George J. Lambert v. Providence Journal Company

508 F.2d 656, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 16696
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedJanuary 7, 1975
Docket74-1287
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 508 F.2d 656 (George J. Lambert v. Providence Journal Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
George J. Lambert v. Providence Journal Company, 508 F.2d 656, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 16696 (1st Cir. 1975).

Opinion

McENTEE, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff George J. Lambert owned and operated the Camelot Inn, a cafe in Fall River, Massachusetts. On October 6, 1972, at the Inn he shot and killed one Thomas F. McCabe. As a result of this incident, described more fully in the newspaper accounts in notes 1-4 infra, Lambert was charged as an accessory after the fact to murder, and later with murder itself. The charge was reduced to manslaughter, however, at a bindover hearing. Lambert was tried in the Massachusetts Superior Court for Bristol County and was acquitted.

During the period before trial the defendant, the Providence Journal Company, published four articles concerning *657 Lambert dated October 8, 1 , October 13, 2 , and December 28, 1972 3 and February 18, 1973, 4 which it distributed in Massachusetts and Rhode Island. Alleging the *658 articles were defamatory, 5 Lambert sued the Journal in the District Court for the District of Rhode Island. The Journal filed a motion for summary judgment together with supporting affidavits, Lambert’s deposition, and a memorandum of law. Lambert filed an objection to the motion, together with supporting affidavits, depositions, and a memorandum of law. The court granted the motion on the alternative grounds that the allegedly libellous material was not defamatory since the innuendo pleaded by Lambert was unwarranted, and that even if the material were actionable Lambert failed to demonstrate that there was a genuine issue of fact as to the Journal’s actual malice under the standard established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 685 (1964). Lambert appeals. We find it unnecessary to reach the court’s second ground of decision, as we agree that none of the articles was reasonably capable of any defamatory meaning.

Lambert cannot object to the articles insofar as they report, admittedly truthfully, that he was charged with murder. “The publication of the fact that one has been arrested, and upon what accusation, is not actionable, if true. . . But if to this fact there is added, by way of comment, words which amount to an accusation that the charge is true, or comment which assumes the guilt of the person arrested, by headlines or otherwise, the mere fact that the person was arrested upon the charge stated is no justification for words imputing guilt.” Commercial Pub. Co. v. Smith, 149 F. 704, 706 (6th Cir. 1907); Thompson v. Globe Newspaper Co., 279 Mass. 176, 188, 181 N.E. 249 (1932). Lambert claims that the articles’ characterization of McCabe as a murder victim and the incident itself as a murder with that term’s denotation of illegality, instead of the neutral “shooting death,” “homicide,” or “killing,” constituted such editorial comment imputing guilt. In support of his construction Lambert submitted the depositions of three community residents who testified that such had been their “fair,” “plain,” and “ordinary” understanding of the articles in question.

It is for the court to decide whether a statement can be defamatory in character. Andoscia v. Coady, 99 R.I. 731, 735, 210 A.2d 581, 584 (1965); Sharratt v. Housing Innovations, Inc., 1974 Mass.Adv.Sh. 575, 577-578, 310 N.E.2d 343, 345. 6 Reading the articles in their entirety, Bray v. Providence Journal Co., 101 R.I. 111, 116, 220 A.2d 531, 534, W. Prosser, Torts § 111 at 747-48 (4th ed. 1971), and construing their language naturally, Reid v. Providence Journal Co., 20 R.I. 120, 122, 37 A. 637 (1897); Lyman v. New England Pub. Co., 286 Mass. 258, 261, 190 N.E. 542, 543 (1934), we are constrained to agree with the district court that none was reasonably capable of conveying the defamatory meaning Lambert alleges. Bray v. Providence Journal Co., supra; Sharratt v. Housing Innovations, Inc., supra at 578, 310 N.E.2d at 345. Even if the use of the term “murder” implied that the killing was unlawful, each article unequivocally *659 states that Lambert has “denied” the murder charge or “pleaded innocent,” or reports the progress of the case in such a way as to make clear that no determination of his involvement has been made. Nothing in them suggests that the Journal has concluded that Lambert is the guilty party even if it has decided that there was a murder. 7 Moreover, the term “murder” is used interchangeably throughout with the terms “fatal shooting,” “shooting death,” and “homicide,” often in the same or adjacent sentences. In this context the term clearly is chosen solely for variety’s sake and merely echoes the report of the charges levelled against Lambert without implying their truthfulness. It is obviously to be understood as “alleged murder.” In these routine news articles we think it would require more forceful language than this to justify Lambert’s reading. 8 The innuendo cannot be used to enlarge the natural meaning of the words actually used. Ogrodnick v. Providence Journal Co., 93 R.I. 316, 317, 175 A.2d 289, 291 (1961); Colby Haberdashers, Inc. v. Broadstreet Co., 267 Mass. 166, 170, 166 N.E. 550, 551 (1929). None of these articles can be construed to impute guilt without such an enlargement.

Finding the meaning of the articles clear, we see no basis on which the depositions of witnesses could be held competent as to their defamatory capacities. Snell v. Snow, 54 Mass. (13 Metc.) 278 (1847); Duncan v. Pearson, 135 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1943). To the ordinary reasons advanced for excluding such testimony may be added the difficulty, evidenced by the depositions here, of distinguishing between “murder” and “killing” — a distinction vital to Lambert’s case. Such considerations explain the courts’ reluctance to entertain libel suits dependent upon a precise construction of a newspaper’s use of technical legal terminology. Bray v. Providence Journal Co., supra (“testimony”). Joyce v. Globe Newspaper Co., 355 Mass. 492, 245 N.E.2d 822 (1969) (“commitment”); Piracci v. Hearst Corp., 263 F.Supp. 511 (D.Md.1966). Despite the Journal’s loose use of the word “murder,” we think only “supersensitive persons, with morbid imaginations,” Reid v. Providence Journal Co., supra at 122, 37 A. at 637, could discover in any of these articles the assertion that Lambert was guilty of murder.

Affirmed.

1

.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cass v. Town of Wayland
D. Massachusetts, 2019
Cass v. Town of Wayland
383 F. Supp. 3d 66 (District of Columbia, 2019)
Wentworth-Douglass Hospital
2011 DNH 020 (D. New Hampshire, 2011)
Salzano v. North Jersey Media Group Inc.
993 A.2d 778 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2010)
Balzaga v. Fox News Network, LLC
173 Cal. App. 4th 1325 (California Court of Appeal, 2009)
Nanji v. National Geographic Society
403 F. Supp. 2d 425 (D. Maryland, 2005)
Amrak Productions, Inc. v. Morton
410 F.3d 69 (First Circuit, 2005)
Riley v. Harr
292 F.3d 282 (First Circuit, 2002)
Foley v. Lowell Sun Publishing Co.
533 N.E.2d 196 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1989)
Foley v. Lowell Sun Publishing Co.
519 N.E.2d 601 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1988)
Riblet Tramway Co. v. Ericksen Associates, Inc.
665 F. Supp. 81 (D. New Hampshire, 1987)
Catalfo v. Jensen
657 F. Supp. 463 (D. New Hampshire, 1987)
Flotech, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Co.
627 F. Supp. 358 (D. Massachusetts, 1985)
Hovey v. Iowa State Daily Publication Board, Inc.
372 N.W.2d 253 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1985)
Ricci v. Venture Magazine, Inc.
574 F. Supp. 1563 (D. Massachusetts, 1983)
Seymour v. A.S. Abell Co.
557 F. Supp. 951 (D. Maryland, 1983)
Williams v. WCAU-TV
555 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1983)
Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing & Printing Ltd.
423 A.2d 655 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1980)
Thomson v. Cash
402 A.2d 651 (Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1979)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
508 F.2d 656, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 16696, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/george-j-lambert-v-providence-journal-company-ca1-1975.