“Huntington Park”), and 20 individual officers Lee Jack Alirez, David Pixler, Jonathan Sekiya, Detective Lopez, 21 Officer Ayestas, Officer Salcido, John Navarrette, Cosme Lozano, and Anthony 22 Porter, following Cabanillas’s wrongful arrest and conviction in 1995 for crimes he 23 did not commit. (Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”), Dkt. No. 142.) South Gate now 24 moves to dismiss Count VI of Cabanillas’s Second Amended Complaint for Monell 25 liability. (Mot. Dismiss (“Motion” or “Mot.”), Dkt. No. 155.) For the reasons 26 discussed below, the Court DENIES South Gate’s Motion.1 27

28 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 II. BACKGROUND2 2 The Court incorporates by reference the detailed background in its prior Order 3 Granting South Gate’s Motion to Dismiss Count VI. (Order Granting Mot. Dismiss 4 (“MTD Order”) 2–4, Dkt. No. 141.) The Court summarizes here only the facts 5 relevant to the disposition of this Motion. 6 Cabanillas spent nearly thirty years incarcerated for crimes he did not commit. 7 (SAC ¶ 192.) During the investigation that led to his conviction, law enforcement 8 officers fabricated evidence, coerced confessions, and withheld exculpatory material. 9 (Id. ¶¶ 147–76.) Another suspect later confessed to the crimes and Cabanillas was 10 ultimately exonerated. (Id. ¶¶ 189–91.) 11 On March 16, 1995, after Cabanillas’s arrest but before his trial, a Deputy 12 Public Defender issued a memorandum to South Gate’s Deputy in Charge (the “DPD 13 Memo”). (Id. ¶¶ 260–66.) The DPD Memo indicated that Officer Alirez, the officer 14 leading Cabanillas’s criminal investigation, “routinely” fabricated evidence, coerced 15 confessions, and obtained confessions in exchange for promises of leniency. (Id. 16 ¶¶ 262, 266.) South Gate’s Police Chief was aware of these practices due to the small 17 size of the agency. (Id. ¶ 272.) Despite knowing this information, officers 18 nevertheless pursued Cabanillas’s criminal prosecution and “South Gate did nothing 19 to cure the problem.” (Id. ¶¶ 268, 273.) 20 After he was exonerated, Cabanillas initiated this action asserting civil rights 21 violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) On August 8, 2025, the 22 Court granted South Gate’s motion and dismissed Cabanillas’s Monell claim with 23 leave to amend. (MTD Order 16.) On August 22, 2025, Cabanillas filed his Second 24 Amended Complaint. (SAC.) South Gate now moves to dismiss the amended Monell 25 claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). (Mot.) 26 27 2 All factual references derive from Cabanillas’s Second Amended Complaint, and well-pleaded 28 factual allegations are accepted as true for purposes of this Motion. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 1 III. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable 3 legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise cognizable legal 4 theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To 5 survive a dismissal motion, a complaint need only satisfy the minimal notice pleading 6 requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—a short and plain statement of the claim. Porter v. 7 Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The factual “allegations must be enough to 8 raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 9 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That is, the complaint must “contain sufficient factual 10 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 11 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 12 The determination of whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a 13 “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 14 experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A court is generally limited 15 to the pleadings and must construe all “factual allegations set forth in the 16 complaint . . . as true and . . . in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Id. 17 However, a court need not blindly accept conclusory allegations, unreasonable 18 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 19 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 20 IV. DISCUSSION 21 Cabanillas alleges that South Gate is liable under § 1983 for violations of his 22 constitutional rights during the investigation and prosecution that led to his wrongful 23 conviction. (SAC ¶¶ 239–76.) South Gate argues that Cabanillas fails to plausibly 24 allege a Monell claim for municipal liability. (Mot.) 25 A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when it maintains a policy or 26 custom that violates the constitutional rights of another. Park v. City & County of 27 Honolulu, 952 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of 28 N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). To impose liability on a municipal entity under 1 § 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) a constitutional deprivation; (2) a municipal policy; 2 (3) “that this policy ‘amounts to deliberate indifference’ to the plaintiff’s constitutional 3 rights; and (4) that the policy is the ‘moving force behind the constitutional 4 violation.’” Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting City of 5 Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389–91, (1989)). A municipality “cannot be held 6 liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. 7 There is no heightened pleading standard for Monell claims. Leatherman v. 8 Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 9 However, a complaint must contain “sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give 10 fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. 11 Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, to survive “a motion to dismiss for 12 failure to state a claim, a Monell claim must consist of more than mere formulaic 13 recitations of the existence of unlawful policies, conducts or habits.” Doe #1 M.L. v. 14 San Bernardino Sheriff Dep’t, 753 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1029–30 (C.D. Cal. 2024). 15 Cabanillas advances several theories of municipal liability against South Gate 16 based on (1) an official written policy or lack thereof, (2) a longstanding custom or 17 practice, (3) failure to train, and (4) ratification. (SAC ¶¶ 239–76.) These theories are 18 “separate arguments in support of a single claim.” Quinto-Collins v. City of Antioch, 19 No. 21-cv-06094-VC, 2022 WL 18574, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2022) (quoting Yee v. 20 City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992)). “In the context of Monell, the different 21 theories of liability . . . are best understood the same way—as different arguments in 22 support of a single claim.” Id. As discussed below, the Court finds that Cabanillas 23 plausibly pleads a Monell claim based on a policy of inaction or omission. Thus, the 24 Court need not assess the merits of Cabanillas’s other potential Monell theories. See 25 Westways World Travel v. AMR Corp., 182 F. Supp. 2d 952, 957 (C.D. Cal. 2001) 26 (“Where a plaintiff within a single claim for relief sets forth several legal theories . . . 27 it is not for the district court to assess the [merits] of each theory at the pleading stage 28 where [the] plaintiff has made sufficient allegations to support one of the theories.”). 1 Cabanillas alleges that South Gate is liable under § 1983 for failing to 2 implement policies and safeguards to prevent constitutional violations. This includes 3 policies prohibiting the use of unreliable identification evidence in criminal 4 prosecutions and policies governing the training and supervision of law enforcement 5 officers. (SAC ¶¶ 239–76.) He alleges that South Gate knew officers had fabricated 6 evidence that was used to convict him and that they failed to act to stop it. (Id. ¶ 273.) 7 He further alleges that South Gate’s inaction and omission caused his wrongful 8 conviction. (Id. ¶¶ 249, 252.) 9 “A policy of inaction or omission may be based on failure to implement 10 procedural safeguards to prevent constitutional violations.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, 11 Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1143 (9th Cir. 2012). “In inaction cases, the plaintiff must show, 12 first, that the policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional 13 right.” Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation modified). This 14 requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant “was on actual or constructive notice 15 that its omission would likely result in a constitutional violation.” Id. (quoting Tsao, 16 698 F.3d at 1145). “Second, the plaintiff must show ‘that the policy caused the 17 violation in the sense that the municipality could have prevented the violation with an 18 appropriate policy.’” Id. (quoting Tsao, 698 F.3d at 1143). 19 Cabanillas’s allegations against South Gate adequately state a policy of 20 inaction. First, Cabanillas plausibly alleges that South Gate’s policy amounts to 21 deliberate indifference to Cabanillas’s constitutional rights. Cabanillas alleges that 22 South Gate lacked adequate written policies governing eyewitness-identification 23 procedures and the supervision of officers conducting criminal investigations. (SAC 24 ¶¶ 241, 249.) These allegations support the inference that this omission did not occur 25 in a vacuum. The DPD Memo put South Gate on actual or constructive notice that 26 Alirez had engaged in serious investigative misconduct, including fabricating 27 evidence, securing confessions through promises of leniency, and using improper 28 identification practices in felony investigations. (Id. ¶ 262.) For example, the DPD 1 Memo indicated that Alirez fabricated identification evidence used against Cabanillas 2 and that Cabanillas confessed to the crimes only following a false promise of leniency. 3 (Id. ¶¶ 263, 265.) The DPD Memo was circulated among those in charge of the police 4 department, so the police chief either knew or is fairly charged with knowing of the 5 conduct described. (Id. ¶¶ 266, 271–72.) Thus, the Court may reasonably infer at the 6 pleading stage that South Gate was aware of a substantial risk that, absent adequate 7 policies or supervision, a constitutional injury would result. Nor do these facts 8 describe an isolated investigative error. Read together, the facts concerning the DPD 9 Memo, Alirez’s known history of misconduct, South Gate’s lack of written 10 identification procedures, and its repeated use of improper investigative methods 11 collectively support the inference that South Gate failed to act despite notice of a 12 pattern of unconstitutional conduct. Thus, these facts suffice to support the deliberate 13 indifference component of a policy of inaction theory. See Park, 952 F.3d at 1141 14 (“Deliberate indifference exists when the need ‘for more or different’ action ‘is so 15 obvious, and the inadequacy [of existing practice] so likely to result in the violation of 16 constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have 17 been deliberately indifferent to the need.’” (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 & n.10)). 18 Second, the facts plausibly support causation. Without governing procedures 19 for eyewitness identifications, officers were able to use improper suggestive methods 20 that could predictably distort eyewitness evidence. For instance, Cabanillas’ describes 21 how officers manipulated photo lineups by reusing the same filler photographs after 22 the victims had already viewed them and permitted witnesses to sit together during the 23 identification process. (SAC ¶¶ 83–95, 124–42.) Moreover, Alirez forced victims to 24 positively identify Cabanillas as the perpetrator, even after the victims expressed 25 serious hesitation and refused to sign the photo array. (Id. ¶¶ 124–42.) These facts 26 support the inference that, without adequate safeguards, officers like Alirez were able 27 to manipulate the identification process to fabricate evidence. Thus, Cabanillas 28 plausibly alleges that South Gate’s policy of inaction caused his constitutional injury. 1 The challenged conduct here is not merely adjacent to Cabanillas’s conviction; 2 || it concerns the very identification practices that produced evidence used to wrongfully 3 || convict him. (/d. 4265.) On this record, the Court reasonably infers that South Gate’s 4|| failure to adopt adequate policies concerning eyewitness identification and officer 5 || supervision amounts to deliberate indifference to Cabanillas’s constitutional rights and 6 || that this omission was the moving force behind the constitutional injury. See Canton, 7| 489 U.S. at 388-90 (holding that municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where a 8 | municipality is deliberately indifferent “to the rights of its inhabitants” and this failure 9 || is the moving force behind the constitutional violation). 10 Accepting Cabanillas’s allegations as true and construing all reasonable 11 || inferences in his favor, Cabanillas pleads sufficient facts to state a Monell claim based 12 | on South Gate’s policy of inaction. Accordingly, South Gate’s Motion fails. 13 Vv. CONCLUSION 14 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES South Gate’s Motion to 15 | Dismiss. (Dkt. No. 155.) 16 17 IT IS SO ORDERED.

9 March 12, 2026 GE i = 20 OTIS D. HT, I 21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28