George v. Moore

District Court, W.D. Virginia·Decided September 30, 2020·No. 7:19-cv-00631·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ROANOKE DIVISION

DESTINED C.M.D. GEORGE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) Case No. 7:19CV00631 ) v. ) OPINION AND ORDER ) DR. P. MOORE, ET AL., ) By: James P. Jones ) United States District Judge Defendants. )

Destined C.M.D. George, Pro Se Plaintiff; Rosalie P. Fessier and Brittany E. Shipley, TIMBERLAKESMITH, Staunton, Virginia, for Defendants.

The plaintiff, Destined C.M.D. George, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants, a dentist and dental assistant, provided him with inappropriate dental care and retaliated against him for filing grievances. Presently before the court are the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and George’s responses thereto. After careful review, I conclude that the defendants’ motion must be granted. I. BACKGROUND. George is confined at Red Onion State Prison (“Red Onion”). In his Amended Complaint,1 filed in November of 2019, George alleges that on April 8, 2019, he

1 After reviewing George’s initial § 1983 Complaint, the court notified him that he had misjoined claims and had failed to state specific facts about what each defendant personally had done to violate his constitutional rights. George then filed the Amended “was given a filling in the wrong tooth, even after the defendants [Dr. P. Moore and R. Hubbard] stated they couldn’t see any cavities on the x-Ray.” Am. Compl. 1,

ECF No. 12. The cavity that George had asked them to fill allegedly remained untreated. George complains that the new filing started causing him “excruciating pain.” Id. He was also prescribed “Boost nutritional supplements and pain pills,”

which he characterizes as proof that the defendants “knew there was negligence on their part and [he] was really having trouble eating.” Id. He states, “The following fillings they’ve given me also cause continuous pain.” Id. George claims that he “lost approximately 40 [pounds] after allowing them to operate on” him. Id.

After George “submitted complaints about their malpractice,” the defendants allegedly retaliated against him by “giving [him] another painful filling and defendant R. Hubbard becoming aggressive with the dental utensils.” Id. at 2.

Specifically, George states that on July 8, 2018, Hubbard shoved the mouth x-ray into my throat making me gag. She then removed the x-ray and said, “Stop.” With a look of pure disgust she then reinserted the mouth x-ray even deeper once again choking me[. S]he then snatched the x-ray out and became argumentative and verbally aggressive with me and told the g[ua]rd that I was not cooperating.

Am. Compl. George Decl., ECF 12-2.

Complaint that is now before the court. While I liberally construe and recite George’s allegations in that pleading, I make no factual finding. In his Amended Complaint, George asserts the following claims against the defendants: (1) medical malpractice on April 8, 2019, by filling the wrong tooth and

leaving his cavity untreated; (2) cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, on April 8, 2019, by filling the wrong tooth and causing pain and weight loss; (3) unreasonable search and seizure on April 8, 2019, for filling the

wrong tooth; and (4) retaliation against George for filing grievances, in violation of the First Amendment, through (a) giving him another painful filling on an unspecified date and (b) Hubbard’s alleged aggressiveness with X ray utensils on July 8, 2019. As relief, George seeks monetary damages.2

The defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that George failed to properly exhaust administrative remedies as required under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) or, in the alternative, that his claims are without merit. George

has responded to both facets of the motion, making it ripe for disposition. II. DISCUSSION. A. The Summary Judgment Standard. A court should grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute exists “if the evidence

2 George also sought preliminary injunctive relief, which I have earlier denied. is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The plaintiff is entitled to have the credibility of all his evidence presumed. The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden to show absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. The opposing party must demonstrate that a triable issue of fact exists; he may not rest upon mere allegations or denials. A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the case is insufficient.

Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994).3 The defendants have filed supporting affidavits and documentation. Accordingly, to avoid summary judgment, George must present sufficient evidence that could carry the burden of proof of his claims at trial. He “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine [factual] issue for trial” on which the jury could find in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A pro se litigant’s verified complaint must be considered as an affidavit and may, standing alone, defeat a motion for summary judgment when the allegations contained therein are based on personal knowledge. Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991). “[U]nsupported speculation is not sufficient to defeat a

3 I have omitted internal citations, quotation marks, and/or alterations here and throughout this Opinion, unless otherwise noted. summary judgment motion,” however. Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 875 (4th Cir. 1992).

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. A prisoner must exhaust any available administrative remedies before challenging prison conditions in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

Exhaustion is mandatory under § 1997e(a). See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006). “[F]ailure to exhaust is an affirmative defense” and, therefore, it must be both pled and proven by the defendants. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). The Supreme Court has also instructed that § 1997e(a) “requires proper

exhaustion.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93. Proper exhaustion means using all steps of the available administrative remedy procedure and doing so according to its rules and timetables, so that the agency addresses the inmate’s issue on the merits. Id. at

90. Thus, an “untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance” does not satisfy § 1997e(a). Id. at 83–84. An inmate who failed to properly exhaust may escape summary judgment under § 1997e(a), if he states facts showing that the remedies under the established

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