George E. Chatfield v. Clerk of the District Court Us Attorney

961 F.2d 219, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18267, 1992 WL 78077
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedApril 16, 1992
Docket91-1405
StatusPublished

This text of 961 F.2d 219 (George E. Chatfield v. Clerk of the District Court Us Attorney) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
George E. Chatfield v. Clerk of the District Court Us Attorney, 961 F.2d 219, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18267, 1992 WL 78077 (10th Cir. 1992).

Opinion

961 F.2d 219

NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored, unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or further order.

George E. CHATFIELD, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
CLERK OF the DISTRICT COURT; US Attorney, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 91-1405.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

April 16, 1992.

Before SEYMOUR, STEPHEN H. ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

STEPHEN H. ANDERSON, Circuit Judge.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

George E. Chatfield appeals the dismissal of his "Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Compell [sic] Respondents to Pay Witness Fees Prescribed by United States Statutes" by which he seeks witness fees pursuant to the authority of Demarest v. Manspeaker, 111 S.Ct. 599 (1991).

Upon a careful review of the record, including the pleadings and arguments of the petitioner, we affirm substantially on the grounds and for the reasons set forth in the district court's Order of Dismissal filed November 8, 1991, a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by this reference.

AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

ATTACHMENT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 91-F-1954

George E. Chatfield, Petitioner,

v.

Clerk of the District Court and the U.S. Attorney, Respondents.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

(Nov. 8, 1991)

SHERMAN G. FINESILVER, Chief Judge

Plaintiff George E. Chatfield currently is in the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections at Shadow Mountain Correctional Facility, Canon City, Colorado. He has tendered a pro se complaint in the nature of mandamus pursuant to the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976), and Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(b). He also has tendered a motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1966 & Supp.1991). The motion is granted. The complaint is filed. It will not, however, be served on defendants.

Mr. Chatfield claims that, under Demarest v. Manspeaker, 111 S.Ct. 599 (1991), he is entitled to the payment of $630.00 for serving as a witness to the defendant in United States v. Tippett, No. 87-Cr-386 (D.Colo. Apr. 15, 1988), which was consolidated on appeal with Demarest v. Manspeaker, 884 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir.1989). He asks that this court direct its clerk to pay him the fees allegedly owed.

I. FACTS

Mr. Chatfield states that, when he was an inmate at Fremont Correctional Facility in Canon City, he was subpoenaed by Mr. Tippett to serve as a witness in No. 87-CR-386. He further states that he was transported by the United States Marshal's Office on March 3, 1991, to Denver County, Colorado, Jail, by writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, and held there for the purpose of giving testimony until March 24, 1988, when he was returned to the prison.

He contends that, at his request, the attorney appointed by the court to represent him attempted to obtain witness fees, and that the request was denied by the United States Attorney's Office in Denver and by the clerk of this court. He asserts that he asked the attorney to appeal from that denial, and alleges that "apparently he did not." Mr. Chatfield argues that, since Mr. Demarest, who also was a witness at the trial, did appeal from this court's denial of witness fees, and since the United States Supreme Court found that Mr. Demarest was entitled to such fees, that plaintiff, too, should be entitled to such fees.

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

A complaint must stand unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts to support his claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1526 (10th Cir.1988). This is especially true when the complaint is pro se. However inartfully drafted, a pro se complaint is held to a less stringent standard than a formal pleading drafted by a lawyer. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir.1979).

Demarest v. Manspeaker, 111 S.Ct. 599 (1991), rev'g, 884 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir.1989), held that a convicted state prisoner who testified at a federal trial pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum is entitled to the payment of witness fees. As previously stated, Mr. Chatfield claims that, under Demarest v. Manspeaker, he, too, is entitled to such payment. He requests that the court order its clerk to pay him the witness fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821(a)(1)1 and 1825(a)2, (b)(2)3 (Supp.1991).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, a federal district court has jurisdiction of a mandamus action "to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." Section 1361 is intended to provide a remedy for a plaintiff only if he has exhausted all other avenues of relief and only if the defendants owe him a clear nondiscretionary duty. Hecker v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1984). "[T]he remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations." Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980) (citations omitted).

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Related

Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Scheuer v. Rhodes
416 U.S. 232 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc.
449 U.S. 33 (Supreme Court, 1980)
Heckler v. Ringer
466 U.S. 602 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Demarest v. Manspeaker
498 U.S. 184 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Coleman v. Thompson
501 U.S. 722 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Wilder v. Prokop
846 F.2d 613 (Tenth Circuit, 1988)
Demarest v. Manspeaker
884 F.2d 1343 (Tenth Circuit, 1989)
Hall v. Bellmon
935 F.2d 1106 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
961 F.2d 219, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18267, 1992 WL 78077, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/george-e-chatfield-v-clerk-of-the-district-court-u-ca10-1992.