George H. Clement v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Company

790 F.2d 1545, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 26003
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedJune 10, 1986
Docket85-3579
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 790 F.2d 1545 (George H. Clement v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
George H. Clement v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Company, 790 F.2d 1545, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 26003 (11th Cir. 1986).

Opinion

HILL, Circuit Judge:

This case presents the question whether, under Florida law, an insured’s claim against his insurer for bad faith failure to settle within the limits of his liability insurance policy survives an agreement which releases the insured from any liability beyond the limits of his policy. We also must decide whether an insured may maintain a breach of contract action against his insurer for damages beyond the limits of his policy for the insurer’s failure to settle a claim within the limits of coverage. The district court decided both questions in the negative. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant George H. Clement was insured by appellee under an automobile liability insurance policy when, on October 6, 1979, he was involved in an automobile accident with Michelle Flowers. Three years later, on November 2, 1982, Flowers’ attorney wrote to appellee to discuss his client’s personal injury claim against appellant. After hearing nothing from appellee, Flowers’ attorney wrote again on December 3, 1982, demanding coverage information pursuant to Fla.Stat.Ann. § 627.7264 (West 1984). Appellee then contacted Flowers’ attorney, initiating a series of communications between the lawyer and the insurance company.

Because all records of appellant’s coverage with appellee had been purged from its files, appellee was unable to confirm coverage. This rendered negotiations with Flowers’ attorney difficult, as the attorney conditioned his offer to settle the case for $10,000, the limit of appellant’s coverage, on verification of coverage by February 18. Coverage still had not been confirmed when Flowers filed suit against appellant in March of 1983. Shortly thereafter appellee was finally able to confirm coverage and offered to settle for $10,000 but Flowers, through her attorney, rejected the offer.

Appellant and Flowers then agreed to settle the litigation between them for $75,-000, with the understanding that appellant would not be personally liable for any sums in excess of the $10,000 that would be (and was) paid by appellee upon notification of the settlement. As part of the settlement, appellant agreed to prosecute a bad faith suit against appellee and assigned all of the benefits therefrom to Flowers. The written agreement between appellant and Flowers is reproduced as an appendix to this opinion.

In accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement, appellant instituted this action. Appellant sought recovery of the difference between the $75,000 judgment entered against him and the $10,000 already paid to Flowers by appellee on two legal theories — breach of contract and bad faith failure to negotiate a settlement. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the breach of contract action on the grounds that appellant’s only recourse was his bad faith *1547 action. That motion was granted by the district court. Appellee then filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining bad faith claim, which motion was granted by the district court. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Appellant’s amended complaint alleged separate claims against appellee claiming the insurer failed to deal in good faith with appellant and breached their contract of insurance. The historical facts out of which the claims arose are essentially identical. Because of the different theories of recovery asserted, however, the district court dismissed the two claims on different grounds. We will consider the breach of contract claim first.

I. The Breach of Contract Claim

Appellant alleges in his complaint that appellee “breached the contract of insurance by failing to timely verify that coverage existed for the plaintiff and by failing to timely respond to the offer to settle the claim of Michelle Flowers within the policy limits.” Appellant has not alleged a breach of a duty expressly assigned to the insurer in the contract of insurance, such as the duty to defend. Compare Caldwell v. Allstate Insurance Co., 453 So.2d 1187 (Fla.App.1984); Life Investors Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 422 So.2d 32 (Fla.App.1982); Thomas v. Western World Insurance Co., 343 So.2d 1298 (Fla.App.1977). Rather, appellant has alleged a breach of “the duty, not under the terms of the contract strictly speaking, but because of and flowing from it, to act honestly and in good faith toward the insured.” Auto Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852, 859 (Fla.1938). Thus, in order to recover damages in excess of the policy limits for appellee’s alleged failure to settle in a timely manner, appellant must prove bad faith or fraud. See, e.g., Thomas v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 424 So.2d 36, 38 (Fla.App.1982). Regardless of what it is labeled, appellant’s so-called breach of contract claim is, in substance, indistinguishable from his claim for failure to deal in good faith with the insured. 1 The district court thus correctly found no separate cause of action for breach of contract to exist and dismissed that claim.

II. The Bad Faith Claim

The Supreme Court of Florida has recently held that, “absent a prior assignment of the cause of action, once an injured party has released the tortfeasor from all liability, or has satisfied the underlying judgment, no [bad faith action for excess damages] may be maintained.” Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Cope, 462 So.2d 459 (Fla.1985). In Cope, the personal representative of a third party fatally injured in an automobile collision sought to recover from the insurer of a person who had been found liable to the estate that portion of the damages in excess of the insured’s policy limits that the representative had not yet recovered from other sources. Prior to filing suit, however, Cope had executed a release and satisfaction of judgment in favor of the insured. The release was not preceded or accompanied by an assignment to the injured party of any bad faith claim then existing in favor of the insured. The Florida Supreme Court held that the release barred a subsequent bad faith claim for excess damages, whether brought by the injured party or the insured.

*1548 Appellant argues that Cope does not bar his claim because the settlement agreement between appellant and the accident victim did not completely release the insured. Instead, Flowers simply agreed to withhold execution of the excess judgment against appellant’s assets and to satisfy the judgment at the conclusion of the bad faith action appellant agreed to prosecute. Appellant thus would have us characterize the settlement agreement not as a release, but as essentially an assignment of the bad faith claim to Flowers, which would not extinguish the claim under Cope.

The Supreme Court of Florida clearly held in Cope, however, that if an insured is no longer exposed to any loss in excess of the limits of his liability insurance policy, he no longer has any claim he might previously have had against his insurance company for bad faith failure to settle within policy limits.

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Bluebook (online)
790 F.2d 1545, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 26003, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/george-h-clement-v-prudential-property-casualty-insurance-company-ca11-1986.