George Berg v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMay 31, 2024
DocketCH-0714-20-0119-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of George Berg v. Department of Veterans Affairs (George Berg v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
George Berg v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

GEORGE BERG, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, CH-0714-20-0119-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: May 31, 2024 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Carson Bridges , Esquire, Dallas, Texas, for the appellant.

Gregory White , Detroit, Michigan, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which reversed the appellant’s removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to find on different grounds that the agency failed to prove its charges by substantial evidence, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW The appellant’s request for interim relief is denied. Under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A), an employee or applicant for employment who prevails in an appeal to the Board must be granted interim relief provided in the initial decision, if a petition for review of the initial decision is filed with the Board. However, the Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-41, §202(a), 131 Stat. 862, 869-73 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 714), provides that, from the date a covered individual appeals a removal taken under 38 U.S.C. § 714 until the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issues a final decision on the appeal, the individual “may not receive any pay, awards, bonuses, incentives, allowances, differentials, student loan repayments, special payments, or benefits related to the employment of the individual by the [agency].” 38 U.S.C. § 714(d) (7). The Board has held that 38 U.S.C. § 714(d)(7) controls in these types of cases and precludes an award of interim relief. Schmitt v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 40, ¶ 16. Additionally, the appellant’s arguments 3

in this regard are now moot, because interim relief would be in effect only pending the disposition of a petition for review. See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A); Garcia v. Department of State, 106 M.S.P.R. 583, ¶ 7 (2007). Accordingly, we deny the appellant’s request.

Legal standard under 38 U.S.C. § 714 Under 38 U.S.C. § 714(a), the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs may remove, demote, or suspend a covered employee upon the Secretary’s determination that the employee’s performance or misconduct warrants such removal. A covered employee may appeal a removal, demotion, or suspension of greater than 14 days to the Board. 38 U.S.C. § 714(c)(4)(A). The statute further provides that the administrative judge must sustain the agency’s decision to remove if it is supported by substantial evidence. See 38 U.S.C. § 714(d)(2)(A). The Board’s regulations define substantial evidence as the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person, considering the evidence as a whole, might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even though other reasonable persons might disagree. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(p). The statute further provides that, if the agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, the administrative judge may not mitigate the penalty. 38 U.S.C. 714(d)(2)(B). However, our reviewing court has clarified that section 714 nonetheless “requires the Board to review for substantial evidence the entirety of the [agency’s] decision—including the penalty—rather than merely confirming that the record contains substantial evidence that the alleged conduct actually occurred.” Sayers v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 954 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2020).

The administrative judge erred in considering the appellant’s due process claim in her analysis of the charges. It is well established that denial of constitutional due process is an affirmative defense for which the appellant bears the burden of proof. See, e.g., Mattison v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 492, ¶12 (2016) 4

(finding that the appellant failed to prove his due process affirmative defense); Hulett v. Department of the Navy, 120 M.S.P.R. 54, ¶¶ 10-11 (2013) (remanding for further adjudication of the appellant’s due process claim, including notice of his burden of proof); see also 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(C) (providing that the appellant bears the burden of proving affirmative defenses by a preponderance of the evidence). Hence, contrary to the analysis in the initial decision, the question of whether the agency denied the appellant due process is ordinarily distinct from the question of whether the agency met its burden of proving the charged misconduct. As discussed below, however, we find on other grounds that the agency failed to meet its burden of proving the charges by substantial evidence.

The agency failed to prove the charge of failure to follow purchase card requirements.

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George Berg v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/george-berg-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2024.