Opinion issued October 31, 2023
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-22-00360-CR ——————————— GEORGE THOMAS REDMON, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 344th District Court Chambers County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 19DCR0136
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted George Thomas Redmon of the felony offense of indecency
with a child by contact. TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.11(a)(1). In his sole issue on appeal,
Redmon complains that the evidence was insufficient to show that he intended to arouse or gratify his sexual desires. Because there was sufficient evidence to infer
intent, we affirm.
Background
Redmon and T. Rose had been dating for several months, and before that
Redmon had been a family friend for several years. Rose is the mother of S.R.
(Sarah),1 who was 10 years old at the time of the offense. Sarah would go with Rose
to Redmon’s ranch frequently to ride buggies or ATVs. In July 2018, while at
Redmon’s ranch, Sarah’s brother took Sarah, her younger sister, and three other
children riding across Redmon’s property on Redmon’s buggy, but they got stuck
and broke the buggy. Sarah went to get help from Redmon. Upon finding Redmon,
she told him that the buggy was broken, and they needed help. Redmon got upset
and told Rose that he was going with Sarah to help the children. Redmon insisted
that Sarah join him on his single-seat tractor to direct him to where the buggy was.
Redmon had her sit on his lap and put her hands on the steering wheel. Redmon
placed his arm around Sarah’s stomach, and after they began driving, his hand started
to drift toward her vagina. Sarah moved his hand off, but he moved it back and began
1 We refer to the child complainant by a pseudonym to protect their privacy. See TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 30(a)(1) (granting crime victims “the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”). 2 to move his thumb up and down across her vagina. Redmon kept doing this until
Sarah jumped off the tractor when she saw her brother.
Not knowing about the incident, Rose continued to visit Redmon with her
children. On one visit in September, Redmon was upset because of trouble he was
having with his buggy. After an argument between Sarah’s brother and Redmon,
Rose and her children left. When they arrived home, Sarah asked to talk to Rose and
began crying. She then told Rose about what Redmon did to her back in July. Rose
spoke to law enforcement about the incident soon after. Sarah, Rose, and Redmon
were all interviewed about the incident.
Redmon was charged with the felony offense of indecency with a child by
contact, pleaded not guilty, and went to trial. During the guilt-innocence phase of
the trial, the jury heard from Officer K. Pascual, former Detective B. Hasley, Rose,
and Sarah. The jury convicted Redmon and sentenced him to three years’
confinement.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his sole issue, Redmon contends that the evidence did not establish that he
acted with the intent to gratify or arouse his sexual desires. See TEX. PENAL CODE
§ 21.11(c).
3 A. Standard of Review
We determine whether the evidence is sufficient by considering all the
evidence, in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, to determine whether any
rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979); Williams v.
State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the factfinder to
fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence, and draw reasonable inferences
from the facts. Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750. Our role is that of a due process
safeguard, and we consider only whether the factfinder reached a rational decision.
See Malbrough v. State, 612 S.W.3d 537, 559 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020,
pet. ref’d); see also Morgan v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)
(reviewing court’s role “is restricted to guarding against the rare occurrence when a
fact finder does not act rationally”).
Sufficiency of the evidence should be measured by the elements of the offense
as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. See Hardy v. State, 281 S.W.3d
414, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We must consider both direct and circumstantial
evidence, as well as any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.
See Malbrough, 612 S.W.3d at 559 (citing Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012). Circumstantial and direct evidence are equally probative in establishing the
4 defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient. Clayton, 235
S.W.3d at 778; Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The State
need not disprove all reasonable alternative hypotheses inconsistent with a
defendant’s guilt for the evidence to be sufficient. Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903. An
appellate court “considers only whether the inferences necessary to establish guilt
are reasonable based upon the cumulative force of all the evidence when considered
in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Id. We review factual and legal sufficiency
under the same standard of review. See Edwards v. State, 497 S.W.3d 147, 156 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d).
B. Analysis
A person commits the offense of indecency with a child by contact if he
“engages in sexual contact with [a] child” younger than seventeen years old. TEX.
PENAL CODE § 21.11(a)(1). “Sexual contact” means “any touching by a person,
including touching through clothing, of the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals
of a child,” if the act is “committed with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person.” Id. § 21.11(c)(1). The indictment here charged Redmon with
engaging in sexual contact with Sarah by touching her genitals. Intent may be
inferred from the defendant’s conduct, remarks, and all the surrounding
circumstances, including a common pattern of similar acts. McDonald v. State, 148
5 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004), aff’d, 179 S.W.3d 571
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Redmon contends that he held onto Sarah to prevent her from falling off the
tractor because he was drunk, and it was a bumpy ride. Redmon points to Rose’s
testimony that he explained it was an accident and to Sarah’s testimony that said in
in her initial interview with law enforcement that she also thought the touching was
an accident. He also highlights that after a conversation with Rose and Sarah about
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Opinion issued October 31, 2023
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-22-00360-CR ——————————— GEORGE THOMAS REDMON, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 344th District Court Chambers County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 19DCR0136
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted George Thomas Redmon of the felony offense of indecency
with a child by contact. TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.11(a)(1). In his sole issue on appeal,
Redmon complains that the evidence was insufficient to show that he intended to arouse or gratify his sexual desires. Because there was sufficient evidence to infer
intent, we affirm.
Background
Redmon and T. Rose had been dating for several months, and before that
Redmon had been a family friend for several years. Rose is the mother of S.R.
(Sarah),1 who was 10 years old at the time of the offense. Sarah would go with Rose
to Redmon’s ranch frequently to ride buggies or ATVs. In July 2018, while at
Redmon’s ranch, Sarah’s brother took Sarah, her younger sister, and three other
children riding across Redmon’s property on Redmon’s buggy, but they got stuck
and broke the buggy. Sarah went to get help from Redmon. Upon finding Redmon,
she told him that the buggy was broken, and they needed help. Redmon got upset
and told Rose that he was going with Sarah to help the children. Redmon insisted
that Sarah join him on his single-seat tractor to direct him to where the buggy was.
Redmon had her sit on his lap and put her hands on the steering wheel. Redmon
placed his arm around Sarah’s stomach, and after they began driving, his hand started
to drift toward her vagina. Sarah moved his hand off, but he moved it back and began
1 We refer to the child complainant by a pseudonym to protect their privacy. See TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 30(a)(1) (granting crime victims “the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”). 2 to move his thumb up and down across her vagina. Redmon kept doing this until
Sarah jumped off the tractor when she saw her brother.
Not knowing about the incident, Rose continued to visit Redmon with her
children. On one visit in September, Redmon was upset because of trouble he was
having with his buggy. After an argument between Sarah’s brother and Redmon,
Rose and her children left. When they arrived home, Sarah asked to talk to Rose and
began crying. She then told Rose about what Redmon did to her back in July. Rose
spoke to law enforcement about the incident soon after. Sarah, Rose, and Redmon
were all interviewed about the incident.
Redmon was charged with the felony offense of indecency with a child by
contact, pleaded not guilty, and went to trial. During the guilt-innocence phase of
the trial, the jury heard from Officer K. Pascual, former Detective B. Hasley, Rose,
and Sarah. The jury convicted Redmon and sentenced him to three years’
confinement.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his sole issue, Redmon contends that the evidence did not establish that he
acted with the intent to gratify or arouse his sexual desires. See TEX. PENAL CODE
§ 21.11(c).
3 A. Standard of Review
We determine whether the evidence is sufficient by considering all the
evidence, in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, to determine whether any
rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979); Williams v.
State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the factfinder to
fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence, and draw reasonable inferences
from the facts. Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750. Our role is that of a due process
safeguard, and we consider only whether the factfinder reached a rational decision.
See Malbrough v. State, 612 S.W.3d 537, 559 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020,
pet. ref’d); see also Morgan v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)
(reviewing court’s role “is restricted to guarding against the rare occurrence when a
fact finder does not act rationally”).
Sufficiency of the evidence should be measured by the elements of the offense
as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. See Hardy v. State, 281 S.W.3d
414, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We must consider both direct and circumstantial
evidence, as well as any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.
See Malbrough, 612 S.W.3d at 559 (citing Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012). Circumstantial and direct evidence are equally probative in establishing the
4 defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient. Clayton, 235
S.W.3d at 778; Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The State
need not disprove all reasonable alternative hypotheses inconsistent with a
defendant’s guilt for the evidence to be sufficient. Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903. An
appellate court “considers only whether the inferences necessary to establish guilt
are reasonable based upon the cumulative force of all the evidence when considered
in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Id. We review factual and legal sufficiency
under the same standard of review. See Edwards v. State, 497 S.W.3d 147, 156 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d).
B. Analysis
A person commits the offense of indecency with a child by contact if he
“engages in sexual contact with [a] child” younger than seventeen years old. TEX.
PENAL CODE § 21.11(a)(1). “Sexual contact” means “any touching by a person,
including touching through clothing, of the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals
of a child,” if the act is “committed with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person.” Id. § 21.11(c)(1). The indictment here charged Redmon with
engaging in sexual contact with Sarah by touching her genitals. Intent may be
inferred from the defendant’s conduct, remarks, and all the surrounding
circumstances, including a common pattern of similar acts. McDonald v. State, 148
5 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004), aff’d, 179 S.W.3d 571
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Redmon contends that he held onto Sarah to prevent her from falling off the
tractor because he was drunk, and it was a bumpy ride. Redmon points to Rose’s
testimony that he explained it was an accident and to Sarah’s testimony that said in
in her initial interview with law enforcement that she also thought the touching was
an accident. He also highlights that after a conversation with Rose and Sarah about
the incident, Sarah gave him a hug.
But Rose also testified about how Sarah’s demeanor changed around Redmon
after the incident. Sarah went from being excited to see Redmon when they visited
to shying away from him. She explained that Sarah had reservations about Redmon’s
explanation of the incident and Sarah’s body language was stiff, showing her
reluctance and hesitation after their group conversation. Additionally, Rose stated
that Redmon proposed to her after he learned of Sarah’s accusation and told Rose to
“drop the shit or get it fixed” regarding the investigation by law enforcement.
Sarah’s testimony also does not comport with Redmon’s version of events.
She testified that when the incident occurred, Redmon put his hand back on her
vagina every time she removed it and then moved his thumb up and down along her
vagina “most every time” that his hand was there. Sarah explained that she thought
it might be an accident the first time it happened, but she stopped believing it was
6 accidental when it happened multiple times in a row. She noted that it was always
his same hand that kept moving down and rubbing her vagina, yet his other hand
managed to stay around her waist without issue. Sarah also explained that she told
law enforcement the touching may have been accidental because Redmon and her
mother had just gotten engaged, and she wanted to keep her mother happy.
Although Redmon has identified conflicting evidence, and offered an
alternative theory, we presume the jury weighed the evidence and resolved any
concerns in favor of the verdict. Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012) (jury is sole judge of witness credibility and weight of any
evidence); see Cantu v. State, 395 S.W.3d 202, 210–11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d) (State need not disprove all reasonable alternative hypotheses
inconsistent with defendant’s guilt).
The jury could have inferred Redmon’s intent to gratify or arouse his sexual
desire from testimony that he admitted rubbing his thumb along Sarah’s vagina, even
though he said it was accidental. See Perales v. State, 226 S.W.3d 531, 535 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (intent can be inferred from defendant’s
conduct, remarks, and surrounding circumstances). The jury could also have inferred
intent from Sarah’s testimony that despite removing Redmon’s hand multiple times,
he repeatedly put his hand back onto her vagina and continued rubbing it. Id. And
7 they could have inferred intent from the descriptions Rose gave of Sarah’s body
language and behavior around Redmon after the incident occurred. Id.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational
factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Redmon touched Sarah
with the intent to arouse or to gratify his sexual desire. That there was conflicting
evidence does not mean that a jury could not have inferred intent from the evidence
presented. We overrule Redmon’s sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Sarah Beth Landau Justice
Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Landau, and Farris.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).