BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs George Goff, David Heaton, and Terry Schertz are inmates at the Iowa State Penitentiary (ISP) in Fort Madison, Iowa. Asserting causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs allege that the conduct of visual body cavity (VBC) searches by ISP officials as a condition of any movement outside their living unit or before being taken outside the confines of the ISP violated their rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The District Court concluded that the VBC searches violated the Fourth Amendment. The court entered permanent injunctive relief prohibiting State officials from enforcing the VBC portion of their strip search policy except under limited circumstances. We reverse except as noted below.
I.
At the time of this suit, plaintiffs Goff, Heaton, and Schertz resided in ISP’s segregation units, which prison officials describe as “prison[s] within a prison.” Brief of Appellant at 26.1 In separate pro se complaints filed in February and March 1984, plaintiffs challenged the VBC search component of ISP’s strip search policy.2 The VBC search portion of the strip search policy basically applies when an inmate enters or leaves the institution or the cell-house if the inmate is in one of the segregation units, before and after contact visits or after exposure to general population inmates if the inmate is in a segregation unit, and any other time when there is a reasonable suspicion that an inmate is concealing contraband in a body cavity. See Policy No. 84-3-2-567(B)(10). The policy was implemented to insure that VBC searches are performed in a consistent and thorough manner. See Hearing Transcript at 70-71.3 On February 29, 1984, Goff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the enforcement of this policy. After an evidentiary hearing held on March 15, 1984, the District Court entered a preliminary [361]*361order prohibiting ISP officials from conducting VBC searches as part of their strip search procedure before or after visits with attorneys, clergy, or the prison ombudsman, and before going to or after coming from medical facilities, court appearances, or exercise areas. Goff v. Nix, 627 F.Supp. 808, 813 (1986) (order granting preliminary injunction).
In assessing the searches at issue under the Fourth Amendment, the District Court balanced the need for the VBC searches against the invasion of personal rights resulting from those searches. Id. at 810; see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). ISP officials asserted that the VBC searches were vital to maintaining the security of the institution and of crucial significance in stemming the introduction of drugs, weapons, and other contraband into ISP and in preventing the transfer of those items between prisoners. The court, however, noted that the inmates at ISP were refusing in some instances the opportunity to visit with their attorneys and to exercise or obtain medical care. The court attributed this to ISP’s VBC search policy. Goff, 627 F.Supp. at 811-12. The court’s analysis then led it to conclude that use of the VBC search technique had an adverse effect on the inmates’ exercise of their constitutional rights to access to the courts, to legal representation, and to adequate exercise and medical care. Id. at 812. In issuing the preliminary injunction, the court stated that the prison administrators’ security concerns “may well be exaggerated and that the exercise of the inmate’s constitutional rights must take precedence____ The defendants have not convinced the Court that the security goals achieved by the vbc searches are so critical as to outweigh the exercise of inmates’ constitutional rights.” Id. at 812-13. The court further observed that “the possible addition of a few extra correctional officers, while somewhat of a burden to the defendants, is clearly a more reasonable alternative than to engage in a practice the effect of which is to deny basic human rights.” Id. (footnote omitted).4
Subsequently, plaintiffs’ actions were consolidated for trial, after which the District Court entered a permanent injunction, affirming the earlier order but modifying it to permit ISP officials to conduct VBC searches of prisoners entering or leaving the University of Iowa Hospitals. The Court’s order also suggests that plaintiffs may have a claim for damages.5 In reaching this result, the District Court first held that prison inmates retain limited Fourth Amendment rights while incarcerated. Goff v. Nix, 626 F.Supp. 736, 741 (1984). The court then found, essentially for the reasons stated in the preliminary injunction, that the VBC searches were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 742-44. ISP officials appeal the District Court’s ruling, contending that the District Court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the VBC searches violated the inmates’ Fourth Amendment rights.6
II.
We begin by taking note of the repeated instruction that the Supreme Court has giv[362]*362en concerning judicial deference to the decisions of prison administrators. Although the Court has stated that “prisoners [must] be accorded those rights not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives of incarceration,” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3198, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984), the Court also has observed that “ ‘[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.’ ” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2804, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974) (citations omitted). In addressing claims that prison conditions or policies violate the Constitution,
courts must heed [the] warning that “[s]uch considerations are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.”
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540-41 n. 23, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1874-75 n. 23, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), quoting Pell, 417 U.S. at 827, 94 S.Ct. at 2806; see Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 583-85, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 3232, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (1984). The Court further noted that judicial deference to prison administrators should be “wide-ranging,” particularly in regard to “the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 547, 99 S.Ct. at 1878. Just this term, the Court stated that judicial deference to prison security measures extends “to prophylactic or preventive measures” and indicated that while this deference “does not insulate from review actions taken in bad faith and for no legitimate purpose, ... it requires that neither judge nor jury freely substitute their judgment for that of officials who have made a considered choice.” Whitley v. Albers, --- U.S. ---, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986).
The rationale for judicial deference has been explained by the fact that the management of corrections institutions is peculiarly the responsibility of the executive and legislative branches of government and by the fact that
courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism. Moreover, where state penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a further reason for deference to the appropriate prison authorities.
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974) (footnote omitted); see Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 548, 99 S.Ct. at 1878. Thus we must recognize the “limited scope” of our review of the policies and practices of State prison officials, Block, 468 U.S. at 589, 104 S.Ct. at 3234, and that their decisions are entitled to considerable deference by virtue of not only their expertise but also because of the proper role of federal courts in supervising state institutions. We are mindful that prison administrators and officials are constantly in close contact with the prison population and we believe that this entitles their views to significant weight. In addition, principles of federalism counsel that we accord State officials wide latitude in performing their legitimate duties.
Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an appellate court may set aside a district court’s findings of fact only if they are “clearly erroneous,” giving “due regard ... to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” To conclude that findings of fact are clearly erroneous, our review of the record must leave us with the “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). But we are also cognizant that to uphold the District Court’s ruling, there must be “substantial [363]*363evidence” to indicate that the prison officials exaggerated their response to the perceived security concerns when viewed in light of the “wide-ranging” deference prison officials must be accorded in these matters. With these considerations in mind, we now proceed to address the constitutionality of the VBC search policy under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
III.
ISP officials first assert that inmates do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in being free from VBC searches. In Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984), a prisoner claimed that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his prison cell entitling him to the protection of the Fourth Amendment. In rejecting this claim, the Court observed that
[a] right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal order. We are satisfied that society would insist that the prisoner’s expectation of privacy always yield to what must be considered the paramount interest in institutional security.
Id. at 527-28, 104 S.Ct. at 3201 (footnote omitted). Although the Supreme Court never has addressed the issue directly, ISP officials contend that the logical implication of Hudson is that prisoners do not retain an expectation of privacy in being free from VBC searches. We need not decide whether inmates have a Fourth Amendment interest in bodily privacy, however, because we conclude in any event that the searches here do not violate that Amendment.
IV.
Assuming for present purposes that the Fourth Amendment imposes some limitation on the ability of prison officials to conduct VBC searches of inmates, see Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 558, 99 S.Ct. at 1884, we first will set forth the general standards under which the challenged policies must be reviewed, and then will discuss the general and specific facts that we believe authorize the searches at issue here in light of those standards. The Fourth Amendment prohibits only those searches and seizures that are unreasonable. In Wolfish, the Supreme Court upheld a prison strip search policy that required all inmates, including pretrial detainees, to submit to a VBC inspection after every contact visit with someone from outside the institution. Justice Kehnquist, writing for the Court, stated that
[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment ... requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of the personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.
441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. at 1884. In applying this standard in Wolfish, the Court noted the serious security problems with which prison administrators must deal and commented upon the smuggling of contraband, including weapons and drags, into prisons by inmate attempts to secrete those items in body cavities. The Court observed that there was only one instance in the record to indicate that inmates were attempting to smuggle contraband into the institution in this fashion but believed that that fact “may be more a testament to the effectiveness of this search technique as a deterrent than to any lack of interest on the part of inmates to secrete and import such items when the opportunity arises.” Id. (footnote omitted).
Subsequently, in Block v. Rutherford, the Supreme Court highlighted the “limited scope of judicial inquiry under Wolfish ” in matters such as the one now before this Court. 468 U.S. at 589, 104 S.Ct. at 3234. In Block, one of the questions presented was whether prison inmates had a constitutional right to contact visits. In addressing [364]*364this question, the Court limited its inquiry to “whether the prohibition of contact visits is reasonably related to legitimate governmental objectives. More particularly, because there is no dispute that internal security of detention facilities is a legitimate governmental interest, our inquiry is simply whether petitioners’ blanket prohibition on contact visits ... is reasonably related to the security” of the facility. Id. at 586, 104 S.Ct. at 3232 (footnote omitted). This framework provides us some useful guidance in addressing the instant claims.
A.
We believe that the District Court in this case both misperceived the limited scope of its inquiry under Wolfish and failed to accord that decision the precedential value to which it is entitled. Although the District Court paid lip-service to the Wolfish decision, the court did not even superficially attempt to explain how the present case is distinguishable from Wolfish in striking the VBC search procedures at ISP as violative of the Fourth Amendment.
We are unable to perceive any distinguishing characteristics that would serve to differentiate this case from Wolfish. The District Court noted at the time it issued the preliminary injunction that prison officials could “recall few, if any, instances where contraband was actually intercepted via a vbc search, despite testimony that such searches have been going on in random fashion for a number of years____” Goff v. Nix, 627 F.Supp. at 812. We have two observations in regard to this statement. First, the Supreme Court in Wolfish specifically rejected this rationale for invalidating VBC searches. The Court stated that the failure of VBC searches to uncover contraband could be attributed more to the deterrent effect of the searches than to inmate lack of interest in smuggling contraband. See 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. at 1884-85. Inmate attempts to smuggle contraband in body cavities have been documented frequently. See Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. at 1884. Second, Warden Nix testified that the policy was implemented to replace discretionary searches because under the earlier policy “only the weak, the poor and those who [were] not prima donnas” were being searched and that the new policy provided consistency of application and thoroughness in the searches. Hearing Transcript at 70.7 We therefore are convinced that a valid reason prompted the implementation of the current policy and we are not inclined to upset it absent extremely persuasive reasons for doing so.
In balancing the interests articulated in Wolfish, we must weigh the need for the VBC searches against the intrusion upon the inmates’ personal rights that accompany those searches. The prison officials assert that the VBC searches are a necessary component of their overall security policy and essential for the safety of prison visitors, ISP personnel, and the inmates themselves. According to prison officials, these searches help to prevent the introduction of contraband into the prison and retard its transfer once already there. As in Block, “there is no dispute that internal security of detention facilities is a legitimate governmental interest,” and therefore our inquiry is simply whether the VBC search policy is reasonably related to the security of the prison. See 468 U.S. at 586, 104 S.Ct. at 3232.
The record in this case reflects what this Court and other courts know and long have acknowledged, namely that weapons, drugs, and other items of contraband are serious problems in our nation’s prisons. The director of security at ISP testified that a substantial portion of the contraband [365]*365at the prison is introduced through contact visitation.8 But the record also reveals that weapons and other potentially dangerous items such as handcuff keys are sometimes manufactured from materials already within the prison. See Hearing Transcript at 64. These considerations in particular deserve great weight in assessing the need for the VBC searches. The security concerns in this case are even greater in our view than those in Wolfish. Unlike the institution in Wolfish, ISP is a maximum security facility. The prisoners in this case are convicted felons instead of pre-trial detainees. The searches here apply in large part to inmates who are in segregation units because of their inability to conform to the prison rules. Moreover, the searches are not any more intrusive or demeaning than those in Wolfish.9
The public’s interest in safe and orderly prisons is significant. The public is entitled to some assurance that prisoners cannot easily take hostages or escape. See Block, 468 U.S. at 586-87, 104 S.Ct. at 3232-3233. The Supreme Court has taken judicial notice of the unauthorized use of narcotics and other drugs that currently plagues our penal institutions, id. at 588-89, 104 S.Ct. at 3234, and the high level of violent crime in our nation’s prisons. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526, 104 S.Ct. at 3200. It seems not unlikely that these two problems are in a significant sense related to one another and we are not inclined to question what we believe are the legitimate concerns of prison administrators who have made considered decisions concerning the measures necessary to protect the prison staff and the prisoners themselves and to preserve the order necessary for the prison effectively to perform its mission.
Against these legitimate and weighty concerns on the part of ISP administrators rests the invasion of the inmates’ personal rights. While YBC searches admittedly are intrusive and unpleasant, a prison inmate has a far lower expectation of privacy than do most other individuals in our society. Plaintiffs argue that the fact that they are challenging only the VBC search portion of the strip search policy and not, for example, the portion of the policy requiring the inmate to lift his genitals for inspection of the crotch area indicates the “particularly traumatic nature of an anal search in a prison setting.” Brief of Appellees at 10 n. [366]*3667.10 We think that this overstates the extent of the invasion of personal rights occasioned by these searches. The search is conducted in as private a location as security concerns will allow by an official of the same sex as the inmate. Policy No. 84-3-2-567(B). More importantly, the search is strictly a visual search unless either the contraband itself or evidence indicating the presence of contraband in that area is observable, in which case the inmate is held until he can be examined by a physician or a physician’s assistant. We simply fail to perceive how a distinction can be drawn between the anal and genital regions for Fourth Amendment purposes and, were we to uphold the injunction issued in the present case, could see no principled basis for not extending it to cover the genital region were some challenge mounted to that portion of the strip search policy. Such a result would disrupt well-established security procedures in our prison systems and would no doubt engender greatly increased attempts to smuggle contraband in what would have become specific bodily areas accorded a preferred position under the Fourth Amendment.
The District Court found that VBC searches are “ineffective in revealing contraband except in cases where a string or part of the item hidden is protruding from the anus or where signs such as excess lubricant, blood or feces are present.” 626 F.Supp. at 739. While this is unquestionably true, the record contains testimony indicating that contraband has been discovered in precisely this manner. Warden Frank Wood of the Oak Park Heights maximum security facility in Minnesota testified that there were “numerous occasions where we have ... had an inmate who believes after he has had a contact visit that he has safely made ... a keister stash ... and when he gets into the search area, he bends over and spreads his buttock ... and [you can] see what is there.” Hearing Transcript at 183. Additionally, we note that contraband would not necessarily have to be inserted to be transported in this area. We therefore need not find the District Court’s factual findings clearly erroneous to disagree with the Court’s ultimate conclusion concerning the efficacy of VBC searches, especially since it is clear that the court failed to give any weight whatsoever to the deterrent effect of a consistently applied VBC policy. See Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. at 1884.
As the foregoing analysis indicates, we believe the prison officials have articulated substantial reasons for their policy which clearly outweigh the minimal additional intrusion of the inmates’ personal rights resulting from the VBC searches. We therefore hold, based upon the general discussion above, that the VBC searches at ISP do not violate the Fourth Amendment.
V.
Within the framework of our general conclusions stated above, we now turn to the specifics of the injunction entered by the District Court. We will first consider those portions of the District Court’s order pertaining to movement of prisoners outside the confines of the institution or outside their cellblock in the case of inmates in the segregation units. We then will dis[367]*367cuss the District Court’s rulings concerning visitation and exercise.
The District Court’s injunction prohibits ISP officials from conducting VBC searches before transporting a prisoner to one of the University of Iowa Hospitals but allows VBC searches “upon arrival at the Hospital and before leaving the Hospital.” The injunction also prohibits VBC searches before or after trips to the prison infirmary or attendance at court dates “unless the inmate is out of restraints and actually beyond the visual supervision of ISP correctional officers.” The record contains evidence sufficient in our view to uphold the prison officials’ decision to conduct VBC searches in all these instances.
In regard to inmate trips to the University of Iowa Hospitals, the District Court distinguished between VBC searches “conducted before leaving the prison and those conducted upon arrival at the Hospital to lessen the burden” on the inmates’ constitutional right to medical treatment. 626 F.Supp. at 743. The court found that Hospital employees are able to determine when an inmate will be at the Hospital and can convey that information to friends or family of the inmate. The court noted that inmates are in the same areas of the facility as the general public and that they may come into contact with individuals who the guards do not know. Finally, the court determined that some examinations conducted at the Hospital were performed outside the presence of a guard.
Additionally, the record reveals that one of the named plaintiffs in this action, Terry Schertz, attempted to escape upon his arriving at the Hospital. When Schertz alighted from the van used to transport him to the Hospital, he “bolted,” leaving behind his restraints. The correctional supervisor at the Hospital testified that Schertz admitted having a handcuff key with which he removed his restraints but that he dropped it while running, although Schertz denied at the trial that he had a handcuff key. II Trial Transcript at 157-58, 188-89. In any event, the presence of contraband handcuff keys among the prison population is not disputed. See Defendant’s Exhibit N (disciplinary report on Plaintiff Heaton for possessing a handcuff key). Obviously, allowing searches only after arriving at the Hospital could not possibly prevent this type of escape.
In light of the legitimate and serious security concerns about transporting prisoners outside the institution, we cannot agree with the District Court’s order in regard to hospital trips. We have discussed the presence of both weapons and handcuff keys inside the institution. If prison officials are precluded from conducting VBC searches of inmates prior to transporting them to the hospital, those two items could combine to produce a very dangerous situation. An inmate’s ability to escape or take a hostage would be increased greatly. For example, if Plaintiff Schertz had possessed a weapon when he attempted to escape, he might not have been captured so easily. We believe that the prison administrators’ decision to conduct VBC searches prior to trips to the hospital is entitled to deference from the federal courts because of the significant evidence in this record supporting their judgment.
Although not strictly outside the confines of the prison, inmate visits to the prison infirmary pose similar if not identical concerns. The infirmary is outside the secure walls of the main prison. The District Court found that segregated inmates do not have access to general population inmates while at the infirmary and that they are in restraints and under constant supervision unless inconsistent with their treatment. The court concluded that the use of VBC searches before and after these visits was an exaggerated response to the security needs of the institution and stated that the searches had “the effect of keeping inmates with legitimate medical needs from visiting the infirmary.” 626 F.Supp. at 743. The court felt that “[a] prisoner should not have to choose between getting [368]*368medical relief and submitting to a vbc search.” Id. (footnote omitted).
While we are bound by the District Court’s factual findings, we are not bound by the conclusions of law that it derives from those findings. First, we do not believe that the inmates’ assertion that they are refusing, because of a particular prison policy, activities or services that enjoy some constitutional protection can serve to invalidate that policy if it is otherwise permissible. Second, we are convinced that, despite the seemingly close observation and restraint, prison officials have legitimate security concerns due to the availability of weapons and because the infirmary is not as secure as most other portions of the institution. This combination would make the infirmary a particularly attractive place for an inmate bent on escaping or taking a hostage. Further, prison officials testified that medical personnel at the infirmary are provided under contract and may not be as sensitive to security precautions as the prison administrators would desire. With these considerations in mind, we cannot say that there is the substantial evidence necessary to discount the concerns expressed by ISP officials.
Similarly, trips outside the confines of the prison for court appearances raise equally serious security problems. Friends or relatives of the inmate frequently are aware of court dates. While inmates may be well guarded and closely observed, the public nature of courts and the frequently crowded surroundings make the presence of a weapon that the inmate has managed to smuggle with him or that someone else has managed to secrete for him particularly dangerous. Again, substantial deference is owed to the judgment of the ISP administrators, and the record does not contain substantial evidence that would justify a court in substituting its judgment of the matter for theirs.
B.
The District Court ruled that the prison officials could continue to conduct VBC searches of inmates before and after contact visits except those with “attorneys, legal interns with a notarized letter of introduction from a licensed attorney, clergy, the prison chaplain, or representatives of the prison ombudsman’s office.” 626 F.Supp. at 747. The prison officials assert that VBC searches are equally necessary before and after these visits because an inmate might attack or take one of these individuals hostage and because of the possibility that one of these visitors might intentionally or inadvertently pass contraband to an inmate. The court found that “the chance that an inmate would wish to attack” one of these visitors “is exceedingly remote” and that “attorneys, clergy, chaplains, legal interns, and the ombudsman are not the type of people who smuggle contraband to inmates.” Id. at 740. The court found that surveillance in the visiting area would make it difficult for an inmate to hide contraband in his rectal cavity. In addition, the court believed that VBC searches before and after attorney visits “would have a chilling effect on the assertion of inmates’ legal rights” to access to the courts. Id. at 742.
We have already rejected earlier in this opinion, the elevation of the inmates’ interest in being free of these searches because of the activities that are allegedly affected by them, such as visits with an attorney. See supra part V.A. Moreover, we see little value in such broad generalizations as the District Court made in concluding that the visitors listed in the injunction are not the “type of people” who would smuggle contraband. There is nothing in the record to support this conclusion, and this is hardly the type of adjudicative fact of which a court properly may take judicial notice. See Fed.R.Evid. 201. The uncontroverted testimony presented at the hearing and at trial was that most of the contraband that enters ISP is introduced through the visiting room. This contraband nevertheless manages to escape detection despite the heavy surveillance, and the identity of the particular visitors who bring it in is un[369]*369known to the prison officials.11 As the Supreme Court remarked in Block, prison visitors easily can hide weapons, drugs, or other contraband in numerous ways and deliver them to an inmate despite constant surveillance. 468 U.S. at 586, 104 S.Ct. at 3233. Given the serious problems that accompany contact visitation, we do not believe that we have any constitutional authority selectively to disapprove of VBC searches of prisoners in this context based on the identity or occupation of their visitors. See id., 104 S.Ct. at 3232-33.
The prison officials testified that attorneys and clergy are admitted to the prison upon the presentation of their professional credentials and that the officials have no opportunity to conduct background checks or otherwise inquire about these visitors. The Supreme Court in Wolfish recognized that the VBC searches there were conducted after a contact visit with anyone from outside the facility, including attorneys. See 441 U.S. at 558, 99 S.Ct. at 1884; id. at 577, 99 S.Ct. at 1893 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Nothing in the record of this case gives us reason to avoid this aspect of Wolfish. Similarly, the Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2985, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), observed that “[t]he possibility that contraband will be enclosed in letters, even those from apparent attorneys, surely warrants prison officials’ opening the letters.” We doubt that we could find more clear indications absent direct instruction from the Supreme Court that the District Court’s ruling in this case in regard to attorney visits is incorrect. We also see no reason that this logic would not apply to visits with members of the clergy. Likewise, the District Court’s intuitive conclusion that inmates would not wish to attack these visitors or take them hostage cannot be sustained based on the record before us when weighed under the substantial evidence standard. The prison administrators’ concerns are not insignificant and we defer to their judgment on these matters.
For similar reasons, we cannot agree with the District Court that the conduct of VBC searches before and after visits with the prison chaplains and the ombudsman are unreasonable. The pre-visit searches serve to protect these officials from attacks and attempts to use them as hostages. As to the post-visit searches, although it may be true that the prison chaplains and the ombudsman are unlikely to be involved in smuggling contraband to prisoners, there is nothing in the record to suggest that prisoners could not obtain contraband from other sources during visits with the prison chaplains and the ombudsman, and we therefore defer to the judgment of the prison officials that post-visit VBC searches also should be conducted.
C.
The final portion of the District Court’s order that we review pertains to VBC searches of inmates in segregation status after their exercise periods. The prison authorities insist that these searches are necessary to prevent the passage of contraband. Inmates in segregation units are strip searched before being taken to exercise pens located near their cellhouses. Each inmate is handcuffed with his hands behind his back and is escorted by one or two officers to the exercise area. Each exercise pen, which has a concrete floor and is surrounded by cyclone fence, is searched each morning before inmates are brought there. At times, only one or two officers may be available to observe as many as sixteen inmates during exercise. [370]*370The exercise pens also are observable from one of the guard towers and the escorting guards assist in observing the inmates when they are not otherwise occupied.
The record shows that plaintiff Goff once received a disciplinary report for receiving contraband from an inmate in the general population who threw the item over the fence of the exercise area. One of the prison guards observed this incident. See Hearing Transcript at 133. We believe that because of the possibility of this type of activity the prison officials have a legitimate security concern in relation to the exercise periods for inmates in segregation units. This security interest is heightened by the fact that at times only one or two officers are available to observe as many as sixteen inmates. We cannot say that the record contains substantial evidence that VBC searches upon the inmates’ return from exercise will not deter or detect the passage of contraband.
VI.
Finally, our views are in full accord with the decisions of other appellate courts considering the constitutionality of VBC searches. In reviewing the ^oat-Wolfish case law from both our own and other circuits, we find two lines of cases. In one line of cases, courts routinely determine that VBC searches of prison visitors or pretrial detainees charged with traffic offenses or misdemeanors are unreasonable unless “reasonable suspicion” exists. See Smothers v. Gibson, 778 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1985) (prison visitor); Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556 (1st Cir.1985) (same); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739 (8th Cir.1985) (arrestee charged with violation of animal leash law); Stewart v. Lubbock County, Texas, 767 F.2d 153 (5th Cir.1985) (misdemeanor arrestees), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 106 S.Ct. 1378, 89 L.Ed.2d 604 (1986); Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1984) (minor traffic offense arrestee), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053, 105 S.Ct. 2114, 85 L.Ed.2d 479 (1985); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391 (10th Cir.1984) (same); Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668 (8th Cir.1982) (prison visitor). Our Circuit is among those courts that have adopted this approach and we express no disagreement with the results reached in these cases.
The second line of cases involves VBC searches of those who already have been convicted and who are incarcerated in facilities such as the one in the present case or of those who are pretrial detainees charged with felonies. We have found no appellate court decision declaring such searches unconstitutional. See Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217, 228 (7th Cir.1986) (“There is, moreover, no reason to think that the body-cavity search requirement has a significantly inhibiting effect on the motivation of inmates seeking access to legal materials.”); Dufrin v. Spreen, 712 F.2d 1084 (6th Cir.1983) (pretrial detainee charged with felonious assault); Arruda v. Fair, 710 F.2d 886 (1st Cir.1983) (convicted prisoner in segregation unit of maximum security facility), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 999, 104 S.Ct. 502, 78 L.Ed.2d 693 (1983). In Arruda, the First Circuit declined to invalidate a prison policy requiring VBC searches for inmates in the security unit of a maximum security prison when they enter or leave their unit. The policy resulted in the inmates being searched in situations strikingly similar to the situations presented in the instant case: visitation, exercise, trips to the prison library or infirmary, and movement outside the confines of the institution. See 710 F.2d at 886; id. at 889 (Maletz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). As in the instant case, these searches were conducted even though each inmate was shackled and accompanied by two guards any time the inmate moved from his cell. The court in Arruda stated that “we do not believe that the factual distinctions to which Arruda points are sufficient to allow us to depart from the Supreme Court’s result [in Wolfish ]. The injury to privacy interests is virtually identical; the “security needs” justification, in our view, is equally plausible.” Id. at 888. We agree with these views and find nothing in the record of this case that serves to [371]*371distinguish it in any significant sense from either Wolfish or Arruda.12
To our knowledge the only cases in which VBC searches have been struck down are three district court cases. We earlier indicated our disagreement with the decision in Sims v. Brierton, 500 F.Supp. 813 (N.D.Ill.1980), concerning VBC searches of inmates before and after visits with attorneys. See supra note 11. The court in Hurley v. Ward, 549 F.Supp. 174 (S.D.N.Y.1982), determined that routine VBC searches were unreasonable in all circumstances other than after contact visits. In Hodges v. Klein, 412 F.Supp. 896 (D.N.J. 1976), the court held that VBC searches of inmates in segregation units before leaving and after returning to the units were unreasonable. The court in Hodges permitted VBC searches of an inmate upon his entering or departing from the institution and after contact visitation. We are, of course, neither bound by these decisions nor do we find them persuasive. We believe that the record in this case and the legal considerations set forth above lead inexorably to the conclusion that the VBC searches here at issue must be sustained.
VII.
In their complaints plaintiffs also allege violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. These allegations, however, were not explicitly addressed at trial and the plaintiffs have not raised these contentions on appeal. Therefore we address them only briefly. The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual” punishments. The Supreme Court has construed this language to proscribe punishments which inflict “unnecessary and wanton” pain or that “are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2398-99, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) (citations omitted). The Court has indicated that
conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety____ It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock.
Whitley, 106 S.Ct. at 1084. We find nothing in the record here that would support a finding of a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Similarly, we do not find anything in the record that would support a finding of a violation of the due process clause. We therefore reject any claim that the VBC aspect of the ISP strip search policy violates these amendments.
VIII.
Although we are acutely aware of the role of the federal courts in safeguarding constitutional rights, absent constitutional violations it is not the business of the federal courts to interfere with the management of state prison systems. The federal courts are not licensed to protect an amorphous set of “basic human rights” from state action, but only those rights that are rooted firmly in the Constitution. For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and vacate the injunction except insofar as it prohibits [372]*372the verbal harassment of inmates during VBC searches.