Georgia Casualty Co. v. Beeman

24 S.W.2d 799
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJanuary 17, 1930
DocketNo. 9374.
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 24 S.W.2d 799 (Georgia Casualty Co. v. Beeman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Georgia Casualty Co. v. Beeman, 24 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. Ct. App. 1930).

Opinion

PLEASANTS, C. J.

This is a suit by ap-pellee against appellant to recover upon a bond executed by appellant under the Employers’ Liability Act (Rev. St. 1925, arts. 8306-8309, as amended) of this state to secure compensation alleged to be due appellee as an employee of H. J. Hetkes, a paving contractor.

The petition alleges the execution of the bond by appellant, the employment of appel-lee by Hetkes, and appellee’s injury on October 24, 1927, while driving a wagon in performance of the duties of his employment.

In, addition to a general demurrer and general denial the defendant presented the following plea:

“Further answering herein the defendant alleges upon information and belief, and has reason to believe that one H. J. Hetkes entered into a contract with one Frank Jones, as an independent contractor, by the terms of which said contract the said Frank Jones agreed to haul and place certain materials for the said H. J. Hetkes in and about the construction of a certain pavement on Twenty-ninth Street in the City of Galveston, Texas ; that the said Frank Jones, as such independent contractor, had sole and exclusive control and direction over all of h'is employees, and paying their wages, in and about the performance of said work, and that the said subscriber, H. J. Hetkes, dealt exclusively for such work and services with the said Frank Jones, depending solely upon him for the proper doing of the work which the said Frank Jones, as such independent contractor, agreed to perform; that the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the driving of one of said teams without authority or any implied promise of remuneration from either said Jones or H. J. Hetkes or his agent thereunto authorized ; and that if it should 'be held that the plaintiff was an employee of the said Fkank Jones, as that term is defined in the Employers’ Liability Act of the State of Texas, the defendant in either case is in no way liable for any injury sustained by the plaintiff.”

*800 The trial in the court below resulted in a • verdict and judgment in favor of appellee.

The cause was submitted to the jury upon special issues. In response to the first and ■second issues submitted, the jury found, that, ■ at the time of his injury the appellee was an employee of H. J. Hetkes, and that he was injured in the course of his employment.

At the close of the evidence the defendant asked the court to instruct the jury to return a verdict in its favor, which request was refused by the court. The first assignment complains of this action of the court.

The undisputed evidence shows that appellee was injured on October 24, 1927, as alleged in his petition, while driving a wagon being used in removing, shell or gravel from a street in the city of Galveston upon which H. J. Hetkes, under a contract with the city, was preparing to construct a concrete pavement, and that appellant had executed a bond under our Employers’ Liability Act to compensate Hetkes’ employees for injuries received in the course of their employment.

Hetkes, a witness for plaintiff, testified:

“James Beeman was not in my employ in the month of October, 1927. I had not hired him as a laborer or as a teamster at any time during that month; or at any time prior to that. The plaintiff had never been in my employ while I was engaged in the execution of that contract. I had never paid him any wages.
“I had a foreman on that job in October, 1927, who was partly in charge there; my foreman’s name was Roy Colville.
“I did not have a colored foreman by the name of Frank Jones. Frank Jones did not work for me in October, 1927. He furnished teams at times for hauling shell for the City of Galveston. I paid Frank Jones so much per hour for the teams he furnished, on a contract.
“I know of a colored man by the name of John Green; this man John Green, during October, 1927, had no connection whatsoever with me. I never did have any teams from him.
“I do not know anything about how many teams this man Jones has. Sometimes on that job he would furnish one team and sometimes fifteen; it is hard to tell, that would be the general run.
“I was the contractor doing the work. I had a contract to do the work with the City of Galveston. I contracted teams from Frank Jones. I got all my teams from him as a rule. I did not have any teams of my own. I did not get any teams from anybody except Frank Jones.
“I stated that I contracted with Frank Jones to furnish me teams for hauling shell. I never did hire or discharge any teamsters on those teams; I never did pay any teamsters any wages. I said I paid Jones by the hour, so much per hour for each team as it worked.
“A city inspector, employed by the City of Galveston, directed the teams as to the manner of doing the work as to where they would take the shell. I had nothing to do with their work.
“I do not own any team myself. I use teams in my contracting work a good many times. I contract with someone to furnish them to me. I never did contract with John Green to furnish teams to me. I never did use any of John Green’s teams on any of my contracts to- my knowledge.
“I said I contracted with people to furnish me teams; and I further stated that I didn’t understand what you meant when you asked me if I ‘rented’ any teams, and at the request of counsel, I will explain the distinction I am drawing there; from time to time it is necessary to have teams on public work, or any other work that I have, and I will go to several contractors who have teams and I will contract for them at so much per hour. The fellow that gives me the cheapest contract gets my work the same as when I am the cheapest I get the contract. I do not rent those from him, I contract them at so much per hour; on a basis of so much per hour, strictly a contract proposition.
“It is not a fact that that character of ar- ’ rangement which I denominate as ‘contracting’ these teams, that I make that arrangement for the purpose of making it appear that the people who owned the teams are independent contractors in order that I may avoid liabilities under this policy of insurance, or attempt to do so.
“The name of the foreman on the job at 29th street was Roy Colville.
“I have been interrogated as to whether I contracted for these teams for the purpose of avoiding liabilities, and to make it appear that the owners of the teams were independent contractors, I had no such idea in mind when I contracted for the teams. The reason I contract for the teams is to get a low price, that is all. Tn fact they all come to me and ask me to give them permission to make bids and the lowest man gets it.
“I do have automobile trucks of my own, lots of them. I employ the drivers for those automobile trucks. They were engaged at different times in the work which I was performing most all of the time. Those men were all under my direct employment. It is a fact that I did not always need teams in doing the work I was performing; just at times.

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Related

Beeman v. Georgia Casualty Co.
41 S.W.2d 39 (Texas Commission of Appeals, 1931)

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Bluebook (online)
24 S.W.2d 799, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/georgia-casualty-co-v-beeman-texapp-1930.