Affirmed as Modified; Opinion Filed June 8, 2015.
In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-13-00752-CR No. 05-13-00753-CR
GEORGE CONTRERAS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. F-1231118-S & F-1231119-S
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Fillmore, Stoddart, and Whitehill1 Opinion by Justice Stoddart A jury convicted George Contreras of possession with an intent to deliver
methamphetamine and possession of marijuana and found the offenses were committed in a
drug-free zone. The jury assessed punishment of fourteen years’ confinement and a $10,000 fine
for the methamphetamine offense, cause number 05-13-00752-CR, and four years’ confinement
and a $10,000 fine for the marijuana offense, cause number 05-13-00753-CR. In a single issue,
Contreras argues the State failed to timely notify him of amended punishment enhancement
allegations. In a single cross-issue, the State argues the judgment should be reformed to reflect
the fine orally pronounced by the trial court in cause number 05-13-00753-CR. We affirm the
1 Justice Bill Whitehill succeeded Justice Kerry FitzGerald, retired. Justice Whitehill has read the briefs and reviewed the record and now serves as a member of the panel. trial court’s judgment in cause number 05-13-00752-CR. We modify the trial court’s judgment
in cause number 05-13-00753-CR, and affirm as modified.
Contreras was indicted for possession of methamphetamine with an intent to deliver and
possession of marijuana. Both indictments alleged the offenses were committed “in, on, or
within 1,000 feet of any real property that is owned, rented or leased to a school or school
board.” Before trial, the State filed a Notice of Intent to Seek Finding of Offense Committed in
Drug-Free Zone in each cause number (Notice). Each Notice reflected the State’s intention to
offer evidence “that the offense charged in the indictment was committed in, on, or within 1,000
feet of a playground.” On appeal, Contreras argues the State failed to timely provide the Notices
to him.
On Tuesday, May 7, 2013, six days prior to trial, the State filed the Notices in OnBase,
the electronic case management system for Dallas County’s criminal courts. Each Notice
included a signed certificate of service stating: “[A] copy of this motion was emailed to attorney
for [Contreras], on May 7, 2013.” The State emailed the Notices to Contreras’s counsel; the
subject line of the email was: “motions service including amended dfz motion and dfz motion on
the PCS Meth case.” Contreras’s counsel was able to read the subject line of the email, but
stated he was unable to open the attachment with the electronic copies of the Notices.
On Monday, May 13, 2013, jury selection began and the State provided Contreras’s
counsel with paper copies of the Notices. Counsel complained about receiving the Notices on
the first day of trial. Responding to his concerns, the trial court stated it would quash the jury
panel and instructed the parties to return the following morning for jury selection. The trial court
stated he would delay the trial to “give [counsel] an opportunity to this afternoon . . . to scout”
out the location of the playground alleged in the Notices.
–2– The following day, May 14, 2013, the trial court began jury selection again with a new
venire. On May 15, 2013, Contreras’s counsel again complained the Notices were not provided
to him in a timely fashion. In response, the State provided a printout from OnBase showing the
Notices were filed on May 7, as well as the email sent to Contreras’s counsel. While
acknowledging the State’s assertion that the Notices were filed in OnBase on May 7, 2013, and
that he received an email from the State about the Notices, Contreras’s counsel again argued he
was unable to open the attachment to the email and, therefore, did not receive timely notice.
Contreras’s counsel requested a ten-day continuance “so that I can prepare an expert to go out
and measure that [the distance between the playground the site of the offense] myself. . . I think
the exact distance is something that can be in dispute.” The trial court stated: “I did dismiss the
jury panel mid-afternoon Monday [when] this first flared up and - - I think I said so probably
give [sic] you an opportunity to make more investigation on the school zone site overnight. You
represented, I believe, you had already been out there to the location.” Counsel agreed he visited
the location. The trial court continued: “And so I recessed, gave you that opportunity to do that.
So that was the purpose behind that, obviously.” The trial court did not grant a continuance.
Contreras’s two cases were tried together. The guilt-innocence stage of trial began on
May 15, 2013, and concluded on May 20, 2013, recessing two days for the weekend. At trial,
the State presented evidence concerning the proximity between the house where Contreras
conducted drug sales and the playground. After the State rested its case-in-chief, Contreras’s
counsel re-urged his objection to the timeliness of the Notices for the third time. He also
requested the trial court exclude the special issue asking the jury to determine whether Contreras
committed the offenses within 1,000 feet of a playground from the jury charge. The trial court
overruled the objection. The jury found Contreras committed the offenses within 1,000 feet of a
playground.
–3– In a single issue, Contreras argues the State failed to timely notify him of its amended
enhancement allegations, which impaired his defense. While the indictment alleged the offenses
were committed within 1,000 feet of property owned, rented, or leased to a school or school
board, the Notices alleged the offenses were committed within 1,000 feet of a playground. A
school and a playground are drug-free zones. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.134
(West Supp. 2014). When certain offenses are committed in drug-free zones, punishment may
be enhanced. See id. The Texas Health and Safety Code does not specify when a notice of
intent to seek a drug-free zone finding must be given or the required manner of notice. See id.
The record shows the State filed its Notices in OnBase and emailed the Notices to
Contreras’s counsel on May 7, 2013. Although Contreras’s counsel was unable to open the
attachment, Contreras’s counsel conceded he could read the subject line of the email: “motions
service including amended dfz motion and dfz motion on the PCS Meth case.” There is no
indication in the record that Contreras’s counsel contacted the State and requested the email
attachments be re-sent or that he was unable to access the Notices via OnBase.
Additionally, voir dire with the first jury panel began on May 13, 2015, six days after the
State filed the Notices in OnBase and emailed them to Contreras’s counsel. Even in light of the
passage of six days between the State notifying counsel and the beginning of the trial, the trial
court quashed the original jury panel and recessed the case so that Contreras’s counsel could
investigate the merits of the amended allegations in the Notices. The trial court did not resume
jury selection until May 15, 2015, eight days after the State filed the Notices in OnBase and
emailed them to Contreras’s counsel.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Affirmed as Modified; Opinion Filed June 8, 2015.
In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-13-00752-CR No. 05-13-00753-CR
GEORGE CONTRERAS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. F-1231118-S & F-1231119-S
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Fillmore, Stoddart, and Whitehill1 Opinion by Justice Stoddart A jury convicted George Contreras of possession with an intent to deliver
methamphetamine and possession of marijuana and found the offenses were committed in a
drug-free zone. The jury assessed punishment of fourteen years’ confinement and a $10,000 fine
for the methamphetamine offense, cause number 05-13-00752-CR, and four years’ confinement
and a $10,000 fine for the marijuana offense, cause number 05-13-00753-CR. In a single issue,
Contreras argues the State failed to timely notify him of amended punishment enhancement
allegations. In a single cross-issue, the State argues the judgment should be reformed to reflect
the fine orally pronounced by the trial court in cause number 05-13-00753-CR. We affirm the
1 Justice Bill Whitehill succeeded Justice Kerry FitzGerald, retired. Justice Whitehill has read the briefs and reviewed the record and now serves as a member of the panel. trial court’s judgment in cause number 05-13-00752-CR. We modify the trial court’s judgment
in cause number 05-13-00753-CR, and affirm as modified.
Contreras was indicted for possession of methamphetamine with an intent to deliver and
possession of marijuana. Both indictments alleged the offenses were committed “in, on, or
within 1,000 feet of any real property that is owned, rented or leased to a school or school
board.” Before trial, the State filed a Notice of Intent to Seek Finding of Offense Committed in
Drug-Free Zone in each cause number (Notice). Each Notice reflected the State’s intention to
offer evidence “that the offense charged in the indictment was committed in, on, or within 1,000
feet of a playground.” On appeal, Contreras argues the State failed to timely provide the Notices
to him.
On Tuesday, May 7, 2013, six days prior to trial, the State filed the Notices in OnBase,
the electronic case management system for Dallas County’s criminal courts. Each Notice
included a signed certificate of service stating: “[A] copy of this motion was emailed to attorney
for [Contreras], on May 7, 2013.” The State emailed the Notices to Contreras’s counsel; the
subject line of the email was: “motions service including amended dfz motion and dfz motion on
the PCS Meth case.” Contreras’s counsel was able to read the subject line of the email, but
stated he was unable to open the attachment with the electronic copies of the Notices.
On Monday, May 13, 2013, jury selection began and the State provided Contreras’s
counsel with paper copies of the Notices. Counsel complained about receiving the Notices on
the first day of trial. Responding to his concerns, the trial court stated it would quash the jury
panel and instructed the parties to return the following morning for jury selection. The trial court
stated he would delay the trial to “give [counsel] an opportunity to this afternoon . . . to scout”
out the location of the playground alleged in the Notices.
–2– The following day, May 14, 2013, the trial court began jury selection again with a new
venire. On May 15, 2013, Contreras’s counsel again complained the Notices were not provided
to him in a timely fashion. In response, the State provided a printout from OnBase showing the
Notices were filed on May 7, as well as the email sent to Contreras’s counsel. While
acknowledging the State’s assertion that the Notices were filed in OnBase on May 7, 2013, and
that he received an email from the State about the Notices, Contreras’s counsel again argued he
was unable to open the attachment to the email and, therefore, did not receive timely notice.
Contreras’s counsel requested a ten-day continuance “so that I can prepare an expert to go out
and measure that [the distance between the playground the site of the offense] myself. . . I think
the exact distance is something that can be in dispute.” The trial court stated: “I did dismiss the
jury panel mid-afternoon Monday [when] this first flared up and - - I think I said so probably
give [sic] you an opportunity to make more investigation on the school zone site overnight. You
represented, I believe, you had already been out there to the location.” Counsel agreed he visited
the location. The trial court continued: “And so I recessed, gave you that opportunity to do that.
So that was the purpose behind that, obviously.” The trial court did not grant a continuance.
Contreras’s two cases were tried together. The guilt-innocence stage of trial began on
May 15, 2013, and concluded on May 20, 2013, recessing two days for the weekend. At trial,
the State presented evidence concerning the proximity between the house where Contreras
conducted drug sales and the playground. After the State rested its case-in-chief, Contreras’s
counsel re-urged his objection to the timeliness of the Notices for the third time. He also
requested the trial court exclude the special issue asking the jury to determine whether Contreras
committed the offenses within 1,000 feet of a playground from the jury charge. The trial court
overruled the objection. The jury found Contreras committed the offenses within 1,000 feet of a
playground.
–3– In a single issue, Contreras argues the State failed to timely notify him of its amended
enhancement allegations, which impaired his defense. While the indictment alleged the offenses
were committed within 1,000 feet of property owned, rented, or leased to a school or school
board, the Notices alleged the offenses were committed within 1,000 feet of a playground. A
school and a playground are drug-free zones. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.134
(West Supp. 2014). When certain offenses are committed in drug-free zones, punishment may
be enhanced. See id. The Texas Health and Safety Code does not specify when a notice of
intent to seek a drug-free zone finding must be given or the required manner of notice. See id.
The record shows the State filed its Notices in OnBase and emailed the Notices to
Contreras’s counsel on May 7, 2013. Although Contreras’s counsel was unable to open the
attachment, Contreras’s counsel conceded he could read the subject line of the email: “motions
service including amended dfz motion and dfz motion on the PCS Meth case.” There is no
indication in the record that Contreras’s counsel contacted the State and requested the email
attachments be re-sent or that he was unable to access the Notices via OnBase.
Additionally, voir dire with the first jury panel began on May 13, 2015, six days after the
State filed the Notices in OnBase and emailed them to Contreras’s counsel. Even in light of the
passage of six days between the State notifying counsel and the beginning of the trial, the trial
court quashed the original jury panel and recessed the case so that Contreras’s counsel could
investigate the merits of the amended allegations in the Notices. The trial court did not resume
jury selection until May 15, 2015, eight days after the State filed the Notices in OnBase and
emailed them to Contreras’s counsel.
Based on this record, we conclude that Contreras failed to establish that his ability to
present a defense was impaired by the timing of the State’s Notices. Even if Contreras had a
defense to the drug-free zone allegation, he had sufficient time to develop that defense.
–4– Contreras’s counsel was notified six days prior to the beginning of trial that the State intended to
seek a punishment enhancement based on distance of the offenses to a playground. Additionally,
the trial court quashed the original jury panel and recessed for the purpose of allowing
Contreras’s counsel to visit the location of the playground, which he did. Voir dire did not begin
again until May 15, 2013. Finally, Contreras’s counsel did not rest his case until May 20, 2013,
nearly two weeks after he originally was notified of the Notices and one week after he received
paper copies of the Notices. Contreras’s counsel had sufficient time to investigate whether the
playground was within 1,000 feet of the site of the offense and to develop a defense to the drug-
free zone allegations. We overrule Contreras’s sole issue.
In a single cross-issue, the State asserts the jury assessed a $10,000 fine in the marijuana
case and the trial court orally pronounced this fine. However, the written judgment does not
reflect the fine. The State requests that we modify the judgment to reflect a $10,000 fine.
This Court has the authority to correct the trial court’s judgment to make the record speak
the truth when it has the necessary data and information to do so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b);
Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d
526, 529–30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). The record reflects that the jury assessed a
$10,000 fine in the marijuana case and the trial court orally pronounced the fine as part of
Contreras’s sentence. The judgment, with the assessed sentence, is the written declaration and
embodiment of the oral pronouncement. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.01, § 1 (West
Supp. 2013). When the oral pronouncement of a sentence and the sentence in the written
judgment conflict, the oral pronouncement controls. Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004).
–5– Because the jury’s sentence included a $10,000 fine and the trial court pronounced the
fine, we modify the judgment in cause number 05-13-00753-CR to reflect that a $10,000 fine
was assessed by the jury and orally pronounced by the trial court.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment in cause number 05-13-00752-CR. We modify the
trial court’s judgment in cause number 05-13-00753-CR, and affirm as modified.
/ Craig Stoddart/ CRAIG STODDART JUSTICE
Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47 130752F.U05
–6– Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
GEORGE CONTRERAS, Appellant On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas No. 05-13-00752-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F-1231118-S. Opinion delivered by Justice Stoddart. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Fillmore and Whitehill participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 8th day of June, 2015.
–7– Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
GEORGE CONTRERAS, Appellant On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas No. 05-13-00753-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F-1231119-S. Opinion delivered by Justice Stoddart. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Fillmore and Whitehill participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED to reflect the $10,000 pronounced by the trial court. As modified, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
–8–