George v. New York City Housing Authority

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

George v. New York City Housing Authority

2017 NY Slip Op 4796, 151 A.D.3d 532, 55 N.Y.S.3d 48

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 13, 2017

Docket4252 159336/14

StatusPublished

This text of 2017 NY Slip Op 4796 (George v. New York City Housing Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

George v. New York City Housing Authority, 2017 NY Slip Op 4796, 151 A.D.3d 532, 55 N.Y.S.3d 48 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2017).

Pincite

Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Barbara Jaffe, J.), entered January 18, 2017, which denied the motion of defendant New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against it, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

*533 NYCHA established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by showing that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the alleged icy condition that caused plaintiffs fall. NYCHA submitted plaintiffs deposition testimony that she did not notice ice on the crosswalk until after she fell. NYCHA also submitted its record logs which indicated that there was no precipitation on the day of the accident, and the testimony of its supervisor of grounds that he was not aware of any complaints about the condition of the sidewalk prior to plaintiffs fall. The supervisor also stated that he had inspected the area the day before plaintiffs fall and did not observe any ice (see Herrera v E. 103rd St. & Lexington Ave. Realty Corp., 95 AD3d 463 [1st Dept 2012]; Rodriguez v 705-7 E. 179th St. Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 79 AD3d 518, 519-520 [1st Dept 2010]).

In opposition, plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether NYCHA had notice of the condition, by submitting an expert meteorologist’s opinion that, based on meteorological data, the ice condition was present for at least 45 hours prior to plaintiffs accident (see Santiago v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 66 AD3d 435 [1st Dept 2009]). NYCHA was not entitled to fill the gaps in its moving papers by submitting an expert affidavit introducing a new theory for summary judgment, for the first time in its reply papers (see Scansarole v Madison Sq. Garden, L.P., 33 AD3d 517, 518 [1st Dept 2006]). In any event, NYCHA’s alternative theory about the timing of the ice formation is a factually disputed issue.

Concur — Friedman, J.P., Mazzarelli, Moskowitz, Gische and Gesmer, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Barbara Jaffe, J.), entered January 18, 2017, which denied the motion of defendant New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against it, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

*533 NYCHA established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by showing that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the alleged icy condition that caused plaintiffs fall. NYCHA submitted plaintiffs deposition testimony that she did not notice ice on the crosswalk until after she fell. NYCHA also submitted its record logs which indicated that there was no precipitation on the day of the accident, and the testimony of its supervisor of grounds that he was not aware of any complaints about the condition of the sidewalk prior to plaintiffs fall. The supervisor also stated that he had inspected the area the day before plaintiffs fall and did not observe any ice (see Herrera v E. 103rd St. & Lexington Ave. Realty Corp., 95 AD3d 463 [1st Dept 2012]; Rodriguez v 705-7 E. 179th St. Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 79 AD3d 518, 519-520 [1st Dept 2010]).

In opposition, plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether NYCHA had notice of the condition, by submitting an expert meteorologist’s opinion that, based on meteorological data, the ice condition was present for at least 45 hours prior to plaintiffs accident (see Santiago v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 66 AD3d 435 [1st Dept 2009]). NYCHA was not entitled to fill the gaps in its moving papers by submitting an expert affidavit introducing a new theory for summary judgment, for the first time in its reply papers (see Scansarole v Madison Sq. Garden, L.P., 33 AD3d 517, 518 [1st Dept 2006]). In any event, NYCHA’s alternative theory about the timing of the ice formation is a factually disputed issue.

Concur — Friedman, J.P., Mazzarelli, Moskowitz, Gische and Gesmer, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

2017 NY Slip Op 4796, 151 A.D.3d 532, 55 N.Y.S.3d 48, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/george-v-new-york-city-housing-authority-nyappdiv-2017.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack