NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1793-23
GEORGE L. FARMER,
Plaintiff-Appellant/ Cross-Respondent,
v.
LOUISE W. MARSH, THE ESTATE OF LOUISE W. MARSH, THE LOUISE W. MARSH SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED TRUST, and J. LAURENCE KENT, ESQUIRE, as Trustee to the LOUISE W. MARSH SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED TRUST, and as Executor to the ESTATE OF LOUISE W. MARSH,
Defendants-Respondents/ Cross-Appellants. _____________________________
Submitted March 5, 2025 – Decided June 23, 2025
Before Judges Rose and DeAlmeida.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. L-1665-23. George L. Farmer, appellant/cross-respondent pro se.
Christopher J. Stanchina, LLC, attorney for respondents/cross-appellants (Christopher J. Stanchina, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff George L. Farmer, a self-represented attorney, appeals from the
Law Division's December 11, 2023 summary judgment dismissal of his
complaint against defendants Louise W. Marsh, 1 the Estate of Louise W. Marsh,
the Louise W. Marsh Second Amended and Restated Trust, and J. Lawrence
Kent, Esq., as trustee to the Trust and executor of the Estate (collectively,
defendants), and a January 22, 2024 order denying reconsideration. Defendants
cross-appeal from the January 22, 2024 order denying their motion for sanctions
against plaintiff.
Because we conclude, as did the motion court, the claims asserted in
plaintiff's Law Division complaint were precluded under the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, the Maryland Supreme Court had jurisdiction to decide the
attorney grievance action against plaintiff in that state, and plaintiff was
afforded due process in the Maryland grievance proceeding, we discern no
1 According to plaintiff's merits brief, Marsh died before he filed the present complaint. A-1793-23 2 reason to disturb the court's decisions on summary judgment and
reconsideration. Nor are we persuaded the court erroneously denied defendants'
application for sanctions. Accordingly, we affirm the orders under review.
I.
The genesis of plaintiff's Law Division complaint is a two-page retainer
agreement between him and Marsh, a nonagenarian resident of Maryland with
dementia. Dated March 6, 2020, the retainer agreement was drafted on
plaintiff's "Attorney at Law" letterhead and reflected his New Jersey address.
The subject matter of the correspondence stated, "LEGAL REPRESENTATION
RETAINER AGREEMENT." Plaintiff was licensed to practice law in New
Jersey but not in Maryland.
The facts giving rise to the ensuing litigation in Maryland are detailed in
the written decisions of the federal district court judge in Farmer v. Kent, No.
20-1806, 2021 WL 690025 (D. Md. Feb. 23, 2021), and the Maryland Supreme
Court in Attorney Greivance Commission of Maryland v. Farmer, 297 A.3d
1144 (Md. 2023), incorporated by reference in the motion court's decision, and
need not be repeated in the same level of detail. Suffice it to say, for several
decades, Kent, a Maryland attorney, represented Marsh, her husband, and their
son. In 1988, Kent created a family trust naming Marsh and her husband as
A-1793-23 3 grantors, trustees, and beneficiaries, and their son as successor beneficiary.
Att'y Grievance Comm'n, 297 A.3d at 1152.
In 2010, one year after her husband died, Marsh granted Kent a general
power of attorney and designated him successor trustee. Ibid. Marsh's son
remained the successor beneficiary. Ibid. In March 2018, Thuan Nguyen
became Marsh's full-time, live-in caretaker. Ibid. Thereafter, Marsh's son
married Nguyen. Ibid.
By March 2020, Marsh was unable to serve as trustee and Kent replaced
her in that capacity. Id. at 1153. Because Marsh's son became ill and was unable
to serve as successor trustee, Kent prepared an amendment to the trust on March
3, 2020, naming his law partner as successor trustee. Ibid. Marsh agreed to the
amendment after obtaining her son's consent. Farmer, 2021 WL 690025, at *1.
Around the same time, Nguyen retained plaintiff to investigate Kent's
actions. Att'y Grievance Comm'n, 297 A.3d at 1153. On March 4, 2020,
plaintiff visited Marsh's son in the hospital. Ibid. On March 5, 2020, plaintiff
sent correspondence to Kent seeking information regarding the trust with
apparent authorization from Marsh instructing Kent to provide the pertinent
documents. Ibid. Plaintiff's correspondence indicated he was an "Attorney at
Law" and provided his New Jersey address.
A-1793-23 4 On March 6, 2020, Marsh signed the following retainer agreement in the
presence of a Maryland notary public. Ibid. The retainer agreement provided,
in full:
I have been advised by your daughter-in-law that there have been numerous actions taken by attorney J. Laurence Kent that could be considered suspicious. She has retained me to advise her and you as to what needs to be done to assure that you are not being taken advantage of as a result of Mr. Kent's actions that have transpired in the past few days.
As such, I have requested in writing that Mr. Kent provide me with certain documents to review so that I can determine what needs to be done to protect your interests. I spoke to Mr. Kent today by phone and he advised me, among another [sic] things that he was not going to provide me with the documents because I do not represent you.
Please accept this letter as my request for me to represent your interests in reviewing Mr. Kent's prior services and documents, as well as the financial accounts including, but not limited to the document he had you sign recently, the trust agreement(s), your will, the financial accounts, the expenditures from the accounts, etc. with the purpose of determining if there are any improprieties.
By signing this retainer letter of engagement, you are authorizing me to perform these services, obtain the aforementioned documents, and take whatever steps I deem necessary (if any) to protect your interests depending upon the information I discover.
A-1793-23 5 You authorize me to retain any expert that I deem necessary to assist me in this assignment such as an accountant. You also authorize me to retain an attorney that is licensed in Maryland in the event that we need to have someone appear in court to protect your interests. You agree to pay the expert fees and local counsel's fees.
With respect to my fees, you agree to pay me $[REDACTED]/hour for any and all work that I perform and have performed to date. You authorize Mr. Kent to pay me from any account (including, but not limited to the Trust fund(s) account) a $ [REDACTED] retainer. I will bill you on a periodic basis to which you authorize Mr. Kent to pay as well.
In light of the fact that I represent your daughter- in-law as well, you will need to waive any conflicts that might exist as well as any appearance of conflicts. By entering into this retainer agreement, you hereby do waive said conflicts and appearance of conflicts.
If the above comports with your understanding of our agreement, please sign below and return to me.
In his March 10, 2020 letter to Nguyen, plaintiff sought her waiver of any
conflicts resulting from his representation of her and Marsh. Id. at 1154. In the
letter, plaintiff noted Marsh "retained [him] to represent her interests." Plaintiff
thereafter attempted to obtain documents from Kent and the bank that held
Marsh's trust account. Ibid. The bank refused, and Farmer filed a complaint
against the bank with the Department of Banking. Id. at 1154 n.7.
A-1793-23 6 In April 2020, Kent filed an emergency guardianship petition for Marsh's
person and property. Id. at 1154-55. In April 2020, the Maryland circuit court
granted Kent's petition, and appointed separate counsel as guardian of Marsh's
person and property. Id. at 1155. Around the same time, plaintiff attempted to
hire two local Maryland attorneys to sponsor his pro hac vice application to
represent Marsh and her son concerning "potential trust litigation" and Kent's
"alleged impropriety." Ibid. Both Maryland attorneys ultimately declined
because Marsh was represented by court-appointed counsel. Id. at 1156.
Thereafter, Marsh's appointed counsel filed an emergency petition for a
hearing regarding the temporary guardian appointment pursuant to Maryland
law. Ibid. Plaintiff filed a pro hac vice motion, without local counsel
sponsorship, and a motion to dismiss the emergency petition. Ibid. Nguyen
separately moved to dismiss the petition, vacate the previous orders, and for
appointment as Marsh's sole healthcare decision-maker. Ibid. Although Nguyen
claimed she was self-represented, the circuit court found "[plaintiff] either
drafted or assisted in drafting the motion." Ibid.
The circuit court denied plaintiff's pro hac vice motion, denied Nguyen's
dismissal motion, found Marsh's appointment of counsel was properly made,
and prohibited plaintiff from contacting Marsh. Id. at 1157. After the hearing,
A-1793-23 7 plaintiff billed Marsh's temporary guardian for $158,589.18 in "legal services
purportedly rendered" on Marsh's behalf between March and May 2020. Ibid.
Marsh's temporary guardian declined payment. Ibid.
In June 2020, plaintiff sued Kent, Kent's law partner, and their firm in
Maryland federal district court alleging various tort claims. Ibid. The district
court granted the defendants' ensuing motion to dismiss. Farmer, 2021 WL
690025, at *7. Pertinent to this appeal, the district court invalidated the retainer
agreement between plaintiff and Marsh because plaintiff was not a member of
the Maryland bar and the agreement violated public policy. Id. at *5.
The district court explained, "Maryland law has articulated a public policy
against the unlicensed practice of law in the state, and [plaintiff] is not a licensed
attorney in Maryland." Ibid. Accordingly, the court dismissed plaintiff's
tortious interference claim. Ibid. In doing so, the court discredited plaintiff's
argument that the retainer agreement was not formed for legal services rendered,
citing plaintiff's attorney letterhead, the subject line of the agreement, and the
agreement's language. Ibid. The court further noted plaintiff solicited Marsh
and billed for legal services provided. Ibid. The court concluded the "agreement
thus was, in form, substance, and execution, an agreement to provide legal
services." Ibid.
A-1793-23 8 Plaintiff appealed and the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision. Farmer v. Kent, No. 21-1350, 2022 WL 4482087, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept.
27, 2022).
Shortly after the district court rendered its decision, Maryland Bar
Counsel filed a statement of charges against plaintiff and referred him to a peer
review panel. The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland thereafter filed
a petition for disciplinary or remedial action asserting plaintiff violated the
Maryland Attorneys' Rules of Professional Conduct (MARPC). Att'y Greivance
Comm'n, 297 A.3d at 1151.
Following a four-day testimonial hearing, another Maryland circuit court
issued a written decision concluding plaintiff violated several MARPCs. Ibid.
Plaintiff filed multiple exceptions to the hearing officer's factual and legal
findings. Id. at 1152.
In July 2023, the Maryland Supreme Court overruled plaintiff's
exceptions, and adopted the hearing judge's factual findings and conclusions of
law. Ibid. Citing the plain terms of the retainer agreement, the Court rejected
plaintiff's argument that the pertinent MARPC did not apply to his "theory that
he provided non-legal services." Id. at 1164. The Court additionally concluded
plaintiff violated the MARPCs in view of his conflict of interest and because
A-1793-23 9 "he was not authorized to practice law in Maryland." Id. at 1162. Citing the
pertinent Maryland statute, the Court also rejected plaintiff's contention, because
he "hop[ed] or anticipat[ed] that he would be admitted pro hac vice without
obtaining a prior sponsor," he was absolved of the unauthorized practice of law
violation. Id. at 1166.
The next month, in August 2023, plaintiff filed a three-count complaint in
the Law Division against defendants for quantum meruit, book account, and
account stated. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, R. 4:6-
2(e), and lack of jurisdiction, R. 4:6-2(b), and sent plaintiff a frivolous litigation
notice pursuant to Rule 1:4-8. Defendants asserted plaintiff's claims were
precluded under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Plaintiff
cross-moved for partial summary judgment, claiming the Maryland courts
lacked jurisdiction. In the alternative, plaintiff argued he was denied his right
to due process in the Maryland proceedings, and as such, the resultant findings
did not bar the claims raised in his Law Division complaint.
On the first return date, the court converted defendants' dismissal motion
to a summary judgment motion, R. 4:6-2, finding "certain factual allegations and
A-1793-23 10 documents were outside the pleadings."2 The parties filed supplemental
submissions.
Following oral argument, the court rendered a cogent written decision,
squarely addressing the dispositive issues raised in view of the governing legal
principles, which the court chronicled in detail. Those principles included
application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1, to the
Maryland judgments. The court found the Maryland judgments were entitled to
full faith and credit, and principles of collateral estoppel precluded relitigating
whether the retainer agreement was void for public policy and whether plaintiff
provided non-legal services to Marsh.
Citing our decisions in Tara Enterprises, Inc. v. Daribar Management
Corp., 369 N.J. Super. 45 (App. Div. 2004), and Sonntag Reporting Serv., Ltd.
v. Ciccarelli, 374 N.J. Super. 533, 538 (App. Div. 2005), the motion court
correctly recognized, "[w]hen viewed in the light of due process rights, a foreign
judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit in New Jersey if a [responding
party] demonstrates the forum state lacked personal or subject matter
jurisdiction, . . . or if a [responding party] was denied adequate notice and a
2 The parties did not provide a transcript of the initial hearing; we glean the court's reasons from its ensuing written decision. A-1793-23 11 reasonable opportunity to be heard." (second and third alterations in original).
Similar to the Maryland Supreme Court, the court found plaintiff performed "a
significant number of tasks" in that state. To support its decision, the court noted
plaintiff was retained by a Maryland resident "to assert inappropriate conduct
against a Maryland attorney" regarding the attorney's representation of Marsh
and his financial decisions concerning her trust. The court elaborated:
Haling him into that state for purposes of an attorney disciplinary proceeding concerning the above representation and actions taken in that state certainly [is] neither unfair or unreasonable nor does it offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Plaintiff had made substantial contact with the parties who were residents of Maryland, who practiced law in Maryland, filed legal actions in Maryland and challenged transactions and the authority and validity of the attorney making such transactions all made in Maryland. Additionally, this court finds that the Maryland court has subject matter jurisdiction concerning attorney ethics matters including issues concerning conflicts of interest and the unauthorized practice of law which apply to plaintiff's actions.
Nor was the motion court persuaded by plaintiff's argument he was denied
due process because the Maryland circuit court failed to conduct a fair hearing.
To the contrary, the court, here, found plaintiff was afforded notice "and was
provided the opportunity to have a contested hearing concerning [the] issues [he
raised] over a period of four trial days." Noting plaintiff failed to cite "any
A-1793-23 12 specific issues he was not permitted to present to that tribunal," the court found
unavailing plaintiff's contention "he was wrongfully limited in time by the trial
judge to present his case." Moreover, the motion court noted, on appeal, the
Maryland Supreme Court fully reviewed the hearing judge's findings.
Turning to the preclusive effect of the proceedings in the Maryland federal
and state courts, the motion court correctly recognized plaintiff's action was not
barred under the doctrine of res judicata because the parties in the present action
were not the same, nor "in privity with the [Maryland] actions."
Conversely, the motion court found plaintiff's present action was
precluded under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the Maryland
"tribunals clearly found that the retainer agreement . . . was void as against
public policy." Noting plaintiff had a full opportunity to be heard concerning
the validity of the retainer agreement in the Maryland ethics proceeding and the
state court "issued a final judgment or order in that matter," the motion court
rejected "plaintiff's arguments that the prior tribunal did not decide whether he
[wa]s entitled to compensation for non-legal tasks." The motion court reasoned,
"[t]he state court found that all the time billed was under a retainer agreement
for legal services and all tasks were legal services." Citing our decision in
Infante v. Gottesman, 233 N.J. Super. 310 (App. Div. 1989), the motion court
A-1793-23 13 was further persuaded that a party to a contract cannot recover under a quantum
meruit theory if the contract is deemed void as against public policy in this state.
In his ensuing motion for reconsideration, plaintiff cited our Supreme
Court's decision in Starkey, Kelly, Blaney & White v. Estate of Nicolaysen, 172
N.J. 60 (2002), and argued the court erroneously dismissed his quantum meruit
claim. In its written decision, the court supplemented its quantum meruit
findings, distinguishing the circumstances of the present matter from those in
Starkey. As the court correctly noted, in Starkey, the parties' oral retainer
agreement was invalidated because it was not reduced to writing but the Court
found plaintiff was entitled to payment under a quantum meruit theory. 172 N.J.
at 63. Conversely, here, the court correctly recognized "the agreement was
unenforceable as void against public policy." Finding plaintiff failed to meet
the criteria for reconsideration, the court denied his motion.
The motion court also denied defendants' application for sanctions,
reasoning plaintiff's arguments were unpersuasive but were not made in bad
faith.
II.
In his overlapping arguments on appeal, plaintiff reprises the issues raised
before the motion court. He maintains the Maryland courts lacked personal
A-1793-23 14 jurisdiction over him and lacked subject matter over the "non-legal services" he
performed. Among his arguments, plaintiff contends the motion court
erroneously: failed to find he was "deprived of due process in the Maryland
proceedings"; failed to find "the Maryland hearing judge was predisposed
against [him]"; applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to dismiss his claim;
dismissed his quantum meruit claim; and failed to decide all issues raised.
After de novo review, see Comprehensive Neurosurgical, P.C. v. Valley
Hosp., 257 N.J. 33, 71 (2024), we reject plaintiff's unsupported claims. We
affirm the orders under review substantially for the thoughtful and thorough
reasons articulated in the motion court's well-reasoned decisions accompanying
the orders. Having employed the same standard as the motion judge, see
Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022), we conclude defendants are entitled
to judgment as a matter of law, see R. 4:46-2(c). Plaintiff raises no issues on
appeal that warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
III.
Lastly, we address defendants' cross-appeal. Defendants argue the trial
court abused its discretion in denying its cross-motion for sanctions because
plaintiff violated Rule 1:4-8 by filing baseless litigation. According to
A-1793-23 15 defendants, plaintiff ignored the Maryland adjudications in filing this complaint,
which defendants argue should not have been filed.
We review a trial court's decision to award counsel fees on a motion for
frivolous litigation sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard. McDaniel
v. Man Wai Lee, 419 N.J. Super. 482, 498 (App. Div. 2011). Reversal is
warranted "only if [the decision] 'was not premised upon consideration of all
relevant factors, was based upon consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate
factors, or amounts to a clear error in judgment.'" Ibid. (quoting Masone v.
Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div. 2005)).
Rule 1:4-8(a) permits sanctions for frivolous claims. United Hearts,
L.L.C. v. Zahabian, 407 N.J. Super. 379, 389 (App. Div. 2009). A claim is
frivolous when "no rational argument can be advanced in its support, or it is not
supported by any credible evidence, or it is completely untenable." Ibid.
(quoting First Atl. Fed. Credit Union v. Perez, 391 N.J. Super. 419, 432 (App.
Div. 2007)). Further, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1(b) permits sanctions for frivolous
litigation if either:
(1) [t]he complaint . . . was commenced, used or continued in bad faith, solely for the purpose of harassment, delay or malicious injury; or (2) [t]he nonprevailing party knew, or should have known that the complaint . . . was without any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith
A-1793-23 16 argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.
However, sanctions are not appropriate when the party has "an objectively
reasonable belief in the merits of an argument." J.O. v. Twp. of Bedminster,
433 N.J. Super. 199, 221 (App. Div. 2013). The term "frivolous" should be
construed restrictively in order to reflect the legislative intent that citizens' ready
access to the judiciary is an important premise of democratic society.
McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel & Casino, 132 N.J. 546, 561-62 (1993).
"When the [litigant's] conduct bespeaks an honest attempt to press a perceived,
though ill-founded and perhaps misguided, claim, he or she should not be found
to have acted in bad faith." Belfer v. Merling, 322 N.J. Super. 124, 144-45 (App.
Div. 1999).
The trial court's findings are supported by substantial, credible evidence
in the motion record. Although the court ultimately was unpersuaded by his
argument, the court reasonably recognized plaintiff had a colorable argument
based on his "honest[] belie[f] he was not given appropriate due process in the
Maryland ethics hearing." Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the
motion court's decision denying sanctions.
A-1793-23 17 To the extent we have not addressed defendants' remaining contentions,
we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-1793-23 18