Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 225 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CV-24-685
GERALD ROBINSON, IN HIS Opinion Delivered April 8, 2026
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COUNTY APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON JUDGE OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ARKANSAS [NO. 35CV-22-199] APPELLANT
HONORABLE GARY ARNOLD, V. JUDGE
LAFAYETTE WOODS, JR., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SHERIFF OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, ARKANSAS APPELLEE AFFIRMED
WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge
Gerald Robinson, the county judge of Jefferson County (Judge Robinson), appeals
from the Jefferson County Circuit Court’s order holding him in contempt for arbitrarily and
capriciously denying claims for payment submitted to him by Jefferson County Sheriff
Lafayette Woods, Jr. (Sheriff Woods). On appeal, Judge Robinson argues that the order he
was found to have violated was not sufficiently clear to form the basis of a contempt finding,
and even if it was sufficiently clear, his denials of Sheriff Woods’s claims were not arbitrary
and capricious. We affirm. I. Procedural History
This case began in March 2022 when Sheriff Woods filed a petition against Judge
Robinson and all the Jefferson County justices of the peace. Sheriff Woods sought a
declaration that Ordinance 2022-136, which set the 2022 budget for Jefferson County, was
invalid and asked the court for a writ of mandamus compelling the Jefferson County
Quorum Court to appropriate additional funds to the Jefferson County Sheriff’s
Department. Sheriff Woods filed a first amended petition in May seeking the same relief,
and a second amended petition in August seeking the same relief plus a declaration that
Ordinance 2021-27, which adopted a job requisition/pre-offer form for use by county
officials, was invalid because the ordinance was not properly enacted and was
unconstitutional because it required the county judge’s signature. On January 26, 2023,
Sheriff Woods filed a third amended complaint to supplement his earlier petitions, adding
the claims relevant to this appeal in which he alleged that Judge Robinson had arbitrarily
and capriciously denied his requests for payment.
On February 6, the circuit court granted a motion to dismiss filed by Judge Robinson
and the justices of the peace as to all claims in the original petition and the first amended
petition. On September 14, the court held a hearing on the remaining claims. At the outset
of the hearing, the court granted Sheriff Woods’s motion for partial summary judgment as
to Ordinance 2021-27, finding that it was not properly enacted and was, therefore, invalid
for failure to comply with the requisite rules; the court entered an order on November 29
reflecting this decision. The only remaining issues were those regarding Judge Robinson’s
2 denial of Sheriff Woods’s payment requests, and the court heard testimony and received
evidence on these issues.
Also on November 29, the circuit court entered findings of fact and conclusions of
law (the November order) recognizing that the county quorum court is required by law to
prepare a yearly budget and that the county judge has the power to “authorize and approve
disbursement of appropriated county funds.” Ark. Const. Amend. 55 § 3. By statute, the
county judge must review all claims for payment to ensure that they comply with the purpose
for which the funds were appropriated. Ark. Code Ann. § 14-14-1102 (Repl. 2013). The
court then entered the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
15. The county budget approved by the Jefferson County Quorum Court provides line items for different types of expenses. By detailing the budget in this way, the Quorum Court indicates the purpose for which the funds are appropriated. Stated another way, the line item in the budget dictates the purpose for which county funds were appropriated by the Quorum Court.
16. Since June 13, 2022, the office of the County Judge has denied or disallowed 93 claims submitted for payment by the Sheriff’s Department, as indicated in the demonstrative exhibit introduced as Petitioner’s Exhibit 2.
17. Of the more than 2,000 claims submitted by the Sheriff’s Department since June 13, 2022, a total of 93 were denied or disallowed, equating to approximately six denied or disallowed claims per month.
18. There is no legal requirement that a county judge explain the reason for the denial of a claim. See Attorney General Opinion No. 2020-059.
19. The testimony established that some of the denied claims were subsequently resubmitted, and approved for payment, but it was unclear from the testimony how many of the 93 denied claims were subsequently paid and how many remain outstanding.
3 20. The testimony also established that some of the invoices that comprised the denied claims were resubmitted without change as part of new claims with different claim numbers.
21. The basis for denial of some claims was not always consistent. Further, some claims initially denied were subsequently resubmitted without substantive change and then allowed.
22. No other department in Jefferson County government was subject to similar inconsistent denial of submitted claims.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
23. “[M]andamus is an appropriate remedy when a public officer is called upon to do a plain and specific duty, which is required by law and which requires no exercise of discretion or official judgment.” Clowers v. Lassiter, 363 Ark. 241, 244, 213 S.W.3d 6, 9 (2005).
24. “Mandamus does not lie to control a public official’s discretionary act.” Martz v. Felts, 2019 Ark 297, at 3, 585 S.W.3d 675, 677.
25. The County Judge’s review of claims and his decision as to whether to approve or deny those claims are discretionary acts. In performing his statutory duties to ensure that county funds are expended in accordance with the budget promulgated by the Quorum Court, the County Judge is called upon to exercise his discretion and his official judgment. As such, mandamus does not lie, and Petitioner’s claim for a writ of mandamus is denied.
26. At the conclusion of the trial, Petitioner asked this Court to limit the County Judge’s review of claims going forward to deny only those where there is evidence of fraud or an issue with procurement. That is not consistent with the County Judge’s duties under the law, and this Court cannot constrain the County Judge’s statutory authority.
27. As to Petitioner’s claim for declaratory judgment, any judgment entered by this Court would operate to control the action of the State. Therefore, the declaratory judgment claim is barred by sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Ark. Lottery Comm’n v. Alpha Mktg., 2013 Ark. 232, at 6, 428 S.W.3d 415, 420 (“Because a judgment for Alpha would operate to control the action of the State or subject it to liability, the suit is one against the State and is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.”)
4 28. To avoid the application of sovereign immunity, Petitioner urged that the County Judge’s actions were arbitrary and capricious, which is an exception to the defense of sovereign immunity.
29. The Court finds that the County Judge’s denials were arbitrary and capricious.
30. The County Judge is enjoined from arbitrarily or capriciously rejecting claims for payment submitted by the Sheriff’s Department, but instead must be reasonably consistent, fair and predictable.
31. The basis for denial of any claim must be clearly stated such that the Sheriff is able to correct the deficiency and avoid similar deficiencies going forward.
32. The Sheriff and the County Judge, or their respective department representatives, shall promptly confer concerning denied claims to ensure timely resolution for the benefit of effective and efficient county government operations.
33. Failure to abide by this Order may subject the violator to a finding of contempt and further appropriate action.
On April 5, 2024, Sheriff Woods filed a petition for contempt claiming that Judge
Robinson had arbitrarily and capriciously denied twenty-seven claims for payment in
violation of the court’s November order.1 The circuit court held a hearing on the petition
on June 28.
II. Contempt Hearing
Sheriff Woods’s office manager, Chris Brown, testified that he had been in his
current position for eleven years and that his duties included submission of the sheriff’s
department’s bills for payment by the county judge. He said most of the recently disallowed
1 Of the twenty-seven claims, twenty of the claims were denied before entry of the November order and seven were denied on or after entry of the November order. The parties agree that only those seven claims are relevant to this contempt action.
5 claims had arisen in situations in which the creditor had included the main address for the
sheriff’s department on an invoice when the expense was for one of the sheriff’s department’s
divisions. Brown said that a creditor, particularly a large creditor like Amazon, generally has
one address for the sheriff’s department, although there are multiple divisions and budgets
within the department. Brown gave the example of an invoice for an item purchased for the
jail that includes at the top of the invoice the main address of the sheriff’s department. He
said that the invoice also includes the proper budgetary code, the appropriate department,
and an affidavit authorizing payment from the proper budget—in this example, the jail—but
it is addressed to the sheriff’s department rather than to the jail. Brown explained that the
county judge had denied payment because the address of the jail is not the address listed on
the invoice. He said the issue had continued after the November order and was an ongoing
problem. According to Brown, the sheriff’s department had been unable to use the Amazon
account this year because of nonpayment due to these address issues.
He explained that the county judge had also denied payment for a hotel for a
conference. The claim was denied because it was “turned in too soon.” The denial stated
that the claim could be resubmitted after the conference had been attended, and then it
would be paid.
Finally, Brown said that payment for a claim in which he had failed to separate sales
tax from the items being expensed had also been denied. He said he had never been required
to do that before, and to his knowledge, he knew of no other Jefferson County department
that had been required to separate taxes from different line items before a claim would be
6 paid. He said there was no line item in the sheriff’s department budget for taxes. He said the
budget requested by the sheriff’s department from the quorum court anticipates that it will
include taxes within and as part of the various budgeted expenses.
Brown testified that in light of these examples, he thought the county judge was
treating the sheriff’s department differently than it treated other departments and referenced
a report listing all the county’s disallowed claims. All of them were from the sheriff’s
department.
Tiffany Lowery testified that she worked in the Jefferson County Clerk’s Office. She
had been in the clerk’s office for nine years and had been the chief deputy clerk for the past
seven years. She said claims for payment are first submitted to the clerk’s office and then
forwarded to the county judge’s office for authorization. She said both denied and approved
claims are then returned to the clerk’s office, which submits the approved claims to the
treasurer’s office. The treasurer issues a check that is sent to the clerk’s office for mailing.
Lowery agreed with Brown that the county judge has been treating the sheriff’s office
differently from other departments. She testified that the denied claims are usually brought
to her for review and that the majority of the claims are for the sheriff’s office. She referred
to the list of disallowed claims for the county that included only claims submitted by the
sheriff’s department. No other claims had been disallowed.
Lowery provided an example of a claim that was denied for attendance at a conference
because it was submitted too early. She said that, to her knowledge, that had never happened;
in fact, she said that the clerk’s office encourages departments to submit such claims as soon
7 as possible so they have the funds to use for the trip. She also testified that she had never
seen taxes separated as a separate line item and had never seen a claim for payment denied
for failure to separate out taxes. Finally, she said that several departments have multiple
budgets, and there has never been a requirement that an invoice for an item budgeted to
one division include that division’s address rather than including the address of the
department. Lowery said she did not think Rosetta Giddens, the person who reviews claims
for Judge Robison, was competent. Lowery opined that Giddens lacked critical thinking skills
in the claims-department area, there was no basis for many of the claims she denied, and
many of the denials were arbitrary.
Judge Robinson’s counsel introduced a letter signed by Judge Robinson’s chief of
staff, Giddens, that was sent on December 1, 2022, to all department heads in the county.
The letter explained that requests for payment of claims should include the “correct fund,
department, account, [and] one address who’s receiving the service[.]” The letter also stated
that if the department had several budgets under its “umbrella,” the department should
make sure to include the correct division’s address and the proper budget and not to pay two
different claims out of the same budget. The letter concluded: “Please, do not cross budget,
in other words.”
Giddens testified that her duties as Judge Robinson’s chief of staff included reviewing
claims submitted for payment. She testified that she has a Bachelor of Science in Accounting,
a master’s degree in finance, and a master’s degree in health administration. She said that
she had been a state auditor for seven years before becoming Judge Robinson’s chief of staff.
8 She said that the problem with many of the sheriff’s department’s claims was its failure to
have the vendor issue a separate invoice for each division in the sheriff’s department. She
explained that the invoice should include the division’s name and address at the top of the
invoice and the expenses for that particular division. Instead, the sheriff’s department would
submit one invoice for a variety of expenses related to more than one division and then note
on the invoice which expenses were to be paid from which budget. She said it was also a
problem even when the invoice contained expenses for only one division when the invoice
was addressed to the sheriff’s department’s main address rather than to the address of the
particular division. She said it is simply not sufficient to designate on each invoice what
division or budget covers what expense. She testified that there must be a separate invoice
for each expense, and the department must ask the vendor to resend separate invoices
properly addressed when this does not occur. Although Giddens admitted that the list of
disallowed claims for the period from January through June 2024 included only claims
submitted by the sheriff’s department, Giddens told the court that she disagreed with
Lowery’s statement that other departments were being treated differently from the sheriff’s
office and that the county judge was paying claims when a department submitted a single
invoice that included multiple claims that were paid from different budgets. She explained
that all the other departments submitted the requests correctly.
She also testified that the request submitted by the sheriff’s department for a
conference was denied because “usually when you go on a trip, or you [are] going to a
conference or something, usually you will go ahead and go to the conference, and when you
9 come back, then we will reimburse you.” Because the request for payment was submitted in
March and the conference was not until May or June, she told the sheriff’s office to resubmit
it closer to the date of the conference. When the court asked Giddens, “How close does it
have to be?” She responded, “[I]t should be at least a month. Because usually when you do
conferences, you pay already with your credit card, so that shouldn’t be an issue.” She
explained that it is generally done by requesting reimbursement after the fact—that is, “you
don’t get paid up front.” When the court again asked what the policy was for claims
submitted beforehand, Giddens said there was no written policy, but she had decided with
her “supervisor” that it should be within a month. When the court asked if every department
knew about this policy, Giddens said the sheriff’s department’s recently denied hotel-
reimbursement claim was the first time since she began her position in 2022 that a
department had submitted a request before the conference. The court noted that this
testimony was inconsistent with Lowery’s testimony.
Giddens admitted that some of the claims submitted by and paid on behalf of the
county judge’s department had not been scrutinized as closely as those of the sheriff’s
department. In fact, several invoices directed to the county judge had multiple divisions or
budgets from which the expenses on one invoice were being paid. Giddens was unable to
explain why such invoices had been paid for the county judge’s department but would have
been denied had they been submitted by the sheriff’s office. She agreed that it was
inconsistent. When asked why an invoice was paid for the county judge’s attorney’s fees
when the invoice had no address on it, she explained that she worked for the county judge,
10 “so I know if it’s from the county judge – I know what address it is.” Counsel for Sheriff
Woods continued to question Giddens:
[COUNSEL]: Are you trying to tell this court that you don’t know the addresses for the sheriff’s office and for the county jail -- is what you’re trying to tell the judge?
[GIDDENS]: No. I know the addresses to the county sheriff’s office and the county jail.
[COUNSEL]: So under the same rationale that you just said you could have also -- those other bills that had the wrong bill-to, ship-to addresses, you could have approved those just as easily, couldn’t you?
[GIDDENS]: No.
[COUNSEL]: Well, you just said you knew the address.
[GIDDENS]: Yeah, I do know the address, but it’s not on their invoice.
[COUNSEL]: It’s not on this invoice, ma’am, and you paid this.
[GIDDENS]: Sir, how do you know I paid it?
[COUNSEL]: Because you just said it.
[GIDDENS]: No, I didn’t say -- you asked me about this invoice. And you asked me was this being paid from the county judge’s office -- I already told you that we have another lady in my office that does claims as well.
[COUNSEL]: Ma’am, what is the code 107?
[GIDDENS]: That is quorum court.
[COUNSEL]: Okay. Show me anywhere on this bill where you see the words quorum court.
[GIDDENS]: Quorum court is not on here.
11 [COUNSEL]: Okay. And show me where that bill was rejected because it was coded wrong.
[GIDDENS]: It’s not rejected; it was paid.
[COUNSEL]: All right.
[GIDDENS]: And I do believe -- I would have to let the judge talk on this right here -- but that is from the quorum court, and I do believe it was somebody that had something to do with the quorum court. A bill came from the quorum court, but I will let the judge talk on that -- I don’t know.
[COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I would ask that what I marked for identification purposes as Plaintiff’s Exhibit F be introduced into evidence.
[An invoice for attorney’s fees was introduced into evidence]
[COUNSEL]: And again, 107 is quorum court, right?
[GIDDENS]: Yes.
[COUNSEL]: And not county judge?
[GIDDENS]: No. County judge is 100.
....
[COUNSEL]: Ma’am, I’m showing you what I’m marking for identification purposes as Plaintiff’s Exhibit G. I would like for you to take a look at that and tell me what it is.
[GIDDENS]: Pivot Legal Services; Invoice Bill-to Judge Gerald Robinson, County Judge’s Office, 101 West Barraque, Pine Bluff, Arkansas 71601.
[COUNSEL]: What is Judge Robinson’s code -- do you see those numbers down there on the affidavit authorizing payment -- what is his code -- is it 107 or is it 100?
[GIDDENS]: No. It’s the quorum court, 107.
12 [COUNSEL]: All right. So this bill was billed to the county judge by Pivot and it was paid out of the quorum court. Why wasn’t it kicked back, and why wasn’t Pivot called and said we’re going to need you to put the right bill-to address?
[GIDDENS]: Again, I would have to let the judge speak on this one.
Judge Robinson then testified that he had not given anyone in his department
directions to treat the sheriff’s department differently from other departments. He could not
explain why requests for payment for his department had been paid when coded incorrectly,
when the invoice did not have a proper address, or when the division from which the bill
was being paid was not on the invoice. He admitted that the claims for the sheriff’s
department had been disallowed in such instances while claims for his department had not.
Judge Robinson explained that sometimes addresses matter, and sometimes they do not.
In an order entered July 15, the circuit court found that Judge Robinson was in
contempt of the November order for “continu[ing] to treat the processing of claims for
payment by the office of Jefferson County Sheriff Lafayette Woods, Jr., differently than
claims for payment from any other Department of Jefferson County, and ha[s] done so in an
arbitrary and capricious manner.” The court made the finding after “particular consideration
of the testimony of” Lowery and Giddens and further found that the other evidence
introduced at the hearing supported a finding of contempt. As a sanction, the circuit court
ordered Judge Robinson to pay $6,700 in attorney’s fees and costs to Sheriff Woods. Judge
Robinson filed this appeal.
III. Standard of Review
13 To establish civil contempt, there must be willful disobedience of a valid order of a
court. Albarran v. Liberty Healthcare Mgmt., 2013 Ark. App. 738, at 4, 431 S.W.3d 310, 313.
However, before one can be held in contempt for violating a valid order, the order must be
definite in its terms and clear as to what duties it imposes. Shahid v. Masood, 2026 Ark. App.
151, at 32. The standard of review for civil contempt is whether the finding of the circuit
court is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Ingle v. Ingle, 2013 Ark. App. 660,
at 2. In our review, we defer to the superior position of the circuit court to determine the
credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Albarran, 2013 Ark. App.
738, at 4, 431 S.W.3d at 313.
IV. Discussion
Judge Robinson first contends that the November order was not sufficiently clear to
serve as the basis for a finding of contempt. He argues that the November order provided no
specific guidance as to what conduct the circuit court would consider to be arbitrary and
capricious and, therefore, contemptuous, pointing specifically to the court’s conclusion that
the county judge is called upon to “exercise his discretion and his official judgment” in
reviewing claims. He contends that no law or government manual provides specific guidance
regarding how this discretion is to be exercised and that the November order merely provides
that his review of claims must be “reasonable, consistent, fair and practicable,” offering no
14 additional guidance or instructions. He argues that because the order was not clear in what
conduct was proscribed, he could not have willfully disobeyed it.2
While recognizing that Judge Robinson’s review of payment claims involved
discretion and judgment, the circuit court found in its November order that the basis for his
denial of claims was “not always consistent,” that “[n]o other department in Jefferson County
government [other than the sheriff’s department] was subject to similar inconsistent denial
of submitted claims,” and that Judge Robinson’s denials of the sheriff’s department’s claims
were arbitrary and capricious. The court’s order was clear in its directive to Judge Robinson:
“The County Judge is enjoined from arbitrarily or capriciously rejecting claims for payment
submitted by the Sheriff’s Department, but instead must be reasonably consistent, fair and
predictable.” At a minimum, the court ordered Judge Robinson to be consistent and not to
treat the sheriff’s department’s claims differently from the claims submitted by other
departments.
The evidence presented at the hearing was undisputed that the claims submitted by
the sheriff’s department were the only claims that were continually disallowed. Moreover,
Giddens provided the alleged reasons for denying claims submitted by the sheriff’s
department—incorrect codes, addresses, or departments or multiple claims from different
departments on one invoice—but then admitted that claims from the county judge’s
2 To the extent Judge Robinson is arguing that the circuit court failed to make a finding that his conduct was willful, we reject it. Unless the contrary can be shown, we presume that the circuit court acted properly and made such findings of fact as were necessary to support its judgment. Wyatt v. Wyatt, 2018 Ark. App. 177, at 7, 545 S.W.3d 796, 802.
15 department had been paid despite having the same errors. Lowery, a neutral third party,
testified that she had worked as a county clerk for nine years and that the reasons given by
the county judge for denying the sheriff’s department’s claims had never previously been
used as reasons for denial and were not being used when the county judge evaluated and
processed claims from other departments. Both Lowery and Brown, who had many more
years of experience in processing claims than did either Judge Robinson or Giddens, testified
that Judge Robinson was treating the sheriff’s department differently than other
departments. It is the circuit court’s duty to determine the credibility of witnesses and the
weight to be given their testimony, not ours. Albarran, 2013 Ark. App. 738, at 4, 431 S.W.3d
at 313. Accordingly, we reject Judge Robinson’s argument that the November order was not
sufficiently clear to serve as the basis of a contempt finding.
Judge Robinson also argues that his denials of the sheriff’s department’s claims for
payment were not arbitrary and capricious because there were rational bases for the denials.
He claims that a letter sent to all department heads included instructions for submission of
payment claims and that the denials were consistent with those instructions. He argues that
the sheriff may disagree with the denials, but because the reasons for the denials were rational
and because the sheriff’s department had been notified of the reasons, the denials were not
arbitrary and capricious. He claims, therefore, that the circuit court erred in finding that the
denials on these bases were arbitrary and capricious.
However, it is not the reasons for the denials—for example, having the main address
for the sheriff’s department listed on the invoice if the expense is for the jail or juvenile
16 division, failing to include the proper budget code on the invoice, or submitting a payment
request before a conference rather than seeking reimbursement after the conference—that
the circuit court found to be arbitrary and capricious. It was the fact that the reasons were
applied inconsistently and unfairly only to the sheriff’s department’s claims. In fact, the
evidence was undisputed that the county judge’s office itself submitted claims with the same
deficiencies, and the claims were paid. Thus, the circuit court’s finding that Judge Robinson’s
denial of the sheriff’s department’s claims was arbitrary and capricious is not clearly against
the preponderance of the evidence.3
Affirmed.
HARRISON and TUCKER, JJ., agree.
Castleberry Law Firm, PLLC, by: Kenneth P. “Casey” Castleberry, for appellant.
Branch, Thompson, Warmath, Dale & Butler, a Professional Association, by: Adam H.
Butler, for appellee.
3 We note that Judge Robinson framed the issues in this case during oral argument as matters of politics between the county judge and the sheriff, suggesting that the courts were not the appropriate forum to resolve them. The issue here is contempt of a valid court order. Contempt is a matter between the court and the litigant and not between the two opposing litigants. Hitt v. Lyle, 2020 Ark. App. 124, at 17, 596 S.W.3d 540, 551. The circuit court’s finding of contempt is not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.