George Duggan v. Department of Defense

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided February 2, 2015·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

GEORGE DUGGAN, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-1221-14-0544-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: February 2, 2015 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NO NPRECEDENTIAL 1

John Ota, Esquire, Alameda, California, for the appellant.

Mark Hostetter, Esquire, San Jose, California, for the appellant.

Kenya M. Gregory, Esquire, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed without prejudice his individual right of action appeal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add sign ificantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. See Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, and based on the following points and authorities, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by this Final Order, 2 we AFFIRM the initial decision. ¶2 On May 7, 2014, the appellant filed this appeal alleging retaliation for whistleblowing. See Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1. On August 22, 2014, the administrative judge dismissed the appeal without prejudice after the parties jointly requested postponement for the purpose of concluding discovery. IAF, Tab 25, Initial Decision (ID) at 2-3. In the initial decision, the administrative judge also ruled on motions to compel brought by both parties. ID at 1-2; see IAF, Tabs 14, 17. He denied as moot the agency’s motion to compel and granted the appellant’s motion in part. ID at 1-2. He limited the scope of production for some of the appellant’s document production requests, and he denied others. He also denied some of the appellant’s interrogatories. ID at 2. Additionally, he set deadlines for discovery and the filing of prehearing submissions. ID at 3. He scheduled redocketing for October 20, 2014, and the hearing for November 18 through 20, 2014. ID at 3. The appellant filed this petition for review on

2 The administrative judge erroneously included mixed-case appeal rights pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 7702(b)(1) and 7703(b)(1). We have corrected the notice of appeal rights. 3

September 26, 2014, however, and the case has not been refiled. See Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. ¶3 The petition for review does not address the administrative judge’s dismissal of the appeal. Instead, he contends that the administrative judge abused his discretion by denying some parts of his July 15, 2014 Motion to Compel Further Responses to Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents. See IAF, Tab 14. He contends that the agency waived any possible objections to his requests for production of documents by untimely serving its response. See PFR File, Tab 1 at 10. Even if the agency’s response had been timely, he argues, the administrative judge abused his discretion by denying the discovery of evidence relevant to his whistleblower claim. Id. at 10-15. Regarding the request for interrogatories, the appellant contends that the agency “refus[es] to provide any responsive information” and that none of the agency’s responses are “verified or signed,” as required by Rule 33(b)(3), (5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 16. The appellant requests that the Board remand the appeal to the administrative judge for adjudication “with instructions directing [him] to order the Agency to provide all of the documents requested by Appellant . . . and complete, non-evasive responses to Appellant’s Interrogator[ies].” Id. at 4. ¶4 The appellant’s pleading most closely resembles a motion for an interlocutory appeal, and the Board will consider it on that basis. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.91 (“An interlocutory appeal is an appeal to the Board of a ruling made by a judge during a proceeding.”); cf. Special Counsel v. Woods, 26 M.S.P.R. 463, 464 (1985) (a pleading entitled “Petition for Mandamus” seeking review of administrative law judge’s stay order would be considered under Board rules governing interlocutory appeals). As such, the motion is improperly filed with the Board as well as untimely. Board regulations require parties seeking interlocutory review to “file a motion for certification within 10 days of the date of the ruling to be appealed” with the administrative judge. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.93(a). 4

¶5 The appellant did not file a motion for certification with the administrative judge within 10 days after the initial decision was issued. He instead filed a timely petition for review on the last day of the filing period. See PFR File, Tab 1 at 1; ID at 1, 3; see also 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e). Accordingly, the Board will not consider his uncertified motion for an interlocutory appeal. 3 See, e.g., Sparrow v. Department of the Navy, 26 M.S.P.R. 335, 336 n.* (1985). Because the appellant has expressed a clear intention to pursue adjudication of his appeal, however, we FORWARD the appeal to the regional office for immediate refiling. See PFR File, Tab 1 at 4, 18-19.

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the Board's final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You have the right to request the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to review this final decision. The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time.

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George Duggan v. Department of Defense, (Miss. 2015).

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