George R Haro v. Costco Wholesale Corporation, a foreign corporation; et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: December 11, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01661
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 * * * 5 George R Haro, an individual, Case No. 2:25-cv-01661-JAD-DJA 6 Plaintiff, 7 Order v. 8 Costco Wholesale Corporation, a foreign 9 corporation; et al.,

10 Defendants.

11 Before the Court is the parties’ stipulated protective order (ECF No. 13). The parties 12 request that the Court enter a protective order to govern their exchange of confidential 13 information. However, the parties fail to state the governing standard for filing documents under 14 seal with the Court. This order reminds counsel that there is a presumption of public access to 15 judicial files and records. A party seeking to file a confidential document under seal must file a 16 motion to seal and must comply with the Ninth Circuit’s directives in Kamakana v. City and 17 County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2006) and Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, 18 LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2016). 19 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the parties’ stipulated protective order (ECF No. 20 13) is granted subject to the following modifications: 21 • Section 5 of the parties’ stipulated protective order is modified in red as follows: 22 o Before any Confidential Information is disseminated or disclosed to any of 23 the above-designated persons other than the Court and Court staff, such 24 person shall (a) read this Confidentiality Agreement in its entirety; and, 25 (b) agree to all provisions of this Confidentiality Agreement. 26 • Section 6 of the parties’ stipulated protective order is modified in red as follows: 27 1 o All depositions, pleadings reports, notes, lists, memoranda, indices, 2 compilations, electronically stored information, and records in which 3 Confidential Information is discussed, documented or referred to shall 4 themselves be deemed Confidential Information and shall be subject to this 5 Agreement. Should a party use any Confidential Information in any 6 pleading filed with the Court, that party shall, at the time of filing, request 7 that the court impound the specific portion of the pleading containing the 8 Confidential Information also file a motion for leave to file the documents 9 under seal as required by Local Rule IA 10-5 and in accordance with this 10 order. 11 • Paragraph 7 of the parties’ stipulated protective order is modified in red as follows: 12 o Upon final termination of this litigation, each person subject to this 13 Confidentiality Agreement, other than counsel for the parties and the Court 14 and its staff, shall either return all Confidential information to counsel for 15 Costco or destroy the Confidential information within thirty (30) days after 16 the final disposition of this matter. Documents that contain notations of 17 counsel may be destroyed rather than returned, but it shall be the 18 responsibility of counsel to ensure the documents are destroyed. Counsel 19 for the parties may maintain Confidential Information in their files 20 according to their file storage obligations under the Rules of Professional 21 Conduct, but shall destroy the Confidential Information once that 22 obligation concludes. 23 • Paragraph 9 of the parties’ stipulated protective order is modified in red as follows: 24 o No person who has received Confidential Information shall seek to vacate 25 or otherwise modify this Agreement at any time. This Agreement shall not 26 be abrogated, modified, amended, or enlarged except by stipulation and 27 agreement of the parties or by the Court with notice given to each of the 1 • Paragraph 13(G) of the parties’ stipulated protective order is removed. 2 • The Court has adopted electronic filing procedures. Attorneys must file 3 documents under seal using the Court’s electronic filing procedures. See Local 4 Rule IA 10-5. Papers filed with the Court under seal must be accompanied with a 5 concurrently-filed motion for leave to file those documents under seal. See Local 6 Rule IA 10-5(a). 7 • The Court has approved the instant protective order to facilitate discovery 8 exchanges, but there has been no showing, and the Court has not found, that any 9 specific documents are secret or confidential. The parties have not provided 10 specific facts supported by declarations or concrete examples to establish that a 11 protective order is required to protect any specific trade secret or other confidential 12 information pursuant to Rule 26(c) or that disclosure would cause an identifiable 13 and significant harm. 14 • All motions to seal shall address the standard articulated in Ctr. for Auto Safety 15 and explain why that standard has been met. 809 F.3d at 1097. 16 • Specifically, a party seeking to seal judicial records bears the burden of meeting 17 the “compelling reasons” standard, as previously articulated in Kamakana. 447 18 F.3d 1172. Under the compelling reasons standard, “a court may seal records only 19 when it finds ‘a compelling reason and articulate[s] the factual basis for its ruling, 20 without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 21 1097. (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179). “The court must then 22 ‘conscientiously balance[ ] the competing interests of the public and the party who 23 seeks to keep certain judicial records secret.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 24 1097. 25 • There is an exception to the compelling reasons standard where a party may satisfy 26 the less exacting “good cause” standard for sealed materials attached to a 27 discovery motion unrelated to the merits of the case. Id. “The good cause 1 orders in the discovery process: ‘The court may, for good cause, issue an order to 2 protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue 3 burden or expense.’” Id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)). “For good cause to exist, the 4 party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm 5 will result if no protective order is granted.” Phillips v. General Motors, 307 F.3d 6 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002). 7 • The labels of “dispositive” and “nondispositive” will not be the determinative 8 factor for deciding which test to apply because the focal consideration is “whether 9 the motion is more than tangentially related to the merits of a case.” Ctr. for Auto 10 Safety, 809 F.3d at 1101. 11 • The fact that the Court has entered the instant stipulated protective order and that a 12 party has designated a document as confidential pursuant to that protective order 13 does not, standing alone, establish sufficient grounds to seal a filed document. See 14 Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003); see 15 also Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992). If 16 the sole ground for a motion to seal is that the opposing party (or non-party) has 17 designated a document as confidential, the designator shall file (within seven days 18 of the filing of the motion to seal) either (1) a declaration establishing sufficient 19 justification for sealing each document at issue or (2) a notice of withdrawal of the 20 designation(s) and consent to unsealing. If neither filing is made, the Court may 21 order the document(s) unsealed without further notice. 22 • To the extent any aspect of the stipulated protective order may conflict with this 23 order or Local Rule IA 10-5, that aspect of the stipulated protective order is hereby 24 superseded with this order. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 DATED: December 11, 2025 27 DANIEL J. ALBREGTS