George Haiss Mfg. Co. v. Link Belt Co.

50 F.2d 450, 10 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 44, 1931 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1410
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in George Haiss Mfg. Co. v. Link Belt Co.. Read the opinion of the Court — 27 F.2d 397
District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania·Decided June 5, 1931·No. No. 3625·Published

Opinion

DICKINSON, J.

The master in this case was the late Cyrus N. Anderson, Esq. He well merited the very handsome tribute of respect paid to his memory by counsel who argued these exceptions at bar. In that tribute we wish to join. Indeed, we have that measure of appreciation of the painstaking care, industry and sound professional judgment of the master that if we differed with him on any conclusion he had reached, we would expect to be convinced that we were in error. None the less, we must follow the best judgment we can summon to our aid. The defendant has been convicted of a trespass upon the property rights of the plaintiff in that it has infringed the plaintiff’s reissued patent No. 15,515 for a wagon loader. The defendant, to do it justice, found itself in a difficult situation. The wagon loader of the plaintiff made an appeal to users which threatened the business of defendant unless it could give to those of its customers, who insisted upon having it, a wagon loader of this type. The defendant was advised, and easily persuaded, that it had the legal right to make and sell the wagon loader of the plaintiff. At all events it did [451]*451so. It does a very large and important business, approaching $70,000,000 a year, of which the wagon loader part is a small percentage. The manufacture and sale of these wagon loaders is on the other hand the mainstay of the business of the plaintiff. The appropriation by the defendant of the plaintiff’s property thus partakes of the nature of the injury done by the taker of the “ewe lamb” in the parable of the prophet. Under such circumstances the defendant could hope to eseape being called to a strict account for the injury done only by proving its right to sell these wagon loaders. In this it failed and is now called upon to make compensation for the wrong done. There is no remedial branch of the law more exposed to just criticism than that with which we now have to do. Cases will readily be recalled by any Patent lawyer in which infringements which touched only one feature of the infringer’s business have been followed by accounting consequences which were ruinous. Many other instances might be cited in which a successful patentee has not been able to recover from infringers an adequate return even for the expense of sustaining the validity of his patent. How unsatisfactory all attempts to find “cost” is illustrated by the attempts to find it as a basis for price fixing in the case of public utilities. An award of damages in patent infringement cases was found to be an inadequate remedy. It was deemed unjust that an infringer who had received large gains as the fruit of his trespass should be permitted to retain them. Hence the resort to the fiction that he was a trustee ex male-ficio for the injured and must account for his illicit gains. The application of this doctrine has been far from satisfactory. The Science of Economics is by no means an exact science at its best and theoretical expectations are often far removed from actual results. In a manufacturing business, even when restricted to one output, the truth is profits cannot be determined or calculated with anything approaching accuracy. Many such a business has been wrecked on the rocks of a faulty system of cost sheets. Any attempt to apportion costs among a number of products is futile. The experiences of years and of many shops has helped some by suggesting certain conventional allowances in cost estimates but none of them even pretend to reflect actual costs of production and of marketing. When they do good it is by way of a guard against an underestimate of cost. When a patented thing is sold in competition with other things, patented or unpatented, it is utterly impossible, except by convention, to determine how much of what is received from its sale is attributable to the patented feature. There are many things which contribute to the sale of a product and the price at which sold. One is the genius of the maker as an inventor and as a constructor. This gives what are called the merits of the thing sold, and in one sense of the word its value. The value however which yields profit is not this kind of value, but commercial value. Eew things, however good, will sell themselves. Another thing which contributes to profitable sales aside from the merits of the thing sold is the genius of salesmanship. Under modem business methods and conditions salesmanship is probably the most productive of all the things which have contributed to a profitable sale of anything. These wagon loaders formed less than two per cent, of the whole output of the defendant’s plant. We venture the very confident statement that the real cost of producing them cannot be determined. The defendant made no attempt to keep the cost separated from the cost of other products. It is therefore in the position of a trustee who has mingled the business of his cestui que trustent with his own.

Although the profits, as we -have said, cannot be told, there are some guides to a fair estimate of them. Some of these guides we have in the instant ease. One of them is a royalty or license fee charge, which the patentee has fixed. Having fixed this himself, it is safe to accept it as fair to him. This plaintiff has not fixed any royalty charge for the right to make and sell its wagon loader, but we do have something very much like this guide. Another help is that, as the plaintiff makes only wagon loaders, we do know the cost to it of making them. It is not a rash conclusion that the defendant could manufacture as economically as the plaintiff. Another help to us is that the defendant keeps books of account of the whole business done by it and has found what its profits are. Again, it is not a rash conclusion that its profits on the wagon loaders at least equalled its average profits on all its products, and it cannot complain if its word is taken for what these profits are.

It would not be fair to find that the infringing profits were the average profits of all products, if we knew what the profits on the infringing product were, but when the infringer has so commingled its business that no separation can be made, it is not unfair to hold him to the profits on the whole. The master has found profits of $2,393.41 on the [452]*452wagon loaders. If we follow the guides spoken of as fairly reliable, this sum would be increased to at least $40,000, and might be found to reach more than $50,000'. This difference is startling, and surely invites a close scrutiny of the defendant’s accounting figures. The scrutiny to which counsel for the plaintiffs have subjected the accounting figures of the master has raised the profits to over $70,000; counsel for defendant reduces the profits to less than nothing. We are almost persuaded that the figuring of one or the other is wrong, and perhaps both are wrong. The question before us is whether the master is in error. There was no need to trouble ourselves with those items in the accounting which both parties have accepted. We therefore attempted to go directly to the findings, which are the subject of exceptions. No one can go far in the quest of making up cost sheets on the manufacture of these wagon loaders without being convinced that sueh a quest is hopeless. The utter unreliability of any estimate of cost is shown by the accounting which the defendant has submitted. This accounting would show that in the manufacture and sale of ‘82 wagon loaders the defendant made not a profit, but a loss of over $62,500. That is to say, that there was a loss of over $750 on each one built. That the defendant would have been guilty of a trespass upon the rights of the plaintiff in order thereby to make a profit can be believed.

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George Haiss Mfg. Co. v. Link Belt Co., 50 F.2d 450, 10 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 44, 1931 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1410 (E.D. Pa. 1931).

50 F.2d 450 (George Haiss Mfg. Co. v. Link Belt Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.