RENDERED: OCTOBER 31, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0566-MR
GEORGE BEASON, JR. APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JOHN D. SIMCOE, JUDGE ACTION NO. 11-CR-00474
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND A. JONES, JUDGES.
JONES, A., JUDGE: Acting without the assistance of counsel, George Beason
appeals from the Hardin Circuit Court’s order denying his motion for post-
conviction relief under CR1 60.02(d)-(f). Beason argues that his convictions are
void because of alleged irregularities in the 2011 grand-jury proceedings that led to
his indictment. Finding the motion untimely and procedurally barred, we affirm.
1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. I. BACKGROUND
In 2013, following a bench trial, the Hardin Circuit Court found
George Beason guilty of three counts of incest, one count of third-degree rape,
three counts of third-degree sodomy, four counts of first-degree sexual abuse, one
count of distribution of obscene material to a minor, and of being a second-degree
persistent felony offender. The court imposed a total sentence of seventy years’
imprisonment. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on direct
appeal. Beason v. Commonwealth, No. 2013-SC-000272-MR, 2015 WL 2266375
(Ky. May 14, 2015).
In 2016, Beason filed a motion for post-conviction relief under RCr2
11.42, raising, among other issues, alleged defects in his indictment. The circuit
court denied the motion, and Beason did not appeal.
No further action occurred until December 2023, when Beason filed
the present motion under CR 60.02(d)-(f), asserting that his indictment was void
because the grand jury allegedly returned “no true bills” on several incest counts.
The circuit court denied the motion without a hearing on May 3, 2024. This appeal
followed.
2 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure. -2- II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of an appeal involving a CR 60.02 motion is
whether the trial court abused its discretion. Hodge v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.3d
227, 229 (Ky. 2020); Meece v. Commonwealth, 529 S.W.3d 281, 285 (Ky. 2017).
“Whether a defendant is entitled to the extraordinary relief provided by CR 60.02
is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court, and the exercise of that
discretion will not be disturbed on appeal except for abuse.” Id. (quoting Brown v.
Commonwealth, 932 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Ky. 1996)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was
arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Foley v.
Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Ky. 2014) (citing Commonwealth v.
English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)).
A movant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a CR 60.02
motion unless he “affirmatively alleges facts which, if true, justify vacating the
judgment and further allege[s] special circumstances that justify CR 60.02 relief.”
White v. Commonwealth, 32 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Ky. App. 2000).
III. ANALYSIS
Kentucky law establishes an orderly and exclusive process for review
of criminal convictions. A defendant aggrieved by a judgment must first pursue a
direct appeal, raising every ground of error reasonably known at that time.
-3- Thereafter, while still in custody, he may seek collateral relief under RCr 11.42 for
any constitutional claims that were not and could not have been raised on direct
appeal. Once those avenues have been exhausted, a motion under CR 60.02
provides only a limited, residual remedy. Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d
853, 856-58 (Ky. 1983).
As the Court in Gross explained, this sequential process is the
exclusive method for a convicted defendant to challenge the judgment, designed to
ensure both efficiency and finality in criminal proceedings. Id. at 856.
Consequently, CR 60.02 cannot be used to relitigate matters previously determined
or those that could have been presented on direct appeal or in an RCr 11.42
motion. Foley, 425 S.W.3d at 886; Baze v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 761, 766
(Ky. 2008).
The rule’s narrow function is to bring before the court issues that
could not have been raised by any other procedure and which, if true, would render
the original judgment manifestly unjust. Halvorsen v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.3d
68, 73 (Ky. 2023). It is not a substitute for direct appeal or collateral review under
RCr 11.42, nor does it authorize repetitive or piecemeal litigation of known claims.
Foley, 425 S.W.3d at 886; Baze, 276 S.W.3d at 766.
This framework reflects a deliberate hierarchy: direct appeal addresses
ordinary trial error; RCr 11.42 provides a vehicle for constitutional challenges
-4- while a defendant remains in custody; and CR 60.02, invoked sparingly, preserves
the integrity of the judicial process only in extraordinary circumstances. The
orderly sequence preserves both fairness and finality, the cornerstones of
Kentucky’s post-conviction jurisprudence.
The circuit court denied Beason’s CR 60.02 motion on two
independent grounds: it was not filed within a reasonable time, and it sought to
relitigate issues that could have been raised earlier. Both determinations were
correct.
Beason sought post-conviction relief under CR 60.02(d), (e), and (f).
Those provisions permit a court to relieve a party from a final judgment on
grounds of “fraud affecting the proceedings, other than perjury or falsified
evidence” (d); because “the judgment is void” or “it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application” (e); or for “any other reason of an
extraordinary nature justifying relief” (f).
Although subsections (d) through (f) contain no fixed deadline, they
are still subject to the requirement that the motion be made within a reasonable
time. CR 60.02; Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 858. What constitutes a reasonable time
depends on the circumstances of each case, but delays of five years or more have
consistently been found excessive. Id.; Foley, 425 S.W.3d at 886.
-5- Beason’s motion was filed in December 2023—more than eleven
years after his conviction and nearly nine years after his direct appeal became final.
The circuit court correctly concluded that such a delay was unreasonable under the
rule and denied the motion on that basis. See Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 858 (five-year
delay untimely); Reyna v. Commonwealth, 217 S.W.3d 274, 276 (Ky. App. 2007)
(four-year delay within trial court’s discretion to deny).
The circuit court also properly found the motion procedurally barred.
CR 60.02 “is not intended to provide relief for grounds that could be attacked
through direct appeals or collateral motions such as grounds under RCr 11.42.”
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 31, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0566-MR
GEORGE BEASON, JR. APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JOHN D. SIMCOE, JUDGE ACTION NO. 11-CR-00474
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND A. JONES, JUDGES.
JONES, A., JUDGE: Acting without the assistance of counsel, George Beason
appeals from the Hardin Circuit Court’s order denying his motion for post-
conviction relief under CR1 60.02(d)-(f). Beason argues that his convictions are
void because of alleged irregularities in the 2011 grand-jury proceedings that led to
his indictment. Finding the motion untimely and procedurally barred, we affirm.
1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. I. BACKGROUND
In 2013, following a bench trial, the Hardin Circuit Court found
George Beason guilty of three counts of incest, one count of third-degree rape,
three counts of third-degree sodomy, four counts of first-degree sexual abuse, one
count of distribution of obscene material to a minor, and of being a second-degree
persistent felony offender. The court imposed a total sentence of seventy years’
imprisonment. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on direct
appeal. Beason v. Commonwealth, No. 2013-SC-000272-MR, 2015 WL 2266375
(Ky. May 14, 2015).
In 2016, Beason filed a motion for post-conviction relief under RCr2
11.42, raising, among other issues, alleged defects in his indictment. The circuit
court denied the motion, and Beason did not appeal.
No further action occurred until December 2023, when Beason filed
the present motion under CR 60.02(d)-(f), asserting that his indictment was void
because the grand jury allegedly returned “no true bills” on several incest counts.
The circuit court denied the motion without a hearing on May 3, 2024. This appeal
followed.
2 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure. -2- II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of an appeal involving a CR 60.02 motion is
whether the trial court abused its discretion. Hodge v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.3d
227, 229 (Ky. 2020); Meece v. Commonwealth, 529 S.W.3d 281, 285 (Ky. 2017).
“Whether a defendant is entitled to the extraordinary relief provided by CR 60.02
is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court, and the exercise of that
discretion will not be disturbed on appeal except for abuse.” Id. (quoting Brown v.
Commonwealth, 932 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Ky. 1996)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was
arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Foley v.
Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Ky. 2014) (citing Commonwealth v.
English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)).
A movant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a CR 60.02
motion unless he “affirmatively alleges facts which, if true, justify vacating the
judgment and further allege[s] special circumstances that justify CR 60.02 relief.”
White v. Commonwealth, 32 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Ky. App. 2000).
III. ANALYSIS
Kentucky law establishes an orderly and exclusive process for review
of criminal convictions. A defendant aggrieved by a judgment must first pursue a
direct appeal, raising every ground of error reasonably known at that time.
-3- Thereafter, while still in custody, he may seek collateral relief under RCr 11.42 for
any constitutional claims that were not and could not have been raised on direct
appeal. Once those avenues have been exhausted, a motion under CR 60.02
provides only a limited, residual remedy. Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d
853, 856-58 (Ky. 1983).
As the Court in Gross explained, this sequential process is the
exclusive method for a convicted defendant to challenge the judgment, designed to
ensure both efficiency and finality in criminal proceedings. Id. at 856.
Consequently, CR 60.02 cannot be used to relitigate matters previously determined
or those that could have been presented on direct appeal or in an RCr 11.42
motion. Foley, 425 S.W.3d at 886; Baze v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 761, 766
(Ky. 2008).
The rule’s narrow function is to bring before the court issues that
could not have been raised by any other procedure and which, if true, would render
the original judgment manifestly unjust. Halvorsen v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.3d
68, 73 (Ky. 2023). It is not a substitute for direct appeal or collateral review under
RCr 11.42, nor does it authorize repetitive or piecemeal litigation of known claims.
Foley, 425 S.W.3d at 886; Baze, 276 S.W.3d at 766.
This framework reflects a deliberate hierarchy: direct appeal addresses
ordinary trial error; RCr 11.42 provides a vehicle for constitutional challenges
-4- while a defendant remains in custody; and CR 60.02, invoked sparingly, preserves
the integrity of the judicial process only in extraordinary circumstances. The
orderly sequence preserves both fairness and finality, the cornerstones of
Kentucky’s post-conviction jurisprudence.
The circuit court denied Beason’s CR 60.02 motion on two
independent grounds: it was not filed within a reasonable time, and it sought to
relitigate issues that could have been raised earlier. Both determinations were
correct.
Beason sought post-conviction relief under CR 60.02(d), (e), and (f).
Those provisions permit a court to relieve a party from a final judgment on
grounds of “fraud affecting the proceedings, other than perjury or falsified
evidence” (d); because “the judgment is void” or “it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application” (e); or for “any other reason of an
extraordinary nature justifying relief” (f).
Although subsections (d) through (f) contain no fixed deadline, they
are still subject to the requirement that the motion be made within a reasonable
time. CR 60.02; Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 858. What constitutes a reasonable time
depends on the circumstances of each case, but delays of five years or more have
consistently been found excessive. Id.; Foley, 425 S.W.3d at 886.
-5- Beason’s motion was filed in December 2023—more than eleven
years after his conviction and nearly nine years after his direct appeal became final.
The circuit court correctly concluded that such a delay was unreasonable under the
rule and denied the motion on that basis. See Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 858 (five-year
delay untimely); Reyna v. Commonwealth, 217 S.W.3d 274, 276 (Ky. App. 2007)
(four-year delay within trial court’s discretion to deny).
The circuit court also properly found the motion procedurally barred.
CR 60.02 “is not intended to provide relief for grounds that could be attacked
through direct appeals or collateral motions such as grounds under RCr 11.42.”
Meece, 529 S.W.3d at 285 (emphasis omitted); Baze, 276 S.W.3d at 766. The
alleged irregularities in the grand-jury proceedings were apparent from the record
and could have been raised before trial or on direct appeal. Because CR 60.02 may
not be used as a substitute for ordinary appellate or collateral review, the trial court
acted within its discretion in denying relief on procedural grounds.
Finally, the circuit court did not err in denying Beason’s request for an
evidentiary hearing. Whether a motion under CR 60.02(d)-(f) was filed within a
reasonable time is a question committed to the trial court’s discretion, and a
hearing is unnecessary to make that determination. Stoker v. Commonwealth, 289
S.W.3d 592, 596 (Ky. App. 2009) (“An evidentiary hearing is not required to
assess the reasonable time restriction inherent in CR 60.02 motions as such is left
-6- to the discretion of the Court.”). Here, the record before the circuit court
conclusively supported its denial of relief without further proceedings.3
IV. CONCLUSION
Beason’s motion for relief under CR 60.02(d), (e), and (f) was filed well
beyond a reasonable time and sought to raise issues that could have been presented
before trial or on direct appeal. Because the rule is not a substitute for those prior
proceedings and because no jurisdictional defect or extraordinary circumstance is
shown, the Hardin Circuit Court acted within its discretion in denying relief.
Accordingly, the order of the Hardin Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
George Beason, Jr, pro se Russell Coleman LaGrange, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Ken W. Riggs Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
3 Beason’s contention that his judgment is “void” is without merit. A judgment is void only when the court lacked jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter, or when it was entered in a manner inconsistent with due process. Baze, 276 S.W.3d at 766. Alleged irregularities in grand- jury proceedings, even if true, do not divest a circuit court of jurisdiction once an indictment has been returned. Foley, 425 S.W.3d at 886. At most, such claims involve trial error that could have been raised before trial or on direct appeal and do not render the judgment void. -7-