George S. Good & Co. v. Central Coal & Coke Co.

104 S.W. 613, 7 Indian Terr. 268, 1907 Indian Terr. LEXIS 35
CourtCourt Of Appeals Of Indian Territory
DecidedSeptember 26, 1907
StatusPublished

This text of 104 S.W. 613 (George S. Good & Co. v. Central Coal & Coke Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court Of Appeals Of Indian Territory primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
George S. Good & Co. v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 104 S.W. 613, 7 Indian Terr. 268, 1907 Indian Terr. LEXIS 35 (Conn. 1907).

Opinion

Townsend, J.

(after stating the facts as above). The plaintiff in error has filed eight assignments of error, as follows: “(1) The verdict of the jury is contrary to law. (2), The verdict of the jury is contrary to the evidence. (3) The verdict of the jury is in excess of the amount sued for by plaintiff. (4) The verdict of the jury is excessive, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion and prejudice. (5) The court erred in overruling defendant’s objection to that part of the evidence of the witness M. W. Osborn, whereby he testified as to the intent and meaning of the contract entered into between said 3\I. W. Osborn and the defendant, for the reason that said contract was plain and unambiguous in its terms, and parol testimony to explain, vary, or modify its terms was inadmissible. (6) The court erred in giving to the jury the following instruction: “The court instructs you that the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant the amount sued for, less whatever you may deem the defendant to have been damaged by virtue of an allegation made by it in its answer that the 'defendant was delayed in completing its work upon the railroad., (7) The court erred in holding that it was bound by the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in this case, for the reason that said decision as to the facts of this case was not binding upon this court, and could not deprive the defendant of a trial by jury upon the issues of fact raised in this case. (8) The court erred in.refusing to permit the defendant to prove by the witness Hitchcock the universal, custom of the chief engineer of the Choctaw, Oklahoma & Gulf [274]*274Railroad Company in sending out estimates of work and material for the purpose of showing that said chief engineer did not place upon the estimate offered by plaintiff in this case the price at which said piling was furnished, to wit, 13^ cents.”

Counsel say, while not waiving any of the assignments of error in this cause, we desire to insist on the general proposition, which includes nearly all the assignments of error, and that is, the court erred in its charge to the jury, as shown in the sixth assignment. The sixth assignment is that: “The court instructs you that the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant the amount sued for, less whatever you may deem the defendant to have been damaged by virtue of the allegation made by it in its answer that the defendant was delayed in completing its work upon the railroad.” It is conceded by counsel upon both sides of this case that the only controversy is with regard to the piles furnished between Oklahoma City and the Canadian river. The damages alleged in defendants' counterclaim, and denied by plaintiff in its reply thereto, were fully submitted by the court in its charge to the jury, and no exceptions were -taken to the charge in that respect. This limits the objection to the charge of the court, in the sixth .assignment, to the question whether the court was authorized to direct a finding for the plaintiff upon the evidence introduced on the trial that plaintiff had delivered to the defendants the piles sued for in this action. It must be remembered that the only question that can be litigated in this case is the difference between plaintiff and the defendants under the contract of December 15, 1894. Whatever controversy existed betwéen M. W. Osborn and the defendants under the contract entered into between them on December 7, 1894, cannot be settled in this lawsuit. Hence the only material question involved in this case is: Did the plaintiff furnish the piles to the defendants as alleged in its complaint, and were those piles when accepted by the defendant used by the defendant in the con[275]*275struction of the railroad? The law of this case announced by the Circuit Court of Appeals, and reported in 120 Fed. 795, 57 C. C. A. 163, is very clearly stated, and is binding upon this court. Judge Sanborn, in delivering the opinion of the court in that ease, asks this question: "May one who has knowingly accepted and applied to his own use property of his contractor, furnished by the latter under the agreement between them, escape payment of the contract price or value of the property delivered by proof that, when he accepted and used it he notified his contractor that he refused to receive- it as his property, and accepted it as the property of another, and that he paid the third party therefor?” The evidence introduced upon the last trial was substantially the same as that introduced at the first trial, and the statement of^facts, as set out by the Circuit Court of Appeals in its report of this case, is as applicable to the last trial as to the first; and in the enumeration of those facts it is stated: “At or near the inception of the delivery of this piling, Good & Co. were notified that it was the property of the plaintiff, and was delivered under its contract pursuant to the agreement which it had made with Osborn, that he should furnish and deliver the piling for the coke company. During the entire course of the delivery both Osborn and the coke company repeatedly informed Good & Co., and insisted that this piling was the property of the coke company, that it was delivered under its contract, and that it was paying Osborn for procuring and furnishing the piling pursuant to its contract with him. While Good & Co. protested to Osborn against accepting the piling as the property of the coke company, and informed him that it accepted it as his property under the contract of Good & Co. with him, neither the coke company nor Osborn assented to this view of their property rights, and Good & Co. put the piles into the railroad-.” ,,]■!)

1 Mr. Hitchcock, superintendent for the defendants, in his testimony for the defendants, upon cross-examination stated [276]*276as follows: "Q. Now, you say you did not promise Osborn to rectify the estimates. Didn't he tell you that he was getting that timber under contract with the Central Coal & Coke Company? A. He did not at the time I had the conversation with him. Q. But he did tell you? A. He wrote us letters afterwards about it. Q.. How long afterwards? A. I don’t know exactly, but I judge in May or June that he started to • notify us. Q. Didn't he do it earlier than May or June? A. Not to my recollection. Q. He notified you as early as May that the timber he was furnishing was the plaintiff's timber that he was furnishing under contract with them? A. Yes, sir. Q. Plaintiff also notified you to that effect, did they not? A. Yes, sir, May 20th. Q. So you had notice both from Osborn who was getting it out and delivering it, and from the plaintiff that it was not Osborn's piling, but it was the piling that belonged to the plaintiff? A. Yes, sir. Q. With that knowledge you received it from Osborn? A. Yes, sir-Q. And used it -in your road? A. Yes, sir. Q. And didn’t pay plaintiff for it? A. No, sir; we paid Osborn. Q. Did plaintiff consent to your paying Osborn for it? A. Don’t know that they did. Q. Don’t know that they didn't? A. I don’t suppose they did consent to it, or anything about it, perhaps. * * * Q. How much of this piling had been furnished up to that time, what proportion of it? A. I don't know what proportion of it.” Upon this state of facts, the Circuit Court of Appeals, in its report, on page 797 of 120 Fed., page 165 of 57 C. C.

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Bluebook (online)
104 S.W. 613, 7 Indian Terr. 268, 1907 Indian Terr. LEXIS 35, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/george-s-good-co-v-central-coal-coke-co-ctappindterr-1907.