George v. County of Westchester

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided April 21, 2020·No. 7:20-cv-01723·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK LLEWELLYN 8. GEORGE, Plaintiff, -against- 7:20-CV-1723 (XMK) WESTCHESTER COUNTY DEPARTMENT ORDER OF SERVICE OF CORRECTION, ef al., Defendants.

KENNETH M. KARAS, United States District Judge: Pro se Plaintiff Llewellyn 8. George (“Plaintiff”) asserts that Defendants Westchester County Department of Correction (“WCDOC”), Assistant Wardens A. Spaulding (“Spaulding”) and Eric Middleton (“Middleton”), Correction Captains Mabra (“Mabra”) and Roberts (“Roberts”), and Correction Sergeants Kitt (“Kitt”) and Lopez (“Lopez”) (collectively, “Defendants”) violated his constitutional rights under the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, (Dkt. No. 2 (Compl.).) Plaintiff’s claims arise from events that occurred while he

was held in the Westchester County Jail, and he seeks damages and injunctive relief. Ud.) The Court construes Plaintiff's complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On February 26, 2020, Plaintiff filed his Complaint and an incomplete Application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Dkt Nos. 1-2.) On March 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed a completed IFP Application, and IFP status was granted on April 8, 2020. (Dkt. Nos. 5-6.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court directs the Clerk of Court to add Captain Vanlierop and the County of Westchester as Defendants, and dismisses Plaintiffs claims against WCDOC. The Court also directs service on Defendants and directs them to comply with Local Civil Rule 33.2.

I, Standard of Review The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);

see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir, 1998), The Court must

also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, See Fed. R, Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret such pleadings to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir, 2006) (citations, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits; to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to

state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Ail. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 US. 544, §70 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail! to allow the

Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Asheroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S, 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well- pleaded factual allegations as true. /d. But it does not have to accept as true “Tt]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Jd. (citing Towmbly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual

allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible — not merely possible

— that the pleader is entitled to relief. fd. at 678-79. II. Discussion A. Captain Vanlierop Although Plaintiff does not name Captain Vanlierop as a Defendant in the Complaint’s caption, Plaintiff refers to her as a Defendant throughout the body of the Complaint. (Compl. 6-

9-10.) In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status and clear intention to bring suit against Vanlierop, the Court directs the Clerk of Court to add Vanlicrop as a Defendant in this action, See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 21 21 (providing that “on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add...a party”). This amendment is without prejudice to any defenses Vanlierop may assert. B. WCDOC Plaintiff’s claims against WCDOC must be dismissed because municipal agencies or

departments do not have the capacity to be sued under New York law. See Omnipoint Comme’ns, Inc. v. Town of LaGrange, 658 F. Supp. 2d 539, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“In New York, agencies of a municipality are not suable entities.”); Hall v. City of White Plains, 185 F, Supp. 2d

293, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Under New York law, departments which are merely administrative

arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and

cannot sue or be sued.”); see also N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 2 (“The term ‘municipal corporation,’

as used in this chapter, includes only a county, town, city and village.”). However, because of Plaintiff’s pro se status and clear intention to assert claims against the County of Westchester, the

Court construes the Complaint as asserting claims against the County of Westchester instead of WCDOC. The Court therefore directs the Clerk of Court to amend the caption of this Action to

replace WCDOC with the County of Westchester. See Fed. R. Civ, P, 21. This amendment is

without prejudice to any defenses the County of Westchester may assert. C, Service on Defendants Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, he is entitled to rely on the

Court and the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service. See Walker v, Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 123

n.6 (2d Cir, 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (The officers of the court shal! issue and serve all process .. . in [IFP] cases.”); Fed, R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the Court must order the Marshals Service to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP). Although Rule 4(n) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires that the summons and complaint be served within 90

days of the date the complaint is filed, Plaintiff is proceeding IFP and could not have served

summonses and the Complaint on Defendants until the Court reviewed the Complaint and ordered that summonses be issued for Defendants, The Court therefore extends the time to serve

Defendants until 90 days after the date that summonses for the defendants are issued. If the Complaint is not served on Defendants within that time, Plaintiff should request an extension of

time for service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to request an extension of time for service); see also Murray v. Pataki, 378 F.

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Harris v. Mills
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Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. Town of LaGrange
658 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D. New York, 2009)