RENDERED: FEBRUARY 21, 2008 TO BE PUBLISHED
AT _. of `rufur; "1W
10uprrmt %Uvurf 'Ptll I
2005-SC-000729-DG AND 2006-SC-000256-DG
GEORGE HENRY GRIPSHOVER APPELLANT/ CROSS-APPELLEE
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS V. CASE NUMBERS 2004-CA-000578 AND 2004-CA-000599 BOONE CIRCUIT COURT NO . 02-CI-00044
DARLENE GRIPSHOVER APPELLEE/ CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE ABRAMSON
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
By Decree entered January 28, 2004, the Boone Family Court dissolved the
marriage of George and Darlene Gripshover, apportioned and divided the couple's
property, awarded Darlene child support of $199.32 per week, and awarded Darlene
maintenance of $600 .00 per month for five years . Contending that the trial court had
erroneously excluded several tracts of realty from the marital estate and that its child
support and maintenance awards were inadequate, Darlene appealed to the Court of
Appeals . That Court, in an opinion rendered August 19, 2005, agreed with Darlene that
the parties' transfer of five parcels of realty to a limited partnership and their assignment
of their partnership interests to an irrevocable trust had not extinguished, for property division purposes, Darlene's equitable interest in the realty . The Court therefore
vacated the pertinent provisions of the family court's Decree and remanded the matter
for a reassessment of the marital estate and for reconsideration of the maintenance and
child support awards in light of that reassessment and of income adjustments the Court
deemed necessary . Both parties petitioned this Court for discretionary review . George
challenges the Court of Appeals' ruling that the transferred real property remained
susceptible to family court division. He also challenges the Court of Appeals'
disturbance of the family court's child support and maintenance awards . Contending
that the Court of Appeals did not go far enough, Darlene insists that the trust was
invalidly formed and should be declared void . She also contends that both lower courts
misapplied the apportionment precedents of Kentucky case law when they awarded
George a substantial non-marital interest in certain proceeds of a real estate sale . We
granted discretionary review primarily to consider the validity and effect of the
partnership and trust into which the parties transferred a large portion of their estate .
Agreeing with the family court that those entities were validly formed and being further
convinced that the transfers to them cannot be deemed either a fraud upon or a
dissipation of the marital estate, we reverse the Court of Appeals' Opinion to the extent
that it held that Darlene retained an equitable interest in the real property . We agree
with that Court, however, that Darlene's child support and maintenance awards must be
reconsidered, and so affirm in part, the Court of Appeals' Opinion .
RELEVANT FACTS
George and Darlene married in June 1988 when George was in his late twenties
and Darlene in her mid-thirties . Darlene brought to the union two children from a prior
marriage . The Gripshovers' marriage produced two additional children, George W . (dob: 8/1190) and Austin (dob : 1/15/95) . Neither party had advanced beyond the tenth
grade in school, and Darlene's work history was limited to a brief stint at a grocery store
and to work as a house cleaner. During the marriage, Darlene was primarily a
housewife, but when Austin, who had been ill, no longer required her full-time care, she
resumed housecleaning, earning as much as $300 .00 to $375.00 per week, but often
much less .
Along with his brother Camillus (Charlie), George operated what had once been
their parents' farm on about 200 acres outside of Union in Boone County. George and
Charlie had acquired the family farm by inheritance from their parents and by gift and/or
purchase from their seven siblings . The farming concern has been successful, affording
George, the trial court found, a personal income of about $64,000.00 per year .
At the time of the marriage George also owned an undivided interest, along with
Charlie and their sister Kathy, in a 283 .43 acre parcel of unimproved land in the
Richwood section of Boone County . The three siblings, along with another brother, Tim,
and their father, acquired the Richwood property in November 1981 . As will be detailed
below, George and Charlie ultimately inherited, purchased, or received as gifts their
father's and their siblings' interests . The family members did not improve the Richwood
property, but through the years, owing to economic development in the region, the
property substantially appreciated . A portion of the Richwood property was sold in
1989, another portion in 1995, and the final portion in January 2001 . George and
Charlie used proceeds from the 1995 sale to purchase a 93.2 acre farm on U.S.
Highway 42 in Boone County. In exchange for the final portion of the Richwood
property in 2001, the brothers received three parcels of Mason County realty, valued for
the transaction at $895,000.00, and a promissory note in the amount of $1,021,925.00 . Following the January 2001 exchange, the brothers found themselves the
owners of a farming operation, including livestock and equipment ; five parcels of
northern Kentucky realty totaling more than 600 acres; and a promissory note for more
than a million dollars. Hoping to protect these assets and to provide for their children,
the brothers sought tax and estate planning advice from Hugh Campbell, an attorney
and certified public accountant . Mr. Campbell recommended that the brothers form two
limited partnerships -- a real estate partnership along with their wives, which would hold
and manage the five parcels of realty (the Gripshover Family Limited Partnership #1)
and a second partnership to own and manage the farming business (the Gripshover
Family Limited Partnership #2). To minimize taxes and for inheritance purposes, Mr.
Campbell further recommended that the partners in the two partnerships assign their
partnership interests to trusts, two trusts for each family, an irrevocable trust to receive
the real estate partnership interests and a revocable trust for the farming partnership
interests. George's children, George W. and Austin, were to be the beneficiaries of both
of George's family trusts . Charlie was to serve as trustee for George's irrevocable
family trust, and George was to serve in like capacity for Charlie's irrevocable family
trust.
In May 2001, George and Charlie had Mr. Campbell prepare the documents to
effectuate this plan. According to Darlene, George did not reveal the plan to her until
the night before they were to meet with Mr. Campbell to execute the documents. She
resented not having been consulted earlier and was upset during the meeting with Mr.
Campbell when he explained the plan to her and to Charlie's wife. Nevertheless she
indicated that she understood the thrust of the plan, and she signed deeds transferring
her interests in all of the realty to the Gripshover Family Limited Partnership #1 (the realty partnership), as well as documents assigning her partnership interests to the
George Gripshover Family Trust (the irrevocable family trust).
The parties separated in December 2001, and Darlene petitioned for dissolution
in January 2002. She moved in limine to have the irrevocable family trust declared
invalid on the ground that George and Charlie retained control over the realty and so
had not effected a valid gift to the trust. Following a hearing in January 2003, the family
court denied the motion and ruled that notwithstanding the two partnerships' continued
management of the realty and the use of at least some of it in the farming business, the
warranty deeds transferring the parties' interests to the partnership and the assignments
of the parties' partnership interests to the trust constituted the irrevocable transfer to the
trust of a present interest--the partnership interests-for a valid trust purpose-
transferring assets to the parties' children as securely and with as limited tax liability as
possible . The court noted Darlene's testimony to the effect that Mr. Campbell took two
or three hours to explain the plan to her and to Charlie's wife, that she was accorded an
opportunity to read the plan documents and to ask questions, and that she was
informed that if she wished she could consult her own attorney. The court concluded
that Darlene had not been misled or coerced, but had freely joined the estate plan and
the gift to the trust.
Following a final hearing in November 2003, the family court entered the Decree
summarized above . In assessing the parties' property, the court considered the assets
of the Gripshover Family Limited Partnership #2 (the farm business partnership) as
assets of the marriage and pursuant to KRS 403.190 assigned some of them to George
as his non-marital property and made an equitable division of the marital remainder .
The court divided the marital property equally, ultimately awarding Darlene $152,792 .00. Included among the assets of the farm business partnership was the
$1,021,925 .00 promissory note from the final Richwood property sale . Applying the
apportionment formula of Brandenburg,v. Brandenburg , 617 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. App.
1981), the family court determined that $185,998.00 represented George and Darlene's
marital share of the note and so included half of that amount ($92,999 .00) in Darlene's
property award . The court excluded from its property analysis the five tracts of real
property transferred to the Gripshover Family Limited Partnership #1, tracts totaling
more than 600 acres and worth, according to Darlene, more than $3,000,000 .00.
The court also made child-support and maintenance determinations . In August
2001, George and Darlene had moved from the old family farm in Boone County to a
house in Dover, Kentucky in Mason County on one of the newly acquired tracts of land.
When they separated in December of that year, Darlene remained in Dover, and
George moved back to the Boone County home. Darlene testified that prior to the move
she had regular house cleaning jobs four or five days per week which afforded her a
weekly income of from $300 .00 to $375.00. After the move to the more rural Mason
County she found only a couple of regular cleaning jobs and was earning far less . She
admitted, however, that her search for additional work had not been extensive . The trial
court imputed income to Darlene at her pre-move level of $360.00 per week ($1,558.80
per month) . The court ruled that George's annual income was $64,256 .25 or $5,354.69
per month . It arrived at that figure by averaging his last four federal income tax
statements and adding to the average ($46,256 .25) $18,000.00 per year to account for
the fact that George charged most of his housing, transportation, and food expenses to
the farming business . The award to Darlene of child support in the amount of $199 .32
per week was based on those amounts . Noting Darlene's $152,792 .00 property award, the parties' modest standard of living, and the fourteen year duration of the marriage,
the court ruled that an award of lifetime maintenance would not be appropriate, but
instead awarded Darlene maintenance of $600.00 per month for five years.
Darlene challenges virtually every aspect of the trial court's Decree. The court
erred, she maintains (1) by excluding from its property analysis the realty, which was
only nominally removed from the marital estate ; (2) by awarding George a non-marital .
share of the $1,021,925 .00 promissory note; (3) by attributing too much income to
Darlene; (4) by attributing too- little income to George ; and (5) by awarding rehabilitative
as opposed to lifetime maintenance when there is no realistic chance that Darlene will
ever be able to support herself. As noted, the Court of Appeals agreed that
notwithstanding valid transfers to the limited partnership and the trust, Darlene retained
an equitable interest in the realty which entitled her to a portion of it upon dissolution .
The Court also held that the trial court imputed too much income to Darlene, too little to
George, and erred by awarding rehabilitative maintenance where the record suggested
very little chance of rehabilitation . The Court upheld, however, the trial court's
apportionment of the promissory note. George now challenges each of the Court of
Appeals' adverse rulings . Darlene challenges that Court's ruling with respect to the
promissory note and its ruling upholding the validity of the irrevocable family trust.
ANALYSIS
1. The Realty was Validly Removed from the Marital Estate and was not Subject to Family Court Division .
We begin our discussion with KRS 403 .190, the statute governing property
division upon marriage dissolution . Under that statute
a trial court utilizes a three-step process to divide the parties' property : (1) the trial court first characterizes each item of property as marital or nonmarital ; (2) the trial court then 7 assigns each party's nonmarital property to that party; and (3) finally, the trial court equitably divides the marital property between the parties . An item of property will often consist of both nonmarital and marital components, and when this occurs, a trial court must determine the parties' separate nonmarital and marital shares or interests in the property on the basis of the evidence before the court. Neither title nor the form in which property is held determines the parties' interests in the property ; rather, Kentucky courts have typically applied the "source of funds" rule to characterize property or to determine parties' nonmarital and marital interests in such property . The "source of funds rule" simply means that the character of the property, i.e., whether it is marital, nonmarital, or both, is determined by the source of the funds used to acquire the property .
Sexton v. Sexton , 125 S.W.3d 258, 264-65 (Ky. 2004) (citing Travis v. Travis , Ky., 59
S.W.3d 904 (2001), internal quotation marks omitted) . This is in accord with KRS
403.190(2), which provides that
For the purposes of this chapter, "marital property" means all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage except: (a) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent during the marriage and the income derived therefrom unless there are significant activities of either spouse which contributed to the increase in value of said property and the income earned therefrom ; (b) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent; . . . (d) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties ; and (e) The increase in value of property acquired before the marriage to the extent that such increase did not result from the efforts of the parties during marriage .
George contends that the five tracts of realty transferred to the Gripshover Family
Limited Partnership #1 were excluded from the marital estate by valid agreement of the
parties and thus that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that Darlene was entitled
to a distributive share of them. As the Court of Appeals suggested, fraudulent or
dissipative transfers of marital property may be avoided or otherwise counteracted so as to vindicate a spouse's interest in support or in an equitable division of the marital
estate . Barriger v. Barriger, 514 S.W.2d 114 (Ky. 1974) ; Harlev v. Harlev , 255 Ky. 370,
74 S .W .2d 195 (1934) ; May v. May, 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 193,109 S .W. 352 (1908); Solomon
v. Solomon , 857 A.2d 1109 (Md . 2004); Hofmann v. Hofmann, 446 N .E .2d 499 (III.
1983). See Lee R. Russ, "Divorce-Dissipation of Assets," 41 ALR 4th 416(1985)and
J . R. Kemper, "Inter Vivos Trust--Impairing Spouse's Right," 39 ALR 3rd 14 (1971) .
Generally, however, a finding of fraud or dissipation requires that the challenged
transfer be made in contemplation of divorce with the intent to impair the other spouse's
interest. See Russ and Kemper, supra . See also, Robinette v. Robinette , 736 S .W.2d
351 (Ky. App . 1987) (dissipation). Here, as the trial court found and as the Court of
Appeals agreed, there was no evidence that either party was contemplating divorce in
May 2001, at the time the estate plan was executed, nor was there any evidence that
George sought to impair Darlene's marital rights. On the contrary, the trial court
expressly found that Darlene had not been defrauded of her rights but had joined in the
estate plan knowingly and voluntarily. As the Court of Appeals observed, substantial
evidence supports that finding, and Darlene does not challenge it.
The Court of Appeals erred, therefore, by ruling that Darlene retained an
equitable interest in the transferred realty . Darlene contends, however, that
notwithstanding her participation in the estate plan, the plan should be set aside
because George and Charlie have not surrendered control over the realty and so have
not truly given it to the irrevocable trust. The lack of a bona fide gift, she maintains,
renders the trust a sham . We note that Darlene did not join in her action the Gripshover
Family Limited Partnership #1, the other partners in the partnership, the trustee of the
George Gripshover Family Trust, or the beneficiaries of the trust, all of whom would be necessary parties to an action seeking to avoid either the partnership or the trust .
Contrary to Darlene's contention, it is clear that the parties' estate plan did not
contemplate an immediate transfer of the realty to the trust. The realty was transferred
to the partnership to be used by the partnership for partnership purposes, including
cooperation with the Gripshover Family Limited Partnership #2, the farming operation .
There was nothing objectionable or underhanded about the partnership's maintaining
control of the realty for that purpose, as clearly it is in the trust beneficiaries', (i.e. the
children's) interest that George and Charlie's farming business continue to thrive. The
realty was not transferred to the trust, but rather the partners' interests in the
partnership, their right to receive distributions of partnership profits and property . This
was a valuable present interest because the partnership owned the realty, and
partnership interests were irrevocably given to the trust, a valid gift for trust purposes .
As attorney Campbell explained, the gift of partnership interests permitted, or at least
was intended to permit, George and Darlene to maximize their tax-free giving to the
trust over the years and further sought to insure that upon dissolution of the partnership
George and Darlene's share of the partnership assets would pass automatically to the
trust. We agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals, therefore, that the estate
plan validly established both the Gripshover Family Limited Partnership #1 and the
George Gripshover Family Trust. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the realty
was subject to division as marital property.
II. The Trial Court Correctly Determined That George Retained a Nonmarital Interest in the Promissory Note.
We also reject Darlene's contention that the trial court erred when it awarded
George an approximately 32% nonmarital share of the $1,021,925 .00 promissory note .
The note, as explained supra, was acquired in January 2001 as part of the exchange for 10 the final portion of the Richwood property originally purchased in 1981 by George,
Charlie, their brother Tim, their sister Kathy, and their father. The property was
originally acquired for $347,201 .75 with a down payment of $86,800.44. Following the
father's death in December 1984, his one-fifth interest was distributed equally among all
nine siblings . Tim sold his interest to George, Charlie, and Kathy in 1986 . The other
siblings quit-claimed their interests (one forty-fifths) to the threesome in 1987. At the
time of the marriage, in June 1988, the outstanding mortgage on the Richwood property
was $197,908 .20 indicating a principal investment of $149,293.55 ($347,201 .75 -
$197,908 .20) . In August 1988 and February 1989 the threesome made additional
principal payments totaling $14, 486.10. The trial court determined that $2,489 .00 of
that amount was a marital contribution from George and Darlene (one third of the
$7,466 .79 February 1989 payment). The marital share, at that point, therefore, was
$2,489 .00 / ($149,293.55 + 14,486.10) or about 1 .5 percent. In April 1989 the three
siblings sold 78 .921 acres of the Richwood property for $205,000.00. They used the
proceeds to retire the outstanding indebtedness. The marital share remained 1 .5
percent.
In February 1994, Kathy sold her one-third interest in the remaining 204.5 acres
to George and Charlie for $175,000.00. The brothers acquired a $236,000.00 equity
loan to finance the purchase and used the additional amounts, apparently, for operating
and/or living expenses . The trial court ruled that the purchase from Kathy involved
marital funds and so deemed the 1/6 th interest (about 16.67%) George acquired from
her as marital . That purchase thus brought George and Darlene's marital portion to
about 18% of the total . Half of that, or about 9% ($92,999 .00), is the portion of the
promissory note the trial court awarded to Darlene . Darlene contends, however, that George's entire half of the promissory note
should have been deemed marital . She argues that because the other siblings
apparently quit-claimed their 1/45th interests to George, Charlie, and Kathy in 1987 for
no consideration except relief from their share of the debt, the property should be
regarded as having no equity at that point, and that all the equity, therefore, was
acquired after the marriage and solely as a result, so Darlene maintains, of the
$2,489 .00 marital contribution of February 1989. We agree with the Court of Appeals
that the trial court did not err when it rejected this argument. The siblings' transfer of
their small interests without consideration certainly does not compel a finding that they
regarded the property as having no equity, and even if they did that would not compel a
finding that the property in fact had no equity. On the contrary, the fact that a very short
time later, in April 1989, less than a third of the property sold for more than the
outstanding indebtedness adequately establishes, as the trial court found, that the
property steadily increased in value and that the increase was the result of economic
factors alone . The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly addressed George's
interest in the promissory note .
III. The Parties' Incomes Must Be Recalculated .
A. George should not have been allowed an alternative depreciation deduction .
We turn next to the trial court's awards of child support and maintenance . We
agree with the Court of Appeals that those awards must be revisited . Both awards
require consideration of the parties' incomes, and we share the Court of Appeals'
concern that the incomes were incorrectly determined . KRS 403 .212, the Child Support
Guidelines statute, defines "income" as "actual gross income of the parent if employed
to full capacity or potential income if unemployed or underemployed ." KRS 12 403.212(2)(a) . Subsection (2)(c) of that statute provides that
[f]or income from self-employment . . . or joint ownership of a partnership . . . "gross income" means gross receipts minus ordinary and necessary expenses required for self- employment or business operation . Straight-line depreciation, using Internal Revenue Service (IRS) guidelines, shall be the only allowable method of calculating depreciation expense in determining gross income .
26 U .S .C. § 179, a section of the United States Tax Code, permits business tax payers
to take an expense deduction for certain capital items up to a fixed maximum per year.
Otherwise the taxpayer would need to create a capital account for the items and
gradually depreciate them . Accordingly, George has appropriately used section 179
expense deductions in calculating his income for federal income tax purposes. In
determining George's income, the trial court relied on his federal adjusted gross income
and ruled that the section 179 deductions were appropriate adjustments to gross
receipts under KRS 403.212 . We agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court
erred in this conclusion. On its face, section 179 provides an alternative to standard,
straight line depreciation, which KRS 403.212(2)(c) expressly identifies as the "only
allowable method of calculating depreciation expense." On remand, therefore,
George's income should be recalculated in accordance with the statutory limitation on
depreciation .
B . The record does not support -the imputation of income to Darlene .
The trial court also erred in determining Darlene's income. As noted above, the
statute defines "income" as "potential income if [the parent is] unemployed or
underemployed ." Darlene testified that while living in Boone County during the months
leading up to the 2001 separation, she had worked four or five days per week for
regular house cleaning customers . She earned, she estimated, between $300 .00 and
13 $375 .00 per week. Her adjusted 2001 income for tax purposes, however, was only
$8,565 .00. At the time of the final hearing in November 2003, Darlene was earning less
than $100.00 per week from two regular house cleaning jobs. She testified that since
moving to Mason County in the summer of 2001 she had inquired about only two other .
cleaning positions, both of which offered substantially less than minimum wage . Her
impression, she stated, was that few people in largely rural Mason County had any
interest in hiring regular house cleaners and those who did were not prepared to pay
them enough to make the work profitable. The trial court deemed Darlene
underemployed and imputed income to her of $360.00 per week or more than
$18,000 .00 per year, nearly twice what Darlene had earned during any of the previous
four years.
KRS 403.212(2)(d) provides that
[i]f a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, child support shall be calculated based on a determination of potential income . . . Potential income shall be determined based upon employment potential and probable earnings level based on the obligor's or obligee's recent work history, occupational qualifications, and prevailing job opportunities and earnings levels in the community.
We agree with Darlene that the trial court's imputation of income did not take
adequately into account prevailing job opportunities, which were apparently much less
in Mason County than they had been in Boone County, or Darlene's very limited
occupational qualifications . Darlene was over fifty years old; had not worked outside
her home except as a part-time housecleaner for nearly twenty years ; had been in
special education classes for most of her schooling, which ended with the tenth grade;
and had health problems. In these circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion
by imputing to Darlene an income level well in excess of what she had achieved even
14 when much younger and in better health . On remand, therefore, the trial court must
redetermine both parties' incomes and recalculate child support accordingly . George's
income may not be based on section 179 expense deductions, and income should not
be imputed to Darlene without due consideration of all of the statutory factors .
IV. The Maintenance Award Must Be Reconsidered .
We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the parties' disparate post-divorce
circumstances require reconsideration of the family court's maintenance award .
Maintenance awards are governed by KRS 403 .200, which provides in pertinent part
that the court may grant a maintenance order
only if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance:
(a) Lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to h[er], to provide for h[er] reasonable needs; and (b) Is unable to support h[er]self through appropriate employment .
As this Court has noted, our statutory scheme envisions post-divorce rehabilitation :
KRS 403.200 seeks to enable the unemployable spouse to acquire the skills necessary to support himself or herself in the current workforce so that he or she does not rely upon the maintenance of the working spouse indefinitely .
Powell v. Powell, 107 S .W .3d 222, 224 (Ky. 2003). Accordingly, in fixing the amount
and duration of an award, the trial court is directed to consider all relevant factors
including:
(a) The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital property apportioned to h[er], and h[er] ability to meet h[er] needs independently, . . . ; (b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment ; (c) The standard of living established during the marriage ; (d) the duration of the marriage ; (e) The age, and the physical and emotional condition of the
15 spouse seeking maintenance ; and (f) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance .
KRS 403 .200(2). We have recognized, however, that the statutory goal of rehabilitation
will not always be attainable:
[I]n situations where the marriage was long term, the dependent spouse is near retirement age, the discrepancy in incomes is great, or the prospects for self-sufficiency appear dismal, our courts have declined to follow that policy [rehabilitation] and have instead awarded maintenance for a longer period or in greater amounts.
Powell, 107 S.W.3d at 224. We agree with the Court of Appeals that this may be such a
case.
While we cannot and do not say that the trial court's original maintenance award
amounted to an abuse of discretion, our ruling that the parties' incomes must be
redetermined and our clarification of the fact that George's continued benefit from the
partnership realty is a factor bearing on the maintenance determination change the
landscape enough to require that the maintenance award be revisited . On remand,
accordingly, the trial court must again determine a suitable amount and duration of
maintenance .
CONCLUSION
To conclude, the estate plan the parties adopted in May 2001 validly transferred
the five tracts of realty from the marital estate to the Gripshover Family Limited
Partnership #1, and validly transferred the parties' partnership interests to the George
Gripshover Family Trust. The Court of Appeals erred, therefore, to the extent that it
purported to subject the real estate to family court division. The Court did not err,
however, in ruling that the realty continued to bear importantly on the parties' post-
16 divorce circumstances or in holding that those circumstances call for a reassessment of
Darlene's maintenance and the child support awards . Accordingly, we reverse the
August 19, 2005 Opinion of the Court of Appeals to the extent that it calls for a new
property division, but affirm its remand to the trial court for a recalculation of the parties'
incomes, a corresponding recalculation of child support, and for reassessment of
Darlene's maintenance award .
All sitting, except Schroder, J., not sitting . All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT/ CROSS-APPELLEE GEORGE HENRY GRIPSHOVER :
David A. Koenig Dallas, Neace & Koenig 223 Main Street P.O . Box 6205 Florence, KY 41022-6205
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT DARLENE GRIPSHOVER:
D. Anthony Brinker Wehrman & Wehrman 301 Pike Street P.O. Box 1226 Covington, KY 41011 .