George Chapman, Jr. v. Deutsche Bank National Trust

Ninth Circuit

George Chapman, Jr. v. Deutsche Bank National Trust

649 F. App'x 638

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedMay 13, 2016

Docket14-15927

StatusUnpublished

This text of 649 F. App'x 638 (George Chapman, Jr. v. Deutsche Bank National Trust) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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George Chapman, Jr. v. Deutsche Bank National Trust, 649 F. App'x 638 (9th Cir. 2016).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

1. The district court had jurisdiction to dismiss George and Brenda Chapman’s wrongful foreclosure and quiet title claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A panel of this court previously vacated the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over these claims because an unlawful detainer claim concerning the same res had been filed earlier and was pending in state court at the time of removal. See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311, 126 S.Ct. 1735, 164 L.Ed.2d 480 (2006). However, the panel also remanded the case to the district court with instructions that it could choose to proceed if the state court action had been terminated. Chapman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 531 Fed.Appx. 832, 833 (9th Cir.2013). Because the unlawful detainer claim had been dismissed before the case was remanded, the district court permissibly elected to reopen the proceedings pursuant to the panel’s instructions.

The panel’s ruling did not unlawfully authorize the district court to proceed with *639 the case. Although the “prior exclusive jurisdiction” doctrine mandates that a court abstain from exercising jurisdiction over in rem and quasi in rem actions when a different court has already exercised jurisdiction over a claim pertaining to the same res, the doctrine itself is prudential, not jurisdictional. See Sexton v. NDEX West, LLC, 713 F.3d 533, 536 n. 5 (9th Cir.2013). The district court correctly found that the statutory requirements for diversity jurisdiction were met at the time the claims were removed, and this court affirmed that determination. See Chapman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 651 F.3d 1039, 1045 n. 2 (9th Cir.2011) (per curiam). Once abstention was no longer mandated, the district court was free to exercise jurisdiction over the claims that were properly before it. See Sexton, 713 F.3d at 537.

2. Because the Chapmans have not challenged the merits of the district court’s order dismissing their claims, we need not address those issues here.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

1. The district court had jurisdiction to dismiss George and Brenda Chapman’s wrongful foreclosure and quiet title claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A panel of this court previously vacated the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over these claims because an unlawful detainer claim concerning the same res had been filed earlier and was pending in state court at the time of removal. See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311, 126 S.Ct. 1735, 164 L.Ed.2d 480 (2006). However, the panel also remanded the case to the district court with instructions that it could choose to proceed if the state court action had been terminated. Chapman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 531 Fed.Appx. 832, 833 (9th Cir.2013). Because the unlawful detainer claim had been dismissed before the case was remanded, the district court permissibly elected to reopen the proceedings pursuant to the panel’s instructions.

The panel’s ruling did not unlawfully authorize the district court to proceed with *639 the case. Although the “prior exclusive jurisdiction” doctrine mandates that a court abstain from exercising jurisdiction over in rem and quasi in rem actions when a different court has already exercised jurisdiction over a claim pertaining to the same res, the doctrine itself is prudential, not jurisdictional. See Sexton v. NDEX West, LLC, 713 F.3d 533, 536 n. 5 (9th Cir.2013). The district court correctly found that the statutory requirements for diversity jurisdiction were met at the time the claims were removed, and this court affirmed that determination. See Chapman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 651 F.3d 1039, 1045 n. 2 (9th Cir.2011) (per curiam). Once abstention was no longer mandated, the district court was free to exercise jurisdiction over the claims that were properly before it. See Sexton, 713 F.3d at 537.

2. Because the Chapmans have not challenged the merits of the district court’s order dismissing their claims, we need not address those issues here.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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649 F. App'x 638, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/george-chapman-jr-v-deutsche-bank-national-trust-ca9-2016.

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