Geovanni Moreno v. Valley Transit Company

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: December 8, 2021
• Docket: 8:21-cv-01765
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 SOUTHERN DIVISION 11 ) 12 ) ) Case No.: 8:21-CV-01765-CJC(JDEx) 13 GEOVANNI MORENO, ) ) 14 ) Plaintiff, ) 15 ) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S v. ) MOTION TO REMAND CASE TO 16 ) ORANGE COUNTY SUPERIOR ) COURT [Dkt. 13] 17 ) GREYHOUND LINES, INC., VALLEY ) 18 TRANSIT COMPANY, and DOES 1 ) through 10, inclusive, ) 19 ) ) 20 ) ) 21 Defendants. ) ) 22 ) 23 24 I. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND 25 26 On May 26, 2020, Plaintiff Geovanni Moreno filed this action against Defendant 27 Greyhound Lines, Inc. (“Greyhound”) alleging personal injury claims in Orange County 1 Defendant Valley Transit Company (“Valley Transit”) was joined as a defendant in the 2 action. On October 8, 2021, Plaintiff served Valley Transit with a copy of the complaint 3 and summons. (Notice of Removal, Ex. A–C.) On October 22, 2021, Valley Transit 4 removed the action to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. (Id. at 3.) Before the 5 Court is Plaintiff’s motion to remand the action. (Dkt. 13 [Motion to Remand, 6 hereinafter “Mot.”].) For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED. 1 7 8 II. LEGAL STANDARD 9 10 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and possess “only that power 11 authorized by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) 12 (internal quotations omitted). A civil action brought in state court may only be removed 13 by the defendant if the action could have been brought in federal court originally. 28 14 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal district courts have diversity jurisdiction over suits where 15 more than $75,000 is in controversy and the citizenship of each plaintiff is different from 16 that of each defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). When a case is removed, the burden of 17 establishing subject matter jurisdiction falls on the defendant, and the removal statute is 18 strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 19 566 (9th Cir. 1992). “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the 20 right of removal in the first instance.” Id. 21 22 “[W]hen a defendant seeks federal-court adjudication, the defendant’s amount-in- 23 controversy allegation should be accepted when not contested by the plaintiff or 24 questioned by the court.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 25 547, 553 (2014). However, “when a defendant’s assertion of the amount in controversy 26

27 1 Having read and considered the papers presented by the parties, the Court finds this matter appropriate 1 is challenged[,] . . . both sides submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of 2 the evidence, whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Id. 3 Moreover, “when the defendant relies on a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions 4 to satisfy its burden of proof, the chain of reasoning and its underlying assumptions must 5 be reasonable ones.” LaCross v. Knight Transp. Inc., 775 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 6 2015). 7 8 III. DISCUSSION 9 10 A. The One-Year Rule and Consent to Removal 11 12 Plaintiff incorrectly argues that removal is improper because one year has passed 13 since the commencement of the present action. (Mot. at 3–4.) The one-year rule 14 prohibits removal of state court actions to federal court after one year has passed when 15 the initial state complaint was not removable. Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 16 1313, 1317 (9th Cir. 1998). As explained below, the initial complaint was removable on 17 the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Moreover, Valley Transit timely removed the action 18 within 30 days of being served with the Complaint. Though Plaintiff insists otherwise, 19 (Mot. at 3), it was not improper for Greyhound to then consent to removal, despite the 20 fact that Greyhound had declined to remove the action previously. 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1446(b)(2)(C) states plainly, “[i]f defendants are served at different times,” which 22 occurred here, “and a later-served defendant files a notice of removal, any earlier-served 23 defendant may consent to the removal even though that earlier-served defendant did not 24 previously initiate or consent to removal.” See also Destifino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 25 956 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, the motion was timely and Greyhound’s consent to the 26 removal was not improper. 27 1 B. Diversity Jurisdiction 2 3 Defendants have also shown that this Court has diversity subject matter jurisdiction 4 over the action because complete diversity and the amount-in-controversy are both met. 5 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). With respect to diversity, Plaintiff is a citizen of California and 6 Greyhound, the only defendant at the time the action was commenced, is incorporated in 7 Delaware with its principal place of business in Texas. Though joined later, Valley 8 Transit is also a diverse party because it is both incorporated and has its principal place of 9 business in Texas. 10 11 The amount-in-controversy is a slightly more arduous inquiry because no amount 12 is specified in Plaintiff’s initial complaint, or subsequent state court complaints. (Notice 13 of Removal, Exs. D–E.) Since Plaintiff has challenged Defendants’ assertion of the 14 amount-in-controversy (Mot. at 4–5), Defendants have the burden to produce evidence 15 that the amount-in-controversy exceeds $75,000 by a preponderance of the evidence. 16 Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC, 135 S. Ct. at 553. Defendant submitted along 17 with its opposition a settlement demand letter from Plaintiff’s counsel, in which Plaintiff 18 identifies over $75,000 in medical bills alone. (Dkt. 15-1 [Declaration of Ryan J. 19 Anderson in Support of Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand] ¶ 2, Exhibit A.) 20 The letter also states that Plaintiff is seeking “a generous award for general damages” in 21 addition to medical expenses. (Id.) Indeed, Plaintiff’s initial complaint and subsequent 22 complaints make plain that he is seeking general damages, medical expenses incurred, 23 future medical expenses, loss of earnings, future loss of earning capacity, and loss of 24 consortium. (Dkt. 1 at 76.) These damages together will likely exceed $75,000. 25 26 Despite this evidence, Plaintiff insists in his Reply that the settlement letter is 27 inadmissible and thus cannot serve as the basis of the Court’s determination of the 1 || Plaintiff is wrong. While a court may consider summary-judgment-like evidence in 2 || determining the amount-in-controversy, there is no requirement that it only consider 3 ||admissible evidence in the analysis. Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 4 ||676, 690 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit has established that “[a] settlement letter is 5 ||relevant evidence of the amount in controversy if it appears to reflect a reasonable 6 || estimate of the plaintiff's claim.” Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 7 ||2002). Here, Plaintiff “could have argued that the demand was inflated and not an 8 ||honest assessment of damages, but he made no attempt to disavow his letter or offer 9 contrary evidence.” Jd. But he did not. Indeed, Plaintiff does not deny or present any 10 || evidence that the amount-in-controversy does not exceed $75,000. The Court therefore 11 || finds that Defendants have shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount-in- 12 || controversy exceeds $75,000. Accordingly, the Court has diversity jurisdiction over the 13 || action. 14 15 ||} IV. CONCLUSION 16 17 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion to remand is DENIED. 18 19 DATED: December 8, 2021 20 Of Of if 21 CORMAC J. CARNEY 22 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 23 24 25 26 27 28